Gillard handily beat her former Foreign Minister Kevin Rudd in a leadership vote after he had resigned to challenge her. Rudd, seen as relatively popular in the country but not among his colleagues, was ousted in a leadership coup in 2010. His thrashing in Monday’s contest – by 71 votes to 31 – has left him and a key ally in the political wilderness.

In announcing the reshuffle, Gillard named Bob Carr as foreign minister, replacing Rudd, who has been relegated to the backbenches. Carr is a highly respected figure in Australian politics, and his appointment will add a touch of glamor to an otherwise drab team of politicians.

Carr retired as New South Wales premier in 2005, and his ten years at the helm, which included the highly successful 2000 Sydney Olympic Games, made him the longest serving premier in the state’s history.  But his appointment as foreign minister was something of a surprise, with analysts having expected Stephen Smith to make a return to the job.

Soon after the appointment was announced, speculation surfaced that Smith had attempted to block Carr, prompting Gillard to remark: “The decisions I've made about my team are about merit, about the strongest possible team.”

Carr for his part added: “…in the end, when the distinctive voice of the prime minister rouses you from your slumber and says, ‘Will you be foreign minister of Australia?’ I couldn't have found it in me to have said no.”

But Gillard showed she wasn’t necessarily in a forgiving mood when she made her cabinet picks. Gone was Rudd supporter Robert McClelland, who was also demoted to the backbenches. Smith, who preceded Rudd in foreign affairs and had been tipped to return, will remain as defense minister.

However, the purge was limited, with other Rudd supporters Martin Ferguson, Anthony Albanese and Chris Bowen keeping their ministries, in resources, transport and immigration, respectively.

Among other changes that Gillard is expected to take into the next election, due in about 12 months, are: Kate Lundy as Minister for Sport and Multicultural Affairs, David Bradbury as Assistant Treasurer and taking up the newly created position of Minister Assisting for Deregulation, and Jason Clare, who will take on the additional portfolio of Minister for Defense Materiel. Attorney General Nicola Roxon, meanwhile, will take on the additional portfolio of Emergency Management, while Environment Minister Tony Burke will take on the additional role of Vice President of the Executive Council.

Related posts:

1. Sun Shines on Gillard…For Now
2. Gillard Election Gloss Fades
3. Australia’s Pacific Ambiguity

Now that we know the outcome of Rudd’s bid to reclaim his job as leader of the Australian Labor Party, and thus prime minister – a resounding 71-31 win for incumbent Prime Minister Julia Gillard (initially reported unofficially as 73-29) – it’s worth asking what it was all about.

It was indeed about power, it was very personal, and it was very much about Kevin Rudd.

For outsiders, its all been quite bemusing: Rudd’s late-night D.C. press conference resigning as Australian foreign minister, the accusations, the unprecedented vitriol, the tearful calls for unity, and the fact that a clear majority of Labor Party MPs refused to vote for the candidate clearly preferred by the Australian people.

On the surface, Australia wouldn’t seem a candidate for this sort of political turbulence. It’s hard to believe, but the country’s last official recession was in 1991, which means that it has made it through the Asian financial crisis, the IT bubble implosion, and the global financial crisis with barely a bump in the road. Australia has by far the highest GDP per capita (nominal; it is second behind the United States on a purchasing power parity basis) among the G-20 countries, and the highest U.N. Human Development Index score. Its cities are consistently ranked among the world’s most livable. Unemployment is low. Its AAA-rated public debt is just 20 percent of GDP. Australian banks are ranked among the world’s safest. The country has a seat at the table of the major regional and global organizations. It does well in sport. Australian politicians by and large have the luxury of debating the future, not how to dig themselves out of a hole of their own creation.

Sure, much of this good fortune has to do with the China-driven commodities boom, but it’s also clear that by international norms, Australia has been well governed. Not perfectly, by any stretch, but other countries have strong commodities exports, after all, and mining and agriculture still only account for about 10 percent of Australia’s economy.

Nor does the country tie itself in knots on “values” politics, unlike, say, the United States. Social beliefs are rarely politically defining in Australia. Center-left Rudd started his political career leading an evangelist group. His then-Deputy Prime Minister Julia Gillard is an atheist. Conservative John Howard was a vigorous proponent of gun control.

So surely, you would think, its politics would be stable.

