The Diplomat » Southeast Asia

Justice in the Philippines

diplomat_admin — Mon, 21 May 2012 16:59:07 +0000

A poster at the Paranaque city hall in Manila reads “Uphold Judicial Independence,” claiming that the rights of Chief Justice Renato Corona are being trampled by the Philippine government and suggesting that rule of law in the almost 100 million population, 7,000 island nation is at risk.

It sounds reasonable – after all, even hardened autocrats pay lip service to lofty abstractions like “rule-of-law.” But the chief justice in question is in the midst of an impeachment trial for abuse of office, and was a so-called midnight appointment by former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, taking up his post two days before she stepped down and Benigno “Noynoy” Aquino III won a May 2010 election, partly on a platform of rule-of-law reform and curbing graft.

When the Aquino government sought to stop Arroyo – who is herself accused of corruption and rigging elections – from traveling abroad for medical treatment for what she claims is a life-threatening bone illness, the courts intervened and sought to overrule the government travel ban on the former president, who is now a heavily bandaged congress representative for Pampanga in central Luzon.

That the Supreme Court decided to break up an Aquino family plantation called Hacienda Luisita, 60 miles north of Manila – and distribute almost 11,000 acres of land to more than 6,000 farm workers – only adds to the intrigue in a country where calls for land reform have long gone unheeded by powerful landed aristocrats.

But Aquino’s media team has been keen to dismiss any link to the impeachment, and media secretary Ricky Carandang said that “we were in favor of the redistribution and supported the decision,” during an interview on Thursday at Manila’s Malacanang Palace.

Similarly, when asked whether the case against Corona was merely part of a broader factional arm wrestle, presidential spokesperson Edwin Lacierda said that “this is in fact about our commitment to hold all officials accountable, and is not about attacking the judiciary.”

If a trial enmeshed in dynastic intrigue and possible score settling wasn’t compelling enough, earlier this month, the defense had ombudsman Conchita Carpio-Morales testify in an attempt to clear Corona of allegations he held secret bank accounts. But that backfired spectacularly, when the ombudsman instead alleged that the chief justice had more than $28million dollars in 82 different accounts.

“We are giving them just enough rope to hang themselves,” said Edsal Tupaz, a lawyer working for the prosecution. He asserted that ombudsman Corona’s revelations were “a game changer.” But on Tuesday, the chief justice will testify, and his defense team said Friday that it has evidence to refute some of the allegations against Corona.

Journalist and academic Luis Teodoro cautions that the Philippine legal system has major weaknesses. “One of the problems in this country is that it’s difficult to prove a lot of things,” he says, a reminder perhaps that neither defense nor prosecution can take anything for granted in this case.

Back at the Paranaque city hall, a few doors down from the poster backing the chief justice, another hearing was taking place – this time for a murder case from one of Manila’s slums, a reminder of how the country’s legal system works for the tens of millions of Filipinos living on the breadline.

*Roger Buendia was 17 when the alleged crime took place, and though kept in a youth detention center, this was in the same building as adult criminals. “The place was filthy and when it rained the floor welled-up with water and we couldn’t sleep,” he says. That was the least of his worries, however.

NGO Preda assists minors in detention in the Philippines, helping them pass at least some of their sentences at Preda centers outside Manila – rather than in jails in Manila where sometimes they are kept with adults, or, in some cases, are locked up on trumped up or false charges by corrupt cops seeking to boost their promotion chances by scoring a certain number of arrests.

Francis Bermido Jr., a Preda social worker, took up the story. “Some of the older prisoners downstairs were threatening Roger because of the murder charge – some said they knew the man he’s accused of killing.” Preda secured a court order allowing Roger to stay with the organization, for his own safety.

Mother of the accused Selena wipes away tears while talking at the cramped but neat family apartment in the barangay Don Bosco slum, a couple miles from the city hall. She sells halo-halo for a living, and handing me one of these ice cold Filipino desserts, she says she has mixed feelings about her son staying at Preda.

“Preda is so far away and I can’t take that much time to visit because I need to make ends meet here,” she sighs. ”But it’s better than the jail, where they treat the prisoners worse than dogs.”

