The Diplomat » Security

U.S., China’s Clashing Korea Dreams

diplomat_admin — Wed, 23 May 2012 22:38:14 +0000

A month after North Korea's failed attempt to launch a satellite, and there are further signs that the country is continuing to make preparations for what would be its third nuclear test. This comes despite repeated warnings against any further provocative actions from the United States, Japan and South Korea. The problem is that, rightly or wrongly, Pyongyang appears to assume that it can count on the support of its traditional ally China. It’s a mindset that means the Kim Jong-un regime is unlikely to be deterred from its current course.

It’s true that China went along with the United States last month in adopting a U.N. Security Council resolution censuring North Korea over its violation of an earlier resolution prohibiting the country from testing long-range missiles. Yet many remain doubtful whether Beijing would ever actually take the kind of substantive action that might hurt its client state.

Why? Essentially because China’s strategic priorities on the Korean Peninsula and in East Asia are simply very different from those of the United States, Japan and South Korea. This was evident at a meeting of the leaders of China, Japan and South Korea in Beijing this month. The three countries agreed during talks that they couldn’t accept North Korean provocations. However, reportedly at China’s request, the joint declaration on “Enhancement of Trilateral Comprehensive Cooperative Partnership” omitted any explicit reference to Pyongyang’s actions.

This omission came despite the clear calls of the Japanese and South Korean leaders on North Korea to rein in its behavior. Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda, for example, reportedly argued that “the international community must unite to show North Korea its firm commitment” to preventing Pyongyang’s further provocations. Similarly, South Korean President Lee Myung-bak insisted the joint declaration should urge Pyongyang to exercise self-restraint and not to carry out a nuclear test or other provocative actions. The Chinese leadership, though, nixed such language from the declaration.

The summit made clear that although China pays lip service to stability on the Korean Peninsula, repeating as it did its commitment to “realizing a peaceful, stable and prosperous East Asia” and “enhancing mutual political trust,” the reality is that China’s words are sounding increasingly hollow.

But it’s not just the Japanese and South Korean leaderships that have been destined to be disappointed by Beijing’s stance. Back in March, U.S. President Barack Obama met with Hu in Seoul when world leaders gathered for the nuclear summit. During a 90-minute talk, Obama is said to have pressed Hu to use all instruments of power to rein in Pyongyang and encourage it to scrap its plan to launch a satellite the following month.

A Flicker of Optimism on Iran

Robert Dreyfuss — Wed, 23 May 2012 12:22:09 +0000

There’s a flicker of optimism about the May 23 talks in Baghdad between Iran, the P5+1 world powers, and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) over Iran’s nuclear program. A tentative accord between Iran and the IAEA, reached in Tehran on Tuesday between Yukiya Amano of the IAEA and Saeed Jalili, Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator, bolstered optimism on the eve of the Baghdad meeting.

However, even if doesn’t stall, the process of solving the standoff over Iran’s program has a long way to go. At best, say analysts in Washington, the most that can be achieved this week is a confidence-building, interim accord that keeps the talks rolling and, perhaps, sets up task forces involving technical experts to work out details of a broader accord. Amano, in his meeting with Jalili, suggested that the two men may have agreed on a step-by-step process in what the IAEA chief called a “structured” framework. “The decision was made by me and Mr. Jalili to reach agreement on the structured approach,” he said. Whether that agreement can be finalized, and what effect it might have on much thornier issues involving whether or not Iran will be allowed to continue to enrich uranium and what will happen in regard to economic sanctions that have been imposed on Iran, is yet to be determined.

The Baghdad talks are a follow-up to talks held April 13-14 in Istanbul, which were the first substantial talks between the two sides in more than two years. And at least one retired, senior American diplomat reacted positively. “For the first time in 32 years, since the Iranian revolution, there is the possibility of serious, substantive and sustained talks with Iran,” said Nicholas Burns, who served as deputy secretary of state during the administration of George W. Bush.

But, analysts point out, “sustained” talks mean that the negotiations are likely to go on for quite some time, likely well into 2013.

In order for the talks to succeed, both Iran and the United States will have to make substantial concessions.