And until recently, that was the case. One of the more significant corollaries of the 1924 decision to make voting compulsory in Australia, is that it has favored mainstream politics. Australia has had its would-be populists (Pauline Hanson and Joh Bjelke-Peterson spring to mind; like Rudd, they both emerged from Queensland) but they tend to struggle for traction beyond the state level. So since Gough Whitlam’s disastrous stab at socialist utopia in the early 1970s, the country has given the top job to a series of professional pols pursuing middle-of-the-road policies.

That’s been just fine for the Australian electorate. Between November 1975, when Whitlam was controversially sacked by the then-Governor General Sir John Kerr, and December 2007, when John Howard finally lost an election, Australia had just four prime ministers (Malcolm Fraser, Bob Hawke, Paul Keating, and John Howard).

Enter Kevin Rudd.

Now it’s almost of truism of parliamentary politics that leadership ends in failure, and none of those four leaders left voluntarily. Opposition leaders also came and went, deposed in intraparty challenges if they failed to impress or were deemed past their use-by date. But Rudd has been a saga unto himself.

Driven and self-regarding even by the lofty standards of political leaders, Rudd had ferociously pursued power ever since a period of childhood hardship following the untimely death of his father. Religious and an intellect-on-his-sleeve type, Rudd entered the Labor Party through the rather unconventional route of diplomacy, spending seven years as a foreign policy professional, becoming fluent in Mandarin in the process. Without a natural power base within the party, still today dominated by unions and their lawyers, Rudd’s rise through the ranks was nonetheless impressive. Eight years after that first speech he was leader, and soon after it was evident he would be the next prime minister.

Rudd was elected in December 2007 in a landslide, ending 11 years of conservative government under Howard. Immensely popular with the public, Rudd quickly moved to repeal Howard’s unpopular and highly pro-business Work Choices industrial relations legislation and took the lauded steps of signing on to the Kyoto Protocol and delivering an overdue apology to Australia’s “Stolen Generations.”

But whispers soon emerged that Rudd had some management problems. The early talk was of a frenetic work pace. But then came stories of inefficiencies, an explosive temper, anger, a lack of consultation, and a megalomaniacal obsession with concentrating all power in his hands, yet a reluctance to make decisions.  Staff and colleagues couldn’t stand him. The government was taking on too much and had become paralyzed, they felt.

For a long time, lips remained sealed. This was the man who had, after all, finally returned Labor to power. He also remained extraordinarily popular with the Australian electorate. This is in itself somewhat of a mystery. Australians, especially those more predisposed to vote for a Labor government, have traditionally liked their politicians to display a common touch. Rudd’s predecessors as Labor prime minister, Gough Whitlam, Bob Hawke, and Paul Keating all affected a streak of larrikinism (the professed Australian fondness for larrikinism is our own little War of Independence). Thus the earthy wit of the extremely erudite Whitlam (Country Party member in parliament: “I’m a country member.” Whitlam: “Yes, we remember”), the drinking tales and broad Australian accent of the Rhodes scholar Bob Hawke, and the famous combativeness of antique aficionado and Paris lover Paul Keating.

Related posts:

1. Australia’s Pacific Ambiguity
2. Gillard Looks Ahead with Reshuffle
3. Australia Leadership Battle On

The United States and Australia’s intelligence and security relationship has been deepening since September, 2001, and this announcement is an extension of the close engagement between the two countries that has been going on for many decades. I don’t think that it should be overstated given the relatively modest scale of the proposal, and nor should it come as a surprise that Australia and the United States, given their close political, military and cultural links, would make such a deal. We’ve been in a formal military alliance with the United States for 60 years, we’ve fought alongside the United States in every major conflict, and if the United States is seeking to broaden its relations, then Australia is an obvious choice.

The move appears to be part of what has been described as a U.S. pivot toward Asia. Should Australia welcome this?

Absolutely. The fact is that the United States never left the Asia-Pacific – it has always maintained a military and economic presence. I’m not surprised the United States is seeking a deeper and broader engagement with the nations of Asia. The social and economic change under way in Asia is extraordinary – billions of people are experiencing an economic and industrial revolution that’s fundamentally altering nations and consequently strategic balances. So I would be more surprised if the United States was not deeply engaged and focusing on the changes occurring in Asia.

What does Australia bring to the table with its alliance with the United States?