*pseudonym used to protect the accused’s identity

Simon Roughneen is a Southeast Asia-based writer. His work has appeared in the Financial Times, Los Angeles Times, South China Morning Post and Asia Times, among other publications.

China’s Small Stick Diplomacy

James R. Holmes — Sun, 20 May 2012 15:32:25 +0000

It seems everything old is new again. My (online) colleague Jens Kastner published an important article in Asia Times this week, detailing how Beijing enlists fishermen as an arm of its maritime strategy. His story will strike a familiar chord with any U.S. Navy sailor of a certain age. During the Cold War it was hard for an American task force of any consequence to leave port without a Soviet “AGI” in trail. These souped-up fishing trawlers would shadow U.S. task forces, joining up just outside U.S. territorial waters. So ubiquitous were they that naval officers joked about assigning the AGI a station in the formation, letting it follow along – as it would anyway – without obstructing fleet operations.

AGIs were configured not just to cast nets, but to track ship movements, gather electronic intelligence, and observe the tactics, techniques, and procedures by which American fleets transact business in great waters. Few seafaring nations use nonmilitary assets that way. Wielded deftly, though, they can play a vital part in sea power, broadly construed as encompassing not only government but commercial shipping, and not only navy personnel but private mariners. Maritime strategy is about more than navies. It’s about using all implements available to governments – sea- and land-based, public and private – to shape events at sea.

AGIs were mainly passive platforms sent to watch, listen, and report. While intelligence collection is part of Chinese fishing vessels’ job description as well, Beijing entrusts more active duties to these small craft. They can discharge combat missions. Some of them can lay or clear sea mines, for example. Or, as Naval War College professor Peter Dutton put it in another context, the fishing fleet is an unofficial maritime auxiliary that Beijing can deploy to stoke “managed confrontation” with neighbors whose seaborne interests contradict China’s. Kastner portrays it as a stick with which the Chinese government can stir up maritime Asia at opportune moments, whether to solidify its claims to contested islands and seas, appease a restive populace at home, or support a cross-strait offensive against Taiwan.

Japan, the Philippines, and other claimants to waters and soil China considers its historic patrimony constitute special targets for managed confrontation. Fishing boats have been in the thick of such scuffles as the war of words that ensued in 2010 after the Japan Coast Guard apprehended a Chinese fishing boat near the Senkaku/Diaoyutai islets. Fishermen have been at the vanguard of Chinese policy in the ongoing impasse with the Philippines at Scarborough Shoal, an atoll west of Luzon. Does Beijing control the whereabouts and actions of fishing boats directly? It’s not entirely clear, and Chinese diplomats aren’t saying. There must be some mix between conscious action and opportunism. While they may or may not exercise operational command over a given boat, Chinese officials can certainly encourage its skipper to ply his trade in disputed water – and respond if he runs into trouble.

If a foreign coast guard or navy tries to shoo Chinese boats away, Beijing gains plausible grounds to act. It can intervene diplomatically on Chinese nationals’ behalf, as in the Senkakus in late 2010. Or nonmilitary maritime services like China Maritime Surveillance can dispatch assets to protect the fishermen, as at Scarborough Shoal. Call it gunboat diplomacy without the guns – or at least without an open display of guns. The People’s Liberation Army is the unseen adjunct to Chinese nautical diplomacy. Military power held in reserve represents an enormous Chinese advantage, especially when the opponent is as completely outmatched as the Philippines.

Will Reform Bring Burma Peace?

diplomat_admin — Wed, 16 May 2012 13:16:20 +0000

Burma’s flurry of reform measures, coupled with the breezy spirit of openness prevailing in the former capital of Yangon, has created genuine hope that Burma’s underlying fault line – its ethnic divisions – can now finally be resolved.

Yet the ongoing conflict in the northern state of Kachin looks like it could remain an intractable blot on the landscape as Burma attempts to shake off a 40-year legacy of rule by a brutal military junta.

“The president called for a ceasefire in March. But more troops were sent,” says Ja Seng Khawn, daughter of former Kachin Independence Organization Chairman Brang Seng. “The conflict has intensified. Government troops burnt down villages, and 65,000 civilians have fled from their homes.”

Earlier this month, government troops moved closer to Laiza, the largest town inside the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) liberated zone. And, despite calls for peace talks, the fighting is continuing.