Dennis Ross, who until earlier this year served as President Obama’s chief adviser on Iran, told reporters in a conference call on May 22 that he could envision an agreement that allows Iran to continue to enrich uranium but limits it in a way that would preclude Iran from developing a nuclear weapon, by proscribing the number of centrifuges Iran can operate, the amount of low-enriched uranium it can amass, the purity of that enriched uranium. However, he said, so far the Obama administration hasn’t accepted that principle. Even so, said Ross, if an accord can be reached that allows Iran to maintain a civilian nuclear program, including enrichment, and can construct a firewall against militarization of that program, even in an election year, “You would go for it.” He added, “I’m not persuaded that just because it’s an election year, it’s impossible to reach an agreement.”

Why Asia Wants America

diplomat_admin — Mon, 21 May 2012 22:26:57 +0000

I met this month with a business delegation from Malaysia, and one of them said to me: “Senator McCain, when we look at America these days, you seem totally dysfunctional. Your political system seems incapable of making the basic decisions to fix your fiscal problems and project resolve to the world.” And by the way, he said, “some in Asia are citing these failings to undermine the confidence that your friends still have in you.” I couldn’t disagree with him.

This is an enormous problem. And it raises doubts about our commitment in the Asia-Pacific region. While it’s wrong to speak of a “pivot” to Asia, the idea that we must rebalance U.S. foreign policy with an increasing emphasis on the Asia-Pacific region is undoubtedly correct. The core challenge we face is how to make this rebalancing effort meaningful, because at the moment, amid all of our political and fiscal problems, we run the risk of over-promising and under-delivering on our renewed commitment across the Pacific.

It’s difficult to overstate the gravity of the choices before us right now. We face immediate decisions that will determine the vector of American power in the Asia-Pacific region – diplomatically, economically, and militarily – for decades to come. We have to get our bearings right. If we fail, we’ll drift off course and fall behind. However, if we get these big decisions right, we can create the enduring conditions to expand the supply of American power, to strengthen American leadership, and to secure America’s national interests across the Pacific.

After all, while the context in Asia is changing, U.S. interests in Asia have not. We still seek the same objectives we always have: the ability to prevent, deter, and if necessary, prevail in a conflict; the defense of U.S. allies; the extension of free trade, free markets, free navigation, and free commons in air, sea, space, and now cyber. And above all, the maintenance of a balance of power that fosters the peaceful expansion of human rights, democracy, rule of law, and the many other values that we share with increasing numbers of Asian citizens.

None of these interests is directed against any other country, including China. The continued peaceful development of China is in our interest. We reject the notion that the United States wants to contain China or that we seek a new Cold War in Asia, where countries are forced to choose between the United States and China.

In short, the question we must answer is: Can we in the United States make the big strategic decisions right now that will position us for long-term success in Asia?

One of those big decisions pertains to trade. It’s often said that the business of Asia is business, but when it comes to trade, the United States has been sitting on the sidelines, and Asia is sprinting forward without us. After four years, this administration still hasn’t concluded or ratified a single free trade agreement of its own making. It took them until last year just to pass the FTAs with Korea, Colombia, and Panama that the Bush administration had concluded. Meanwhile, since 2003, China has secured nine FTAs in Asia and Latin America alone. It’s negotiating five more, and it has four others under consideration.

And it isn’t just China. The Japanese prime minister announced this month that he wants Japan to begin negotiations on a free trade area with China and South Korea. India is now negotiating an FTA with the European Union. And yet, we won’t even conclude a narrower Bilateral Investment Treaty with India, let alone a full FTA, as we should. As of last year, one report found that Asian countries had concluded or were negotiating nearly 300 trade agreements – none of which included the United States of America. The launch of the Trans-Pacific Partnership has brightened this picture a bit, but a deal may be years off – if it happens at all.

Instead, we should be moving forward with a bilateral trade agenda, starting with India and Taiwan. We should also move more aggressively on a multilateral track. The Trans-Pacific Partnership splits the ASEAN countries. We either need to bring all of the ASEAN countries into the Trans-Pacific Partnership or push for a formal U.S.-ASEAN free trade agreement. The bottom line is that U.S. long-term strategic and economic success requires an ambitious trade strategy in Asia.