This alliance is 60 years-old this year, and we’ve obviously been strong military allies. We’ve fought alongside the United States in every major conflict in the 20^th and 21^st centuries, so from that point of view we can be counted on. And we’re also a country of this region – the Asia-Pacific is where we are based, this is where much of our trade is based, we have strong people-to-people links, and so we can offer perspectives that the United States can draw upon.

Many see Australia’s foreign relations as a choice between the U.S. and China. Is it bound to be that way?

Not at all. We can balance our relationship with our largest trading partner, China, while still having a very strong alliance with the United States. We’ve been balancing this changing relationship for some years now. During the John Howard government years (1996 to 2007) we were able to achieve that balance with the United States as our closest military ally and China. This is one of the points of contention with the current government. Kevin Rudd as foreign minister has argued that Australia should have a new “third way” approach that avoids the extremes of conflict and kowtowing. But that’s a straw man argument and isn’t something any self-respecting nation, and certainly not Australia, has adopted in relation to China. In fact, if anyone is swaying erratically in terms of relations with China it would be the foreign minister.

The fact is that we don’t need a new third way. What we need is a return to the firm and positive diplomacy that the Howard government provided for a dozen years. You can call that pragmatic policy a third way if you need a label, but I think that the Howard government managed to balance the relationship between China and the United States very successfully.

Is there anything the government could have done better with China?

I think Australia’s Defense White Paper in 2009 sent a very mixed message to China. It essentially was prefaced on the idea that China was going to be a military threat to Australia. The issue of the white paper has been raised directly with me in Beijing because there was tacit identification of China as a potential military threat to Australia. I don’t share the view that conflict with China is inevitable, and as history has shown, attempting to chart the course of nation states is a dangerous exercise fraught with speculation and mistakes.

I would say that although I disagreed with much of what it had to say about China, I do think it highlighted the need for China to show greater transparency with regards to its military build-up and long term goals, and I think that when China declared its indisputable sovereignty in the South China Sea it did cause concern throughout the region, particularly with countries with their own claims. And I think that’s why nations in the region are looking for more U.S. leadership, not less, because they do want to maintain a balance between China and the United States.

Overall I think the handling of the relationship with China has lacked consistency. I know the mixed messages cause consternation in China, and the defense white paper certainly did. There were also question marks over the way the government handled the Stern-Hu case. I think the Rudd government’s handling of the case left a lot to be desired.

Kevin Rudd has been hectoring China on certain occasions, and I think some of the things that the government has done haven’t helped the relationship at all. There has been no progress on the free trade agreement, although the relationship between individuals remains strong across many parts of the economy. We do have different political systems, which does lead to some tensions over issues such as human rights. But we’ve always believed that these issues can be resolved by adopting a position of mutual respect. We do have a ministerial-level dialogue with China, although I think more could and should be made of that.

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1. Australia’s Pacific Ambiguity
2. The Australia-China Relationship
3. Australia’s China Dance

While supported by environmentalists, the carbon tax battle has seen Gillard’s Labor Party sink in the polls amid fierce opposition from the mining and manufacturing industries along with the government’s political opponents, led by Liberal Party and Coalition leader Tony Abbott.

Yet even as the dust has barely settled in Australia, the seventh largest emitter among industrialized nations, current climate treaty talks in Durban, South Africa, are again attempting to find a global solution to the issue. Will the new Australian scheme inspire the world’s top emitters to do likewise, perhaps even creating an “Asia-Pacific” carbon trading regime? Or will Australia’s effort simply vanish into the thin air of international diplomacy, as the world’s leaders focus on rescuing the global economy?

The Diplomat spoke to political, business and economic analysts on the implications of Australia’s new scheme. Unfortunately for the green visionaries, the most upbeat prognosis was: nice try, pity about the timing.

“There’s an argument that Australia can set an example and others will follow, but my experience of foreign policy is that what really drives national policy is self-interest,” says former Foreign Minister Alexander Downer.

“These days, the fashion in international dialogue is the problems of the global economy, not climate change,” he says. “As much as we may hope that what we do will influence other countries, it won’t encourage a greater sense of altruism in other countries, and to think so is just naïve.”

Downer’s hard-headed, Realpolitik assessment appeared well-founded, after U.S. President Barack Obama declared while visiting Australia that carbon trading was off the agenda in the United States for the foreseeable future.

And with the European Union’s carbon price in free fall, the accusation that Australia has given a free kick to trading competitors by levying a costly and high carbon price has gained weight.