Karen, Kachin, Chin, Shan and other dissident ethnic forces have been demanding equal rights and local autonomy for more than forty years, and their repression at hands of the military has thwarted any attempt to create a genuine Union of Burma based on its myriad cultures and diversity.

Prospects appeared to be brightening with the apparently reform minded President Thein Sein reaching out to non-Burmans, and efforts to bring a halt to the fighting have enjoyed better results in the case of the Karen National Union and its armed wing. A draft agreement for a ceasefire has already been signed.

After decades of bitter conflict with the central government, the dissident Karen forces never dreamed that one day the president would invite their banned organization to peace talks in the capital. However, on April 12,Thein Sein hosted seven KNU leaders in Naypyidaw after another round of peace talks was successfully concluded in Yangon.

Various sets of talks have taken place with other small ethnic armies, including the Karenni, Chin, Shan and others, but it’s primarily the resource rich Kachin state that finds itself excluded from the friendly embrace of the government’s charm offensive.

Indeed, there’s been very little charm exuded by the government peace panel responsible for the talks. The panel is led by Aung Thaung, a former industry minister described in leaked U.S. diplomatic cables as a “notorious hard-liner.” It has met a KIO Kachin delegation in China on three occasions, but without any success in reducing hostilities.

“Wecalled for military operations launched since June 2011 to stop, in order to achieve a ceasefire,” says Ja Seng Khawn, now based in Myitkyina, the capital of Kachin state, after years of working with the KIO leadership. “They didn’t listen to us. There’s no trust between the two sides.”

Bush and Cheney on Trial

Luke Hunt — Mon, 14 May 2012 20:48:19 +0000

For decades, critics have politely pointed to Malaysia as a country of parallel universes. Laws separate race and religion, and people who live and work side by side are forced to coexist within different worlds as defined by successive UMNO coalitions and at times enforced by the courts, civilian and Islamic.

Prime Minister Najib Razak has attempted to change this. He has announced a series of political and economic reforms that he and the reformers in his United Malays National Organization (UMNO) hope will make Malaysia a fairer and more competitive place.

The initiatives, however, haven’t stopped protestors like the Bersih movement from campaigning for free and fair elections. They also fear Malaysia won’t change, and will instead slip back to its autocratic ways, which found real traction under Najib’s predecessors, in particular former premier Mahathir Mohamad. His style of autocracy has never been far from the surface of Malaysian political life and was again on display in Kuala Lumpur in recent weeks when political mischief went on show in the guise of putting Western leaders in the dock through a court with no jurisdiction or legitimacy other than it being backed by Mahathir, who attended the hearings.

As an eye witness to war in Afghanistan and Iraq and the wanton destruction caused elsewhere by the War on Terror, I can testify to the sheer ferocity of the conflicts. There’s little doubt that a legal case against Western leaders for their behavior throughout the first decade of this century could be made. But the Kuala Lumpur War Crimes Tribunal (KLWCT) is certainly not the answer.

In its final round of hearings, the KLWCT has found former U.S. President George W. Bush along with another seven associates guilty of crimes of torture.

It said the eight accused – Bush; former Vice President Dick Cheney; former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld; former counsel to Bush, Alberto Gonzales; former general counsel to the vice president, David Addington; former general counsel to the defense secretary, William Haynes II; former Assistant Attorney General Jay Bybee and former Deputy Assistant General John Yoo – had engaged in a web of instruction and directives leading to a common plan, purpose and conspiracy to commit crimes of torture and war crimes in relation to the War on Terror as conducted in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Among the evidence provided, Abbas Abid testified his fingernails had been pulled out with a pair of pliers. Moazzam Begg told how he was kept in a hood, beat and locked away in solitary confinement.

The tribunal says Bush, Cheney and Rumsfeld were aware that the U.S. had violated the 1984 Torture Convention and the Geneva Conventions but they had failed to intervene. This came after legal opinions asserted in their defense that the Geneva Conventions didn’t apply to suspected al-Qaeda and Taliban detainees and that as such there was no torture occurring within the meaning of the Torture Convention. As a result, interrogation techniques which included cruel, inhumane and degrading treatment, were actually allowed.