A second decision with enormous implications is our regional force posture. We all share the same goals – strengthening the U.S.-Japan alliance, while maintaining our strategic commitments in the Asia-Pacific region through a robust presence of forward-deployed military forces. Like many of you, however, some of us on the Senate Armed Services Committee were critical of the previous plan to realign U.S. forces on Okinawa and Guam, which had become totally unaffordable. The costs of the Guam move alone had doubled in seven years to more than $20 billion.

China’s Small Stick Diplomacy

James R. Holmes — Sun, 20 May 2012 15:32:25 +0000

It seems everything old is new again. My (online) colleague Jens Kastner published an important article in Asia Times this week, detailing how Beijing enlists fishermen as an arm of its maritime strategy. His story will strike a familiar chord with any U.S. Navy sailor of a certain age. During the Cold War it was hard for an American task force of any consequence to leave port without a Soviet “AGI” in trail. These souped-up fishing trawlers would shadow U.S. task forces, joining up just outside U.S. territorial waters. So ubiquitous were they that naval officers joked about assigning the AGI a station in the formation, letting it follow along – as it would anyway – without obstructing fleet operations.

AGIs were configured not just to cast nets, but to track ship movements, gather electronic intelligence, and observe the tactics, techniques, and procedures by which American fleets transact business in great waters. Few seafaring nations use nonmilitary assets that way. Wielded deftly, though, they can play a vital part in sea power, broadly construed as encompassing not only government but commercial shipping, and not only navy personnel but private mariners. Maritime strategy is about more than navies. It’s about using all implements available to governments – sea- and land-based, public and private – to shape events at sea.

AGIs were mainly passive platforms sent to watch, listen, and report. While intelligence collection is part of Chinese fishing vessels’ job description as well, Beijing entrusts more active duties to these small craft. They can discharge combat missions. Some of them can lay or clear sea mines, for example. Or, as Naval War College professor Peter Dutton put it in another context, the fishing fleet is an unofficial maritime auxiliary that Beijing can deploy to stoke “managed confrontation” with neighbors whose seaborne interests contradict China’s. Kastner portrays it as a stick with which the Chinese government can stir up maritime Asia at opportune moments, whether to solidify its claims to contested islands and seas, appease a restive populace at home, or support a cross-strait offensive against Taiwan.

Japan, the Philippines, and other claimants to waters and soil China considers its historic patrimony constitute special targets for managed confrontation. Fishing boats have been in the thick of such scuffles as the war of words that ensued in 2010 after the Japan Coast Guard apprehended a Chinese fishing boat near the Senkaku/Diaoyutai islets. Fishermen have been at the vanguard of Chinese policy in the ongoing impasse with the Philippines at Scarborough Shoal, an atoll west of Luzon. Does Beijing control the whereabouts and actions of fishing boats directly? It’s not entirely clear, and Chinese diplomats aren’t saying. There must be some mix between conscious action and opportunism. While they may or may not exercise operational command over a given boat, Chinese officials can certainly encourage its skipper to ply his trade in disputed water – and respond if he runs into trouble.

If a foreign coast guard or navy tries to shoo Chinese boats away, Beijing gains plausible grounds to act. It can intervene diplomatically on Chinese nationals’ behalf, as in the Senkakus in late 2010. Or nonmilitary maritime services like China Maritime Surveillance can dispatch assets to protect the fishermen, as at Scarborough Shoal. Call it gunboat diplomacy without the guns – or at least without an open display of guns. The People’s Liberation Army is the unseen adjunct to Chinese nautical diplomacy. Military power held in reserve represents an enormous Chinese advantage, especially when the opponent is as completely outmatched as the Philippines.

Air Power Key to U.S. Asia Goals

diplomat_admin — Sat, 19 May 2012 14:37:40 +0000

The United States has refocused its strategic priorities in an oft-talked about “Pivot to Asia” and has made a deliberate decision in new defense strategic guidance not to size the military for large scale counter-insurgency operations, but instead to posture to deter conflict in Asia where there is a clear anti-access, area-denial threat. Such a shift has implications and raises questions about the appropriateness of retaining force structure and concepts developed for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan across all the military services.