Still, last month’s passage of the carbon pricing legislation marked a personal victory for Gillard, who ousted former Labor leader Kevin Rudd in June 2010 partly due to his failure to drive through parliament his proposed “Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme,” or CPRS.

Aimed at achieving at least a 5 percent reduction in emissions compared with 2000 levels by 2020 – and potentially an 80 percent cut by 2050 – Gillard’s scheme has legislated for a A$23 a ton carbon price from July 1, 2012, rising 5 percent a year for three years.

By comparison, Europe’s carbon price has dropped more than 40 percent in the past four months to below A$12.30, its lowest level since the global financial crisis, according to the Australian Financial Review.

By mid-2015, assuming Abbott’s coalition hasn’t assumed power and abolished the scheme, Australia’s system is proposed to become a trading scheme linked to international carbon markets, although with a floor price of A$15 per ton.

But four years is a very long time in politics, judging by the troubled history of Australia’s proposed carbon pricing schemes.

On, off and on again

Australia’s first serious attempt at carbon pricing was in 2007, an election year in which both the challenger, Rudd, and the incumbent, then Prime Minister John Howard, pledged their own versions of the scheme. After winning office, Rudd announced plans for the CPRS, a cap and trade scheme aimed at slashing Australia’s emissions by 60 percent compared with 2000 levels by 2050.

Yet by late 2009, Rudd’s scheme was under attack from both environmentalists and business groups, with the government forced to concede ground in gaining support from the Malcolm Turnbull-led opposition. Turnbull’s leadership on the CPRS angered his party members, however, and on December 1 he lost a leadership ballot by just one vote to the anti-CPRS Abbott, who called it a “great big new tax.”

A day later, and the opposition-controlled Senate blocked the legislation, giving Rudd the trigger for a new election. Rudd failed to grasp the opportunity, though, and his decision in April 2010 to delay the scheme ultimately helped cost him the party leadership.

In another irony, Gillard had reportedly helped convince Rudd to scuttle the CPRS over fears of its electoral unpopularity. Abbott, for his part, would have been duty bound as a government minister to implement the Howard scheme had his party won the 2007 poll, and was even quoted in mid-2009 saying a carbon tax might be preferable to emissions trading schemes.

By June 2010, Rudd was badly trailing Abbott in the polls, and with an election looming, Gillard was installed as Labor leader in a bloodless coup. In her first speech as prime minister, Gillard pledged to “prosecute the case for a carbon price at home and abroad.”

Despite vowing that “there will be no carbon tax under the government I lead,” the cliffhanger August poll saw Labor lose its parliamentary majority, and Gillard was forced to implement a carbon pricing scheme as a condition of forming a minority government with the Greens and independents.

Consequently, in February 2011, Gillard proposed a fixed carbon price prior to a floating, market-set price in the Clean Energy Bill. Despite both major parties committing to emissions reductions of 5 percent below 2000 levels by 2020, a bitter debate followed, with the legislation passing through the lower house in October and the upper house a month later. Announcing his continued opposition, Abbott made a “blood pledge” to abolish the scheme after the next election, even if it required a double dissolution election. He has proposed a A$3.2 billion “direct action” plan involving tree planting, solar rebates and direct subsidies to emitters, although the government has claimed its actual cost would be A$62 per ton of carbon.

But for Gillard, the legislation’s passage was a moment of political history for her beleaguered government.

“Within the space of just 38 years…our nation will cut nine out of every 10 tons of the carbon pollution we would otherwise have released into our atmosphere,” Gillard was reported as saying.

The legislation’s passage through the Senate corresponded with a rise in Labor’s electoral support, with one lawmaker saying it made a move against Gillard less likely following speculation of a challenge from Rudd.

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That process has begun with a major enhancement of military cooperation between the two countries, to be concentrated in Australia’s North West. The arrangement grants the U.S. military greater access to Australian bases, particularly airfields, as well as providing for more extensive training, ship visits and exercises, and the forward deployment of a small detachment of U.S. Marines. It also covers the prepositioning of materiel – fuel, ammunition and spare parts – creating the foundations of a latent staging point for the U.S. military in the Indian Ocean.

For many Australians, an enhanced U.S. presence in Australia is a beguiling prospect. Not only is it seen as a welcome symbol of Washington’s enduring strength and resolve, but also as a more tangible expression of U.S. strategic commitment.

The reality is somewhat different. In fact, Washington’s sudden interest in Australian real estate says less about its resilience than its relative decline. In particular, the quest for new bases reflects the way in which China’s growing power has already begun hollowing out U.S. military dominance, pushing back the boundaries of U.S. primacy.