Unanimously, under KLWCT President Lamin Mohammad Yunus, a bench of five judges ruled the prosecution had proved beyond reasonable doubt charges of crimes of torture in accordance with Article 6 of the Nuremberg Charter. The court says it was following the Nuremberg model.

People inside the court also like to compare the KLWCT with the Russell Tribunal, established by the British philosopher Bertrand Russell and his French counterpart Jean-Paul Sartre to evaluate American foreign policy in North and South Vietnam after the defeat of French forces at Dien Bien Phu in 1954.

The KLWCT wouldn’t be described as a kangaroo court if it had any form of legitimacy. It does not.

But when following the proceedings in the mainstream press or through the national wires one could be forgiven for thinking that this tribunal ranks alongside the Khmer Rouge Tribunal in Cambodia or similar international courts established to try those responsible for tragedies in Rwanda, Lebanon and the former Yugoslavia.

Indeed, the coverage has been unquestioning and has found friends elsewhere. The Tehran Times, for example, trumpeted the Malaysian verdict as: “It’s official – George W. Bush is a war criminal.”

It was a second KLWCT conviction for Bush. He and former British Prime Minister Tony Blair were last November found guilty in absentia of committing “crimes against peace” during the Iraq war after a four day hearing. It then said: “Unlawful use of force threatens the world to return to a state of lawlessness. The acts of the accused were unlawful.”

Why Philippines Stands Up to China

James R. Holmes — Sun, 13 May 2012 23:02:27 +0000

Last month, I wrote a column for Global Times in which I observed that a dominant Chinese Navy lets China’s leadership deploy unarmed surveillance and law-enforcement vessels as it implements policy in the ongoing stand off at Scarborough Shoal. It can flourish a small, unprovocative seeming stick while holding the big stick – overwhelming naval firepower, and thus the option of escalating – in reserve.

That, I wrote, translates into “virtual coercion and deterrence” vis-à-vis lesser Asian powers. If weak states defy Beijing, they know what may come next. Global Times readers evidently interpreted this as my prophesying that Southeast Asian states will despair at the hopeless military mismatch in the South China Sea – and give in automatically and quickly during controversies like Scarborough Shoal.

Not so. Diplomacy and war are interactive enterprises. Both sides – not just the strong – get a vote. Manila refuses to vote Beijing’s way.

Military supremacy is no guarantee of victory in wartime, let alone in peacetime controversies. The strong boast advantages that bias the competition in their favor. But the weak still have options. Manila can hope to offset Beijing’s advantages, and it has every reason to try. Sounds familiar, doesn’t it? China has been the weaker belligerent in every armed clash since the 19th century Opium Wars. It nevertheless came out on top in the most important struggles.

That the weak can vanquish the strong is an idea with a long pedigree. Roman dictator Quintus Fabius fought Hannibal – one of history’s foremost masters of war – to a standstill precisely by refusing to fight a decisive battle. Demurring let Fabius – celebrated as “the Delayer” – marshal inexhaustible resources and manpower against Carthaginian invaders waging war on Rome’s turf.

Fabius bided his time until an opportune moment. Then he struck.

Similarly, sea power theorist Sir Julian Corbett advised naval commanders to wage “active defense” in unfavorable circumstances. Commanders of an outmatched fleet could play a Fabian waiting game, lurking near the stronger enemy fleet yet declining battle. In the meantime they could bring in reinforcements, seek alliances with friendly naval powers, or deploy various stratagems to wear down the enemy’s strength. Ultimately they might reverse the naval balance, letting them risk a sea fight – and win.

Victory through delay represents time-honored Chinese practice. Mao Zedong built his concept of protracted war on stalling tactics, and, like Corbett, he dubbed his strategic vision “active defense.” For both theorists, active defense was about prolonging wars to outlast temporarily superior opponents.

Mao pointed out that China boasted innate advantages over the Japanese Army that occupied Manchuria and much of China during the 1930s. It merely needed time to convert latent power – abundant natural resources and manpower in particular – into usable military power. Mao’s Red Army later overcame stronger Nationalist forces by winning over popular support, and with it the opportunity to tap resources, establish base areas in the countryside, and the like.

Good things came to those who waited.