Since fiscal reality dictates that the United States must downsize its military and focus on a more limited set of priorities, is it appropriate for the United States Air Force to create and sustain an institutional irregular warfare capability?

If the key strategic pre-occupation of the United States in the forthcoming decades is maintaining a force posture credible to defeating aggression on the high-end of the spectrum in Asia, what is the place of irregular warfare?

And what are the changes required to make the fundamental components of Air Force irregular warfare – air advising, air diplomacy and aviation enterprise development – more aligned with larger U.S. strategies?

An institutional Air Force irregular warfare capability directly supports U.S. foreign policy objectives in the Asia-Pacific and represents an asymmetric strength the envy of our competitors. Institutionalization of USAF irregular warfare capability is important, because it supplies exactly the sort of “low-cost, innovative” strategies called for in the defense strategic guidance and provides a tool to address the larger deeper problem: shaping the conditions for continued advantage.

America’s problem in Asia is more than just maintaining a favorable balance of military power. Such a balance is certainly critical to regional stability and global security. Asia is, after all, the heart of the global economic engine of growth, and it is U.S. military strength that ensures customary freedom of navigation in the global commons and deters newly powerful states from using force to settle conflicting claims. Asian states appreciate the positive historic role the United States has played over the past 50 years, but some hand wring about the ability of the U.S. to continue to play that role. While the importance of maintaining military balance is undeniable, the larger challenge is a competition for leadership, legitimacy and influence. Legitimacy is dependent on the actions available to the U.S. to continue to be perceived as present, committed and the security partner of choice.

The great military theorist Carl von Clausewitz enjoined that “war is politics by other means.” But the strategic competition in Asia, if well managed, is likely to be one of posture and deterrence rather than war. Rather, the United States might instead consider the rejoinder of China’s first premier, Zhou Enlai, that “All diplomacy is a continuation of war by other means,” and realize that the strategic competition between great powers takes place against a backdrop where competing interests struggle for influence and legitimacy within their own states; the realm of irregular warfare.

According to Joint Publication 1, Doctrine of the Armed Forces of the United States, irregular warfare is a “struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s). IW favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capacities in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will.”

And Asia – Southeast Asia, South Asia, North Asia, and Central Asia – all feature non-state actors who seek to erode the legitimacy of various states. Each of those should be considered dangers and opportunities to U.S. and global security. Any such conflict could flare into a crisis, triggering instability that undermines the global economic system or presenting the threat of a failed state with all its attendant costs to blood and treasure. Such internal conflicts can be used by one power against another to distract, entangle and undermine the stability of their partners. Each internal conflict creates an opportunity for a “preferred security partner” to fill a vacuum, and provide critical opportunities that build sympathy and lay the groundwork for access.

All the great powers seem to understand that the game in Asia is about more than just deterrence, but influence. Take for example the recent piece by Yan Xuetong titled “How China Can Defeat America” where he the author states:

“To shape a friendly international environment for its rise, Beijing needs to develop more high-quality diplomatic and military relationships than Washington. No leading power is able to have friendly relations with every country in the world, thus the core of competition between China and the United States will be to see who has more high-quality friends. And in order to achieve that goal, China has to provide higher-quality moral leadership than the United States. China must also recognize that it is a rising power and assume the responsibilities that come with that status. For example, when it comes to providing protection for weaker powers, as the United States has done in Europe and the Persian Gulf, China needs to create additional regional security arrangements.”

Japan’s Persistent “Ameriphobia”

diplomat_admin — Thu, 17 May 2012 21:50:31 +0000

Earlier this week, Okinawa Prefecture marked the 40th anniversary of its reversion to Japanese sovereignty following U.S. occupation. Yet four decades on, and the future of Japan’s southernmost prefecture remains uncertain, with slow progress on key issues. For Okinawans, the harsh reality is that they are still living on occupied territory.