Indeed, while the United States has spent the past decade losing wars and squandering power, China has been studiously undercutting U.S. advantages across virtually every sphere of policy: economic, diplomatic and strategic. No longer the quiescent child it was when the United States took its eye off the ball, China has grown into a boisterous teenager – and has plenty of growing still to do.  With the transformation of Asia’s security order well underway, Washington now finds itself trying to reinvigorate its strategic presence in the face of a putative rival over whom its leverage has been greatly diminished.

 Still, why the specific interest in Australia? Three reasons predominate.

The first reason is largely technical: over the past two decades, China has accumulated a formidable array of precision guided strike capabilities, namely long-range ballistic and cruise missiles, which can be launched from sea, air and land. These have been woven into an offensive war-fighting doctrine that places an operational premium on their use early and en-masse – and not just against U.S. ships at sea. Since U.S. bases in Japan, Korea and even Guam are increasingly at risk of being saturated by Chinese missiles at the outset of a conflict, they no longer constitute an indefinitely reliable basis from which the United States can project power.

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1. China Base a Threat to India Navy?
2. Puncturing the U.S. Base Myths
3. Why Allies Need US Base

How could the government get itself into such a bad position? Some key decision-makers have failed to appreciate that Australia now faces a much more demanding security future. As the Pentagon’s recently released annual report on China’s military development makes clear, Beijing’s surveillance, missile, air and naval developments are transforming the strategic balance in the Western Pacific. Indeed, by 2025 China’s military power will be predominant in parts of our region.

There’s also a need to take account of China’s much more aggressive recent military operations, especially in disputed areas of the South and East China Seas. Australian security planners should do everything in their power to negotiate peaceful resolutions of these issues. They would, however, be naive to neglect strong investment in defense capabilities that can deter coercion against us in the 2025-2050 timeframe.

Advanced submarines offer special strategic leverage in the more demanding security environment that’s in store. The best submarines are highly survivable in intense military operations and have the potential to force the leadership of even a major power to pause and think carefully before attacking Australia or our key interests. They are one of only two or three military capabilities that carry this game-changing leverage. So, while Australia will always need some surface warships, armored vehicles and transport aircraft, the truth is that advanced submarines offer unique strategic advantages for us in the troubled times ahead.

All this means we need to get the new submarine program right and do so quickly. Australia has three main submarine options. The government currently favors designing and building our own unique, rather large, diesel-electric submarines, essentially a Collins Mk 2. Second, we could purchase much smaller diesel-electric submarines that are currently in production in Europe. Third, we could purchase or lease from “hot” production lines advanced nuclear-propelled submarines from the United States or Britain.

Designing and building a Collins Mk2 would probably eventually deliver a class of the largest diesel-electric submarines in the world. However, given that the government has yet to launch even preliminary design work, the first of these boats couldn’t be delivered until at least 2028 and more likely 2035-2040. Because they would be a completely new design, they would inevitably experience technical problems, would probably possess some unreliable systems and we should expect them to have relatively low availability. As these Australian-designed boats would be “orphans,” they would also be expensive to maintain and update.

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1. Australia’s China Dance
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Following the 9/11 services, it was announced that US President Barack Obama is scheduled to visit Australia from November 16 to 17, in part to commemorate the ANZUS milestone. Will Obama find a changed Australia? This is the ‘new view’ emerging in Australian strategic circles. China is now Australia’s largest trading partner, and in response this view argues that Australia must ‘choose’ a strategic future informed by the supposed power shift from Washington to Beijing. Yet the alliance with the United States is unlikely to fracture – even with a more influential and powerful China. Supporters of the ‘new view’ misunderstand Australian identity and engagement with the region post-1945.

Since Britain forsook colonial investments (except for Hong Kong) and sought refuge in the European Economic Community in 1973, Australia has been involved in what could be called an ‘Asian Dance.’ Australia’s engagement with Asia has never been anything more than a dance with several partners, each nothing more than a fling, with loving and longing looks across the seas to Great Britain.

At different times and for different reasons, Asian nations have courted Australia, but none have been able to enjoy consummation because Australia’s passion for ‘new love’ is as dry as the red desert sand of the Outback. The reality is that Australians have special affection for only three nations on earth. The first is New Zealand, a country that in the early 1890s had indicated interest in joining what became the Commonwealth of Australia. Australia’s military history is unrecognizable without the ANZAC spirit (Australia and New Zealand Army Corps) forged on the beaches of Gallipoli in Turkey in 1915.