So there’s some precedent for Philippine leaders to hope for diplomatic success at Scarborough Shoal. The Philippine military is a trivial force with little chance of winning a steel-on-steel fight. But like lesser powers of the past, Manila can appeal to law, to justice, and to powerful outsiders capable of tilting the balance its way. Sure enough, Philippine officials have advocated submitting the dispute to the Law of the Sea Tribunal and invoked a longstanding U.S.-Philippine mutual defense pact.

Despite all of this, the deck remains heavily stacked against Manila. Why persevere in defying China, with its overwhelming physical might? Thucydides would salute the Filipinos’ pluck. The Greek historian chronicled the Peloponnesian War, the protracted 5th century BC struggle between Athens and Sparta. One of Thucydides’ best-known precepts is that “fear, honor, and interest” represent “three of the strongest motives” driving societies’ actions.

In one infamous episode, Athenian emissaries inform the leaders of Melos, a small island state, that “the strong do as they will and the weak suffer what they must” when their interests collide. They demand submission. The Melians balk, but have no hope of help from Sparta or any other rescuer. When they remain defiant anyway, the Athenians put the men to the sword while enslaving the women and children.

Fear, honor, and interest animate small states like Melos and the Philippines as much as they do superpowers like Athens and China. Maritime claims are a matter of self-interest for Filipinos. They are also a matter of honor. Beijing can't expect Manila to simply tally up the balance of forces, acknowledge it faces a hopeless mismatch, and buckle. Philippine leaders can solicit foreign support, and they know Beijing has no Melian option.

Why admit defeat prematurely, any more than Fabius or Mao did?

James Holmes is an associate professor of strategy at the US Naval War College. The views voiced here are his alone.

Khmer Rouge, a Family Affair

Luke Hunt — Mon, 07 May 2012 18:14:33 +0000

Cambodia is enduring a controversial period. The recent murder of Chhut Vuthy, a high-profile environmentalist, has rattled the country and diverted attention from issues the government would prefer its bureaucrats to focus on, including Cambodia taking over as annual hosts of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and a diplomatic plan to win Cambodia a seat as a non-permanent member of the U.N. Security Council.

But on the outskirts of Phnom Penh, at the Extraordinary Chambers for the Courts in Cambodia (ECCC), this country’s main event has motored along at a steady, if grisly, pace and has now gone into recess after another marathon session of sensational revelations of atrocities committed by Pol Pot and his Khmer Rouge between April 1975 and January 1979.

Critical for the prosecution was how the regime, blamed for the deaths of up to two million people, had turned on itself and linked the surviving leaders of the Standing Committee – Nuon Chea, Ieng Sary and Khieu Samphan – to the atrocities committed by the ultra Maoists.

All threedeny charges of war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide.

Among the most startling evidence was testimony that Nuon Chea, once second in charge of the Khmer Rouge, had condemned members of his own family. He sent two nieces – Lach Vary and Lach Dara, both Chinese trained doctors who worked for the regime’s health ministry – their husbands and another two nephews to the dreaded S-21 at Toul Sleng to meet their end.

Pol Pot had also dispatched a sister-in-law of his to a security center where she perished.

Much of the evidence was produced by the prosecution’s star witness, Kang Guek Eav, also known as Duch, who has already been jailed for life after being convicted of committing crimes against humanity for the deaths of about 12,000 people at Toul Sleng. However, the final S-21 death toll has been estimated as much higher, up to 24,000 people. Nuon Chea has denied any involvement and denies that he was Duch’s boss. Duch testified he met regularly with Nuon Chea or Son Sen to give them updates on the prisoner “confessions” and camp operations.

Typically, 10-minute meetings were held every three to five days.

“I reported to him about the confessions, and he instructed and advised,” Duch said. “All the power was concentrated in the hands of the secretariat of the communist party, Pol Pot and Nuon Chea.”

Duch said Nuon Chea replaced Son Sen in 1977 as head of Santebal – the Khmer Rouge secret police. Son Sen remained in favor but was eventually killed along with his family amid a factional split in 1997 on the orders of Pol Pot.

“When Pol Pot was absent, Nuon Chea replaced him, and when Pol Pot issued an order, Nuon Chea followed up on how it was applied,” Duch told the court.