Despite the 1972 transfer, U.S. military bases still occupy almost a fifth of the main Okinawa island, while 75 percent of all U.S. bases in Japan are concentrated in Okinawa.

For the central government and the U.S. at least, progress seemed to have been made last month on the question of the future of U.S. forces in Japan. Under a new agreement, the U.S. and Japanese governments decided to stick to an existing plan to relocate the controversial U.S. Marine Corps Air Station in Futenma to Henoko, Nago, in northern Okinawa by constructing a new sea-based replacement facility off Camp Schwab.

But the deal, which includes the transfer of about 9,000 troops and their dependents to U.S. Pacific territory of Guam, has left many Okinawans cold.For a start the United States is reportedly planning to deploy the MV-22 Osprey vertical take-off and landing transport aircraft to Futenma, in what is an already built-up area, in July. In addition to longstanding concerns over crime, locals also point to concerns over safety and noise pollution from aircraft. Such concerns have only been compounded by a series of accidents involving the Osprey during its development. Indeed, only last month, a Marine Corps MV-22 Osprey crashed in Morocco, sparking further safety concerns.

Today’s problems are rooted in a deal reached during the U.S. occupation following Japan’s defeat in World War II, when Emperor Hirohito suggested to U.S. Gen. Douglas MacArthur, then the post-surrender potentate in Tokyo and protector of the Japanese monarchy, that the U.S. continue occupying Okinawa and other islands in the Ryukyu chain in exchange for keeping the imperial system intact.

MacArthur saw limited Japanese opposition to the U.S. retaining Okinawa because “the Okinawans are not Japanese.” Hirohito's Okinawa message, and MacArthur's willingness to retain Okinawa, underscored the reality that the islands were being sacrificed for the purpose of defending the traditional national polity.

But since Hirohito’s death in 1989, his thinking on Okinawa has remained deeply embedded in the minds of mainstream conservative political elites, bureaucrats and politicians in Tokyo, including in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which is often criticized as being subservient to U.S. diplomacy.

Why Philippines Stands Up to China

James R. Holmes — Sun, 13 May 2012 23:02:27 +0000

Last month, I wrote a column for Global Times in which I observed that a dominant Chinese Navy lets China’s leadership deploy unarmed surveillance and law-enforcement vessels as it implements policy in the ongoing stand off at Scarborough Shoal. It can flourish a small, unprovocative seeming stick while holding the big stick – overwhelming naval firepower, and thus the option of escalating – in reserve.

That, I wrote, translates into “virtual coercion and deterrence” vis-à-vis lesser Asian powers. If weak states defy Beijing, they know what may come next. Global Times readers evidently interpreted this as my prophesying that Southeast Asian states will despair at the hopeless military mismatch in the South China Sea – and give in automatically and quickly during controversies like Scarborough Shoal.

Not so. Diplomacy and war are interactive enterprises. Both sides – not just the strong – get a vote. Manila refuses to vote Beijing’s way.

Military supremacy is no guarantee of victory in wartime, let alone in peacetime controversies. The strong boast advantages that bias the competition in their favor. But the weak still have options. Manila can hope to offset Beijing’s advantages, and it has every reason to try. Sounds familiar, doesn’t it? China has been the weaker belligerent in every armed clash since the 19th century Opium Wars. It nevertheless came out on top in the most important struggles.

That the weak can vanquish the strong is an idea with a long pedigree. Roman dictator Quintus Fabius fought Hannibal – one of history’s foremost masters of war – to a standstill precisely by refusing to fight a decisive battle. Demurring let Fabius – celebrated as “the Delayer” – marshal inexhaustible resources and manpower against Carthaginian invaders waging war on Rome’s turf.

Fabius bided his time until an opportune moment. Then he struck.

Similarly, sea power theorist Sir Julian Corbett advised naval commanders to wage “active defense” in unfavorable circumstances. Commanders of an outmatched fleet could play a Fabian waiting game, lurking near the stronger enemy fleet yet declining battle. In the meantime they could bring in reinforcements, seek alliances with friendly naval powers, or deploy various stratagems to wear down the enemy’s strength. Ultimately they might reverse the naval balance, letting them risk a sea fight – and win.