The second is the United States. This alliance is central, but must be viewed in the context of shared cultural and political values, common experiences, and commitment to democracy. The debt owed to the United States by Australia during the Pacific War will also never be forgotten. The sacrifice of many US servicemen during this conflict for the sake of freedom forged an abiding relationship between the two nations informing the creation of the alliance itself.

The third country, Britain, is important because of the emotional, familial and historical ties with the motherland or land of origin. All Australians (with the exception of indigenous peoples) are immigrants. Before the Pacific War, this usually implied Britain (although since 1945, it has come to mean anywhere in the world).

The new view on China fails to understand the profound impact multiculturalism has had on Australian society and identity. Contemporary Australia is by definition ethnically diverse. Filial ties extend across Asia to Europe, the Pacific Islands, New Zealand, South Africa, the Middle East, and Africa. As in the United States and New Zealand, these ethnic groups have political lobbyists, constituencies, concerns, and political influence. This multiculturalism also reaffirms and strengthens support for New Zealand and the United States. Importantly, Australia remains a constitutional monarchy, with enduring affection for the British Queen and her successors. Despite several attempts, political elites have failed to sever symbolic ties with the Crown, the most recent being in 1999.

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1. Australia’s Third Way Nonsense
2. The Australia-China Relationship
3. Australia’s Pacific Ambiguity

The comment was by Brisbane flood victim Benitta Harding, but could just as easily apply to a host of disasters that have hit the Asia-Pacific region already in 2011.

In a year that started with floods and cyclones in eastern Australia, before a major earthquake in New Zealand, and then Japan’s devastating temblor, tsunami, and now nuclear disaster, the region has barely had a chance to draw breath before the onset of the next crisis. But if regional governments are to try and mitigate the sometimes catastrophic effects of natural disasters, there are plenty of lessons that can be learned from what has happened so far this year.

In Queensland, the December-January floods are estimated to have killed 35 people across the state, mainly from flash flooding in Toowoomba and the Lockyer Valley in the south-east. Brisbane suffered an estimated A$440 million worth of damage, with 20,000 houses inundated and many city businesses shut down for over a week in mid-January. The floods caused over three-quarters of Queensland to be declared a disaster zone, but also caused significant damage in the southern states of New South Wales and Victoria.

Just a few weeks later, as the country was still reeling from the worst flooding in half a century, Cyclone Yasi—a category 5 cyclone—made landfall in north Queensland. Australia’s second-costliest cyclone on record caused A$3.5 billion in damage, destroying large swathes of the region’s banana and sugar cane crops, and contributing to an estimated total damages bill from recent disasters of about A$9 billion.

For Brisbane resident and artist Harding though, the January floods almost completely submerged her house, destroying 20 years’ worth of artworks along with nearly all her belongings and those of her family’s. Nearly three months afterwards, she was still seeking assistance from charities after missing out on income-tested government aid.

‘Unless you’ve been through it, it’s really hard to comprehend,’ says Harding. ‘People come to our place and can’t comprehend that we don’t have running hot water, everything we own fits into the garage where we’re living, and a lot of the stuff there has been given to us.’

New Zealand was among the many countries that were quick to show their support, but a few weeks later the country would be left reeling from its own natural crisis.

On February 22, a magnitude 6.3 earthquake struck just 10 kilometres south-east of the centre of New Zealand’s second-largest city of Christchurch, killing 182 people, injuring 2,000, and leaving an estimated insurance bill of US$12 billion. The collapse of the six-story Canterbury TV building not only destroyed a TV station, but also killed a number of overseas students at an English language school, from Japan, China, and other countries.

Japan was among the many nations that dispatched assistance to the quake-stricken city, sending 66 search and rescue workers to Christchurch. The government would not have imagined that less than a month later it would need all available assistance for its own darkest hour.

Striking at 2.46 pm local time on Friday, March 11, a 9.0 magnitude earthquake hit the Tohoku region in the northeast of Japan, producing tsunami waves of up to 38 metres high and travelling up to 10 kilometres inland. The death toll has continued to rise, with more than 12,100 killed and 15,500 still missing as of April 4, while tens of thousands have been left homeless.