Favoritism wasn’t allowed and Nuon Chea sought to prove his purity among the hierarchy of the Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK) by dispatching his own kin to the Killing Fields. This ruthless culture was corroborated by Saloth Ban, now 67, who was secretary general of the regime’s foreign ministry and Pol Pot’s nephew.

He told the court that despite his family connections he was always terrified for his own life and the lives of his immediate family. He added that Ieng Sary – his chief and the former foreign minister – had also lived in fear of the regime he helped rule.

“I had such fear, and I think others had bigger fear than me,” he said, adding that no one was safe and that Pol Pot’s oldest sister-in-law, Khieu Thirath, was killed in a Khmer Rouge security center. Thirath’s sister, Ponnary, was the first Cambodian woman to receive a baccalaureate degree and had married Pol Pot in 1956 but suffered chronic schizophrenia as the regime began to assert control over the country.

A third sister, Tirith, married Ieng Sary, became the minister for social affairs and is widely regarded as the first lady of the Khmer Rouge. She’s also facing charges of genocide and crimes against humanity, but the tribunal has ruled her mentally unfit to stand trial.

Is the Philippines an Orphan?

diplomat_admin — Tue, 01 May 2012 19:19:55 +0000

The ongoing naval standoff between China and the Philippines at Scarborough Shoal clearly indicates the difficulties in constraining Beijing from unilaterally asserting its “indisputable sovereignty” over all of the islands, rocks, and adjacent waters in the South China Sea. The reality is that China’s actions in prolonging the standoff are a portent of the difficulties that the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) will face in trying to constrain China by negotiating a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea.

The current standoff began early last month, when the Philippines dispatched the naval frigate BRP Gregorio del Pilar to investigate an earlier sighting of several Chinese fishing boats in the lagoon at Scarborough Shoal. An armed boarding party from the frigate discovered that one of the fishing boats contained large amounts of giant clams, coral, and live sharks that appeared to have been illegally harvested from waters lying within the Philippines’ Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).

Two unarmed China Marine Surveillance (CMS) vessels interposed themselves between the fishermen and the frigate, thus precipitating the standoff. China and the Philippines proceeded to trade diplomatic protests over this incident. In an effort to diffuse tensions, the Philippines replaced the navy frigate with the Coast Guard cutter BRP Edsa

China, meanwhile, reinforced its presence by dispatching an armed Fishery Law Enforcement Command (FLEC) ship to relieve one of the CMS vessels. The Chinese fishing boats later slipped away with their catch. On April 20, China further reinforced its presence at Scarborough Shoal with the arrival of its most advanced FLEC ship, Yuzheng 310.

Both China and the Philippines claim sovereignty over Scarborough Shoal and argue that that it’s an integral part of their national territory. Under the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), a rock is entitled to a 12 nautical mile territorial sea. The Philippines further claims that the waters surrounding Scarborough Shoal fall within its 200 nautical mile EEZ.

The Philippines has invited China to join it in submitting claims to the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea for arbitration. This is an inappropriate forum, however, as the Tribunal can only decide matters of maritime jurisdiction, not questions of sovereignty which need to be solved first.

China’s claim to sovereignty rests on historic rights arising from prior discovery. The Philippines, on the other hand, bases its claims to sovereignty on intermittent occupation and continual administration since independence. This matter could be decided bilaterally by China and the Philippines or by an international court if both parties agree. Neither prospect seems likely given that the Philippines refuses to negotiate bilaterally and China refuses to place the matter before an international court.

The Philippines has thus turned to ASEAN and the United States for support. But the standoff over Scarborough Shoal has provoked a domestic outcry and made it abundantly clear that the Philippines holds misconceived expectations over the roles that ASEAN and the U.S. can play.

Malaysia Rally Turns Ugly

diplomat_admin — Sat, 28 Apr 2012 16:17:47 +0000

Tens of thousands of yellow and green-clad protestors gathered in Kuala Lumpur were turned on by police firing water cannon and tear gas Saturday as protests seeking reforms of Malaysia’s electoral system turned ugly.

The demonstrators, part of the latest Bersih (clean) rally, were driven back from Independence Square after they pushed through barricades sealing off the plaza. Almost 400 demonstrators were subsequently arrested by police, including some seen being dragged away holding bloodied faces and bruised limbs.