Victory through delay represents time-honored Chinese practice. Mao Zedong built his concept of protracted war on stalling tactics, and, like Corbett, he dubbed his strategic vision “active defense.” For both theorists, active defense was about prolonging wars to outlast temporarily superior opponents.

Mao pointed out that China boasted innate advantages over the Japanese Army that occupied Manchuria and much of China during the 1930s. It merely needed time to convert latent power – abundant natural resources and manpower in particular – into usable military power. Mao’s Red Army later overcame stronger Nationalist forces by winning over popular support, and with it the opportunity to tap resources, establish base areas in the countryside, and the like.

Good things came to those who waited.

So there’s some precedent for Philippine leaders to hope for diplomatic success at Scarborough Shoal. The Philippine military is a trivial force with little chance of winning a steel-on-steel fight. But like lesser powers of the past, Manila can appeal to law, to justice, and to powerful outsiders capable of tilting the balance its way. Sure enough, Philippine officials have advocated submitting the dispute to the Law of the Sea Tribunal and invoked a longstanding U.S.-Philippine mutual defense pact.

Despite all of this, the deck remains heavily stacked against Manila. Why persevere in defying China, with its overwhelming physical might? Thucydides would salute the Filipinos’ pluck. The Greek historian chronicled the Peloponnesian War, the protracted 5th century BC struggle between Athens and Sparta. One of Thucydides’ best-known precepts is that “fear, honor, and interest” represent “three of the strongest motives” driving societies’ actions.

In one infamous episode, Athenian emissaries inform the leaders of Melos, a small island state, that “the strong do as they will and the weak suffer what they must” when their interests collide. They demand submission. The Melians balk, but have no hope of help from Sparta or any other rescuer. When they remain defiant anyway, the Athenians put the men to the sword while enslaving the women and children.

Fear, honor, and interest animate small states like Melos and the Philippines as much as they do superpowers like Athens and China. Maritime claims are a matter of self-interest for Filipinos. They are also a matter of honor. Beijing can't expect Manila to simply tally up the balance of forces, acknowledge it faces a hopeless mismatch, and buckle. Philippine leaders can solicit foreign support, and they know Beijing has no Melian option.

Why admit defeat prematurely, any more than Fabius or Mao did?

James Holmes is an associate professor of strategy at the US Naval War College. The views voiced here are his alone.

Israel’s Reluctant Friend

diplomat_admin — Sat, 12 May 2012 00:35:09 +0000

A new and perhaps surprising country took center stage recently in the ongoing row over Iran’s nuclear program – Azerbaijan. Citing anonymous “high-level sources” from U.S. diplomatic and intelligence circles, a controversial article in Foreign Policy at the end of March suggested the possibility that Israel might have been proffered the use of Azerbaijani airstrips for any strikes against Iran’s nuclear facilities.

The article attracted impassioned rebuttals from officials and observers alike. But the question remains: how did Azerbaijan get sucked into the controversy over Tehran’s nuclear plans in the first place?

Azerbaijan’s relations with Israel developed in earnest 20 years ago, and have grown significantly in depth and scope ever since. With bilateral trade currently hovering around $4 billion, Azerbaijan is Israel’s top trading partner among Muslim states, and the second largest source of Israel’s oil after Russia.

Conversely, Israel represents Azerbaijan’s second largest oil customer, and via the Ashkelon-Eilat Trans-Israel Pipeline, a crucial transit point for Azeri oil flowing to Asia’s growing markets. Israeli companies have also made no secret of their stake in the country’s other key, non-energy sectors, including agriculture and communications. However, it’s the military-defense aspect of bilateral cooperation that has kept Iran on its toes of late.

Israel began modernizing Azerbaijan’s ragtag army after its six year, undeclared war with Armenia led to the loss of the Nagorno-Karabakh enclave and seven neighboring districts. On February 26 of this year, Baku and Tel Aviv inked the latest in a series of arms deals, this time to the tune of $1.6 billion, on the basis of which Israel Aerospace Industries would supply Heron and Searcher drones, anti-aircraft and missile defense systems over the coming months and perhaps years.