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Why? In the book, Kaplan examines the United States’ interest in the Indian Ocean region, providing ample evidence of why the area has been of such importance for great powers throughout history, starting with the Portuguese back in the 16th century, and ending with the US, Chinese and Indian roles in the region in the 21st century.

Lula has certainly been a great statesman and a revered world leader. Indeed, US President Barack Obama dubbed him the ‘most popular politician on earth,’ while last year Time named him the world’s most influential leader—the first time a Latin American leader had been selected for this honour.

So what’s in store now for a nation that has just lost such a highly regarded leader? Well, if President Rousseff can build on Lula’s recognition of the importance of the Indian Ocean region for boosting trade, then things are looking good.

Back in 1510, India’s Goa—now a holiday paradise—was captured by the Portuguese. This move set the stage for further colonial advances and the eventual takeover of large parts of Asia by Western powers including the Netherlands, France and later the British.

The Portuguese, with limited military power, weren’t able to establish active rule in some of the further flung parts of Asia, but were still able to establish trading outposts in the region that allowed them to indirectly control trade between not only Europe and Asia, but also among areas that now fall within modern day India, China and Indonesia. Indeed, Portugal established trading ports in locations like Goa, Ormuz (in the present day Persian Gulf), Malacca (Malaysia), Kochi (India), the Maluku Islands (Indonesia) and Nagasaki.

Fast forward to today, and some of these spots are now seen as vital for key trade routes—something that hasn’t gone unnoticed by the Brazilian leadership.

In Macau, Brazil has been looking to build on the language legacy of its former Portuguese masters by building ties with the island. In December 1999, Macau became the second Special Administrative Region of China following the transition of local administration from Portugal to China.

From around 2003 onwards, Portuguese-speaking countries emerged as the most important asset of Macau’s foreign ties, providing ample space for Brazil to step in. That year, China launched a new initiative called the Forum for Economic and Commercial Cooperation between China and Portuguese Speaking Countries (Fórum para a Cooperação Económica e Comercial entre a China e os Países de Língua Portuguesa, in Portuguese), known more memorably as the Macao Forum.

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As Japan’s whaling fleet set sail this week for its latest expedition to the Southern Ocean, anti-whaling militants Sea Shepherd Conservation Society had already struck a propaganda blow by naming their interceptor vessel after the feared icon of their enemy. While the Japanese movie monster better known as Godzilla has fought many battles throughout his career, it’s fair to say that his creators would never have envisaged him combating his own country’s whalers.

‘This vessel is going to play a huge part in shutting down the Japanese whaling fleet for the entire summer,’Sea Shepherd’s Jeff Hansen told reporters in Fremantle, Australia, where it was registered with the backing of the city’s mayor. The group launched from Hobart its largest ever contingent of three vessels and a helicopter against the Japanese whaling fleet, which in 2009/10 comprised a factory ship, three harpoon ships, a supply ship and two security patrol vessels.

Meanwhile, the whalers were reportedly planning to put armed Japan Coast Guard ranks aboard their vessels to deter illegal activity. On the diplomatic front, Japan flagged its intention to set up a new pro-whaling organisation rivalling the divided International Whaling Commission (IWC), while the Australian government continued to pursue its case against Japan’s research whaling at the International Court of Justice.

It all adds up to yet another looming showdown between the warring parties, both at sea and diplomatically. Yet, rather than another ‘Gojira’ episode, will it end up being ‘Groundhog Day’ all over again this season for the main protagonists?

Ahead of the annual whale hunt, The Diplomat canvassed the views of experts both within and outside Japan on the rationale and future of the nation’s whaling industry, viewed by its supporters as a traditional cultural practice, but by its critics as ‘Japan’s diplomatic scarlet letter. ’While few could see signs of compromise, none favoured the continuation of the current stand-off.

‘The Japanese have been eating whale meat and utilising whalebones, blubber and oil for more than 9000 years,’ says Glenn Inwood, a spokesperson for Japan’s Institute of Cetacean Research (ICR).

Established in 1987 and under the auspices of the Fisheries Agency, the ICR is responsible for Japan’s whale research programmes in the Antarctic and western North Pacific, which are officially conducted under Article VIII of the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (ICRW).

According to Inwood, the ICR’s whaling company Kyodo Senpaku plans to catch around 850 minke and 50 fin whales in the upcoming 2010/11 season, ‘scientifically calculated as the minimum sample size required to obtain statistically useful information.’

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