Moments after Malaysian opposition leader Anwar Ibrahim addressed the crowd at the frontline, several protestors at the barricades suddenly shouted “back, back,” before pushing through the police lines around the Dataran Merdeka, or Independence Square, the iconic downtown location where the protestors sought to hold their sit down demonstration seeking changes to how Malaysia holds elections.

Bersih is a grouping of NGOs and activists who say that Malaysia's election system is skewed in favor of the current government, a coalition that has governed Malaysia since independence from Britain in 1957. Recent electoral reforms proposed by the government don’t go far enough, say the protest leaders, who have been criticized in some quarters locally for being too close to Malaysia’s parliamentary opposition. Bersih says that anyone is free to support their electoral reform cause, including the current government.

Bersih said Friday that they expected 100,000 people to take to Kuala Lumpur’s streets, and though the eventual turnout was unclear, estimates have ranged anywhere from 30,000 to 250,000 as protestors lived up to their pledge to march from several locations in the city to Independence Square, where the organizers hoped for “goodwill from the government.” The protestors said that they had the right to gather at the square, but the government ruled otherwise, saying it offered the organizers four alternative venues, a move that Bersih in turn said came too late to be logistically feasible.

Bersih leader Ambiga Sreenevasan told media after the rally that a crowd of 250,000 was on the streets, concluding that “in that sense it (the rally) was a success.” But under a searing southeast Asian sun glinting off the high-rise skyline backdrop, Malaysia’s biggest city once more turned into a battleground, repeating the events of the July 9, 2011, Bersih rally, when the electoral reform group and its supporters last took to the streets.

This time around, though, the blame game could go both ways, with some protestors seen pushing through barricades, followed by police firing water cannon laced with chemicals and tear gas, sending the crowd running back toward a nearby mosque and train station.

In a statement released early Saturday evening, Malaysian Home Affairs Minister Hishamuddin Hussein praised police and put the blame squarely on protestors. “A group of protesters tried to provoke a violent confrontation with the police,” he said.

“I’m not surprised they released the gas,” said Bert Chen, one of the thousands of protestors, speaking after leaving the protest area. Raising his right arm to show a grazed elbow, he said: “I fell, and lost my shoes…There was so much confusion, and people were running in several directions.”

Nodding toward the coils of razor wire running along the edge of the Independence Square, protestor Norariani Harris said “people have the right to sit there peacefully,” referring to the square. “But this wire is like something inhuman.”

Last July, more than 1,600 people were arrested, including opposition leaders. That crackdown prompted a decline in the government's popularity, though Prime Minister Najib Razak recently recovered some lost ground in opinion polls, partly on the back of cash handouts to households taking home less than RM3,000 a month.

Last year’s loss of face also seemingly prompted a reform drive starting in September 2011, with changes proposed to Malaysia's print media regime, to draconian-sounding laws allowing detention without trial, and through new laws allowing peaceful protests.

Burma Across the Threshold

diplomat_admin — Fri, 27 Apr 2012 18:31:21 +0000

Aung San Suu Kyi’s participation in by-elections for Burma’s new parliament, her sweeping win, and the government’s endorsement of the result have completed a sea-change in the country’s politics – and as a result, its relations with the Western world, including Australia.

Events have moved quickly since President Thein Sein, a former army general and prime minister in the previous military regime, moved quickly to show his bona fides after taking office last April in the aftermath of tightly controlled elections:

– Thein Sein’s direct dialogue with Suu Kyi drew her into political participation under the Constitution she had earlier rejected.

– Truces were negotiated with many of the 11 armed ethnic insurgent groups, culminating in this month’s visit to Yangon by leaders of the Karen National Union.

– The controversial Myitsone hydro- electric scheme being built by a Chinese- led consortium on the upper Irrawaddy was suspended.

– Large groups of political prisoners have been released, including leaders of the 1988 student uprising.

– A plan to open up the economy has seen the first major step with adoption of a market-based exchange rate.

– The April 1 by-elections have been judged free and fair, the wins by Suu Kyi and nearly all of the other National League for Democracy candidates ratified.