This closeness represents everything that relations between Iran and Azerbaijan ought to have been right from the start, given both nations’ deep historical ties. Azerbaijan was a Persian satrapy under the Achaemenid, the Parthian and the Sassanian empires, and the Shiite Safavids credited for laying the foundations of modern Iran were mainly ethnic Azeris, a sub-branch of the Turkic peoples. Only after Iran was twice defeated by the Russians in the 19th century was it obliged to renounce the half of the Azeri homeland located north of the river Araxes.

This disjuncture largely stems from the overwhelming secularism brought on by 71 years of Soviet rule (1920-1991) and Azerbaijan’s palpably pro-West, pan-Turkic and anti-Iranian outlook, especially under former President Abulfaz Elçibey and his Popular Front Party of Azerbaijan, a factor that prompted Iran to support Christian Armenia during the Nagorno-Karabakh war.

South of the Araxes, Tehran remains acutely sensitive to potential Azeri irredentism stoked by the existence of independent Azerbaijan, despite the fact that its own Azeris – a fifth to a quarter of all Iranians including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei (who is half-Azeri) – are generally well integrated.

Baku has for its part accused Iran of supporting radical Shiite elements, including the now outlawed Islamic Party of Azerbaijan, as well as the Talysh ethnic minority inhabiting the border areas. Nationalist rhetoric has also sharpened with calls for the country to be rechristened “North Azerbaijan” as opposed to what some view as the “occupied” South.

Both Israel and Iran have repeatedly accused each other of using Azeri territory as a base for covert operations, and the Azeri authorities haven’t held back from publicly linking a number of locally arrested individuals with Iranian intelligence.

All this suggests that an Israeli “staging ground” may not be that farfetched, despite a 2005 Baku-Tehran non-aggression pact and official insistence – most recently by President Ilham Aliyev during a cabinet meeting – that Azerbaijan would never allow its territory to be used against its neighbors.

However, while Azerbaijan is eminently suited to Israeli interests, the costs of a potential Iranian backlash toward Baku are unbearable for three key reasons.

The Indian Navy’s Big Ambitions

diplomat_admin — Thu, 10 May 2012 03:14:58 +0000

Two unrelated but important developments late last month highlighted the strides the Indian Navy is taking against a backdrop of a significant expansion aimed at meeting emerging maritime security challenges in the Indian Ocean region.

On April 27, a stealth frigate, the INS Teg, was commissioned in Russia. Three days later, India’s latest naval base, INS Dweeprakshak (Island Protector) was put into operation at Kavaratti in Lakshadweep, a tiny island chain southwest of India’s southernmost tip. Although, India had had a small presence on the strategically important island chain for the past decade, the Navy’s decision to open a permanent base was prompted by nearby recent incidents of piracy. Indeed, the Navy has in recent years captured scores of pirates and foiled several attacks.

“The Indian Navy has been operating a detachment at Kavaratti since the early1980s,” the Navy said in a statement. “With the commissioning of INS Dweeprakshak, the island territories would see calibrated strengthening of assets in step with their growing relevance to the security calculus of the nation. A firmer footing in the islands, which are spread out astride some of the busiest shipping lanes in the world, would provide the necessary wherewithal to the Indian Navy to discharge its responsibilities suitably.”

The establishment of the base is in keeping with an announcement made by Chief of Naval Staff Adm. Nirmal Verma at the end of last year, in which he noted that the Navy is also in the process of setting up so-called operational turnaround bases, forward operating bases and naval air enclaves along the coast with a view towards enhancing India’s surveillance efforts in the region.

“In 2011, the Navy has provided a renewed impetus and focus towards creation of operational and administrative infrastructure in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands and the Lakshadweep and Minicoy Islands,” Verma noted in December. “These islands are the country’s strategic outposts and augmentation of the facilities will enhance our reach and enable extended presence in the area.”

But it’s the INS Teg that gathered many of the headlines. The Teg will be followed by two more such stealth ships, to be inducted early next year. The 125 meter frigate displaces 4,000 tons and includes the BrahMos surface-to-surface missile system, a surface-to-air missile system, torpedo tubes and anti-submarine rockets. With its advanced weapons suite and sensors fully integrated with its combat management system, the ship is, in the Navy’s words, “well suited to undertake a broad spectrum of maritime missions.”

The commissioning of the Teg and the opening of a new naval base within days of each other, although technically unrelated, highlight the Indian Navy’s growing footprint in its broader area of influence, and its determination to boost its capabilities – especially in light of the recent stinging criticism of the military’s readiness dished out by the country’s army chief, Gen. V.K. Singh. The development of the Navy is seen as necessary to fulfill two roles: giving the country a blue water capability, while allowing it to effectively counter threats closer to its own shores.

Why the U.S. Wants a New Bomber

David Axe — Sun, 06 May 2012 01:49:09 +0000

The U.S. Air Force has struggled for years to develop a new long-range bomber to complement its existing fleet of B-52, B-1 and B-2 bombers dating from the 1960s, ’80s and ’90s, respectively.

The rise of China as a regional power compelled the Air Force, in 2006, to begin design work on a radar-evading “stealth” bomber capable of striking heavily-defended targets within the Chinese heartland from secure American bases in the Pacific. But the basic design of the so-called “Next-Generation Bomber” grew increasingly complex and potentially expensive – reportedly billions of dollars per copy. In 2009, then-U.S. Secretary Robert Gates cancelled the Next-Generation Bomber.

But the Air Force revived its bomber effort under new Defense Secretary Leon Panetta. The new “Long-Range Strike Bomber” would be slightly less sophisticated and therefore cheaper than the Next-Generation Bomber: just $550 million per copy for up to 100 copies, with production beginning in the early 2020s. The U.S. Congress approved the first $300 million in development funding late last year. The Pentagon has vowed to cancel the Long-Range Strike Bomber if the total projected program cost exceeds $55 billion. Lockheed Martin, Boeing and Northrop Grumman will compete for the contract, details of which are a closely guarded secret.

One man has played a central role in building the case for the new bomber. David Deptula retired from the Air Force as a lieutenant general in 2010. In 36 years of service, he flew F-15 fighters, helped plan the air war over Afghanistan in 2001 – including long-range strikes by B-2 bombers – and later oversaw Pacific bomber operations. In a landmark 2004 exercise organized in part by Deptula, B-52s flying from the U.S. struck and sank a decommissioned U.S. Navy ship using “smart” guided weapons. In retirement, Deptula has continued advocating for bombers.

The Diplomat asked Deptula about the need for the bomber, the risks to the program and the technologies that could be included.

Why now? Why, during a period of defense cutbacks, is the Pentagon so determined to build a new bomber? What changed to make the bomber such a high priority?

Broadly speaking, nothing has changed; the need for a new bomber is not “new.” The 2001 [Quadrennial Defense Review] noted the challenges to American power projection that included: the potential for a surprise attack that would prevent U.S. forces from deploying to trouble spots in a timely manner; the dearth of viable U.S. bases within range of likely trouble spots in Asia; and the emergence of “anti-access” capabilities that could deny the U.S. access to overseas bases, airfields and ports.

Furthermore, some potential opponents have great strategic depth within which to hide mobile anti-access systems. To counter this, the 2001 QDR said we should develop and acquire “robust capabilities to conduct persistent surveillance, precision strike and maneuver at varying depths within denied areas” – what is this but a new stealth bomber?

The 2006 QDR restated these challenges to power projection and specifically called for the U.S. to “develop a new land-based, penetrating long-range strike capability to be fielded by 2018 while modernizing the current bomber force.” The 2010 QDR called for an expansion of the nation’s long-range strike capabilities, to include options for “fielding survivable, long-range surveillance and strike aircraft as part of a comprehensive, phased plan to modernize the bomber force.”

The January 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance was consistent with [Department of Defense] logic going back 12 years, during which two presidents and three [secretaries of defense] have deemed a new bomber necessary. The guidance again noted the challenges that time, distance and anti-access threats represent to American power projection – certainly, the strategic environment has not become more benign since 2001. The guidance renewed the call for the development of a stealth bomber in order to overcome these challenges.