The simple paradigm of a revered democracy advocate holding out in her enforced isolation against a brutal, reform-resistant military now needs to be abandoned. The outside world must engage with a more complex political situation, judiciously supporting reformers and good policy in both government and opposition.

Only three days after the by-elections, the United States announced a substantial easing of its political and economic sanctions. It will send a new ambassador, expected to be President Barack Obama’s special Burma envoy Derek Mitchell, to fill a post left vacant in protest since the former military regime annulled the 1990 election won by the NLD.

The United States’ $35 million aid program will be formalized and extended through a new office in the embassy and Washington will be more ready to approve World Bank and United Nations development projects. Government leaders and officials seen as positive reformers will be allowed to travel to the United States, and even invited.

The biggest impact will come from the lifting of barriers in the U.S. financial system to clearance of transactions involving parties in Burma. These have not only blocked payments routed through American institutions or in U.S. dollars, but inhibited third-country banks through fear of attracting U.S. Treasury penalty.

As a result, visitors will be able to use their credit cards to pay for hotels, domestic air travel and other expenses inside Burma, avoiding the present need for large amounts of hard cash. Exports of commodities priced in U.S. dollars will no longer need indirect payment through a third-country currency, which shaves up to 4 percent off earnings.

The Americans are also selectively lifting their ban on investments in Burma. Tourism, agriculture, banking and telecommunications are favored sectors, unlike extractive industries such as ruby mining and timber, which are beset with illegality and located in areas of ethnic conflict zones.

The South China Seasickness

Trefor Moss — Mon, 23 Apr 2012 21:11:10 +0000

Many citizens of China, the Philippines and Vietnam won’t have heard of the tiny scraps of land in the South China Sea that their governments compete with one another to claim. Certainly, almost none will ever set eyes on them.

So are places like Scarborough Shoal, the scene of Beijing and Manila’s latest maritime spat this month, really worth all the aggravation? And whose fault is it that these confrontations, which have the potential to start wars – and at the very least to kill fishermen and sailors – keep on happening?

Tiny, uninhabitable islets like Scarborough Shoal have little value per se, but the resources that surround them have plenty. The islets serve as pins in a map, around which governments can draw dotted lines and claim ownership over everything that lies within.

It’s these resources – the food even more, perhaps, than the oil or gas – that make stability in the South China Sea matter.

“The urgency is that these areas are being overfished and polluted, and that’s threatening the food supply of millions of people,” says Carlyle Thayer, an Emeritus Professor at the Australian Defence Force Academy who closely follows disputes in the South China Sea. “That’s something these countries have to start taking seriously.”

Fishing grounds can, of course, be shared, just as undersea energy reserves can be co-developed. But as Thayer points out, marine environments must be managed, as well as shared. If there’s a perception that fishermen from other countries are abusing resources in disputed waters and endangering livelihoods and food supplies, then that will inevitably trigger an angry response from the other claimants.

So putting an end to the South China Sea disputes is important from a security perspective. But it’s also important from a food security perspective. As things stand, the South China risks a textbook “tragedy of the commons,” the destruction of common resources over which no single authority has control.

In addition, Thayer points out that oil licenses will be granted in the near future, potentially causing further upset. And all this comes as most of the interested parties are investing in their navies and, in China’s case, in paramilitary maritime agencies. “The South China Sea bathtub is being filled up more and more by Chinese control vessels, and by other countries’ patrol vessels and submarines,” he says.

This approaching spike in contestation makes it all the more important that a solution be found now, and the diplomatic activity of the past year suggests that one is attainable. ASEAN has been China’s main interlocutor on South China Sea issues, and Beijing made an important goodwill gesture last November when it put up $475 million to create a China-ASEAN Maritime Co-operation Fund. Several ASEAN-China expert working groups are also now in place.

The key process of 2012 is the drafting of a Code of Conduct (COC) governing behavior in the South China Sea – and envisaged as being more far-reaching than the existing Declaration of Conduct (DOC). Crucially, ASEAN is writing the new code. The association is due to present China with its proposals in July, and Beijing will be under political pressure to accept the ASEAN formula, rather than appear domineering by rejecting the plan. The existing process also excludes the United States, which is to China’s liking. Furthermore, “China has Cambodia in the box seat at the moment [as ASEAN chair],” adds Thayer.