The Diplomat » Central Asia

A Flicker of Optimism on Iran

Robert Dreyfuss — Wed, 23 May 2012 12:22:09 +0000

There’s a flicker of optimism about the May 23 talks in Baghdad between Iran, the P5+1 world powers, and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) over Iran’s nuclear program. A tentative accord between Iran and the IAEA, reached in Tehran on Tuesday between Yukiya Amano of the IAEA and Saeed Jalili, Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator, bolstered optimism on the eve of the Baghdad meeting.

However, even if doesn’t stall, the process of solving the standoff over Iran’s program has a long way to go. At best, say analysts in Washington, the most that can be achieved this week is a confidence-building, interim accord that keeps the talks rolling and, perhaps, sets up task forces involving technical experts to work out details of a broader accord. Amano, in his meeting with Jalili, suggested that the two men may have agreed on a step-by-step process in what the IAEA chief called a “structured” framework. “The decision was made by me and Mr. Jalili to reach agreement on the structured approach,” he said. Whether that agreement can be finalized, and what effect it might have on much thornier issues involving whether or not Iran will be allowed to continue to enrich uranium and what will happen in regard to economic sanctions that have been imposed on Iran, is yet to be determined.

The Baghdad talks are a follow-up to talks held April 13-14 in Istanbul, which were the first substantial talks between the two sides in more than two years. And at least one retired, senior American diplomat reacted positively. “For the first time in 32 years, since the Iranian revolution, there is the possibility of serious, substantive and sustained talks with Iran,” said Nicholas Burns, who served as deputy secretary of state during the administration of George W. Bush.

But, analysts point out, “sustained” talks mean that the negotiations are likely to go on for quite some time, likely well into 2013.

In order for the talks to succeed, both Iran and the United States will have to make substantial concessions.

Dennis Ross, who until earlier this year served as President Obama’s chief adviser on Iran, told reporters in a conference call on May 22 that he could envision an agreement that allows Iran to continue to enrich uranium but limits it in a way that would preclude Iran from developing a nuclear weapon, by proscribing the number of centrifuges Iran can operate, the amount of low-enriched uranium it can amass, the purity of that enriched uranium. However, he said, so far the Obama administration hasn’t accepted that principle. Even so, said Ross, if an accord can be reached that allows Iran to maintain a civilian nuclear program, including enrichment, and can construct a firewall against militarization of that program, even in an election year, “You would go for it.” He added, “I’m not persuaded that just because it’s an election year, it’s impossible to reach an agreement.”

To Stop Iran Nukes, Give it a Stake

diplomat_admin — Sat, 12 May 2012 22:50:31 +0000

Western diplomats described last month’s talks between the P5+1 and Iran in Istanbul as “constructive” and “useful.” But the adjectives, although only guardedly positive, are certainly an improvement on the terms officials have used to describe previous Iranian diplomacy.

Since May 2010, when the P5+1 rightly rejected a proposed fuel swap deal agreed between Turkey, Brazil and Iran (also in Istanbul), diplomacy has stalled. Throughout the latter part of 2010 and into 2011, Iran continued to enrich and stockpile uranium, and the only real developments in the nuclear standoff seemed to be a heightening of rhetoric – and violence. Assassinations of Iranian scientists (many claim by Israel’s security service Mossad) were met with attacks on Israeli targets in India, while EU moves to sanction Iran’s oil brought corresponding Iranian threats to close the Strait of Hormuz, through which 20 percent of the world’s oil passes.

This year began with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s visit to Washington. Speaking at a meeting of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, he said that Iran’s nuclear program was unquestionably for military purposes: if it walks like a duck and quacks like a duck, it must be a duck, he vividly declared. Meanwhile, as the U.S. presidential elections near,presumptive Republican challenger Mitt Romney described Obama as “feckless,” comparing him with U.S. President Jimmy Carter during the 1979-1981 hostage crisis.

Likening Obama to Carter, of all U.S. presidents, was a calculated but irresponsible move; rarely has professed concern for the national interest so clearly revealed itself as self-interest. Trying to appeal to a worried U.S. electorate, Romney then promised that under any administration of his Washington would “deal” with the nuclear program permanently, thereby giving those in Tehran urging the Supreme Leader to quit the Non-proliferation Treaty and make a dash for a bomb one more reason to push their case.

All this meant the backdrop to the April talks was far from positive. Only days before they were due to begin, Iran’s conservative press rallied to declare that the West had been cowed and that Iran should continue onwards with enrichment regardless of international opposition. P5+1 diplomats were unsurprisingly sceptical that the talks would yield anything of note and feared more Iranian stalling tactics. Quiet surprise was the feeling afterwards. So far little has happened since, but there’s a discernible change of Iranian tone and with yet more talks scheduled to take place in Baghdad in May. There are, for the first time in years, signs of hope. Why?

Fear. Iran is now under huge pressure. The Iranian economy is in serious trouble; sanctions have intensified the effects of decades of internal financial mismanagement. The targeting of Iranian banks is stifling Iran’s means of doing business internationally, and, critically, its access to foreign exchange earnings. Sanctions on Iranian oil will only make these problems worse. Targeting the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps – now the prime economic player in Iran – is especially astute, as it singles out for punishment the one organization in Iran that has political clout enough to influence Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.

Direct pressure on Khamenei is the only thing that will work: Iran compromises only on his say so, and he only says so when he feels threatened. Almost ten years ago, in May 2003, shortly after the United States had obliterated the Iraqi Army, Iran offered the U.S. a historic deal via the Swiss ambassador under which it would compromise on its program and normalize relations between the two countries. The deal was reportedly rejected out of hand by then vice-President Dick Cheney (we don’t negotiate with evil was his terse and short-sighted response). Nonetheless, European diplomats at the International Atomic Energy Agency sensed palpable fear in their Iranian counterparts during those early months of 2003; a few months later, in the October 2003 Tehran agreement, Iran agreed to suspend uranium enrichment while talks to resolve the overall crisis continued. Iran subsequently suspended enrichment for two years while vague European promises of more discussions never materialized – largely because without U.S. involvement in negotiations, there was simply nothing of substance they could offer Iran.

Khamenei’s de facto anti-western instincts were (in his eyes) confirmed by this seeming lack of response; and once he gave the order to re-start enrichment there was no going back. Iran has continued with enrichment and the stockpiling of uranium ever since – in fact it has accelerated the process, enriching to 20 percent and announcing (just before Western powers were about to reveal it) the existence of another uranium enrichment plant at Fordow, near the city of Qom. Nothing has since been sufficient to make Tehran change course; certainly, threats of military action have been ineffective.

The reality is that hardliners in Iran believe the West is in decline, and that the United States, so recently bogged down in Iraq and Afghanistan, won’t risk a third war in a time of financial crisis. Israeli threats are a concern, but Tehran calculates (probably correctly) that Israel doesn’t have the means to effectively strike its nuclear facilities. In fact, many hardliners welcome an attack. Damage would likely be limited and it would give them the excuse to go for a bomb. Perhaps more importantly, in a time of increasing domestic oppression following the 2009 fraudulent elections, not to mention the severe financial hardship many Iranians are facing, it would give them an excuse to rally an understandably hostile populace to their cause in the face of a common enemy.

Military action is not the solution, but nor will merely increasing financial pressure on the Islamic Republic stop the nuclear program. Khamenei and those around him have staked too much political legitimacy on it to climb down now without risking a dangerous loss of credibility. An increased inspector presence and supervised, limited enrichment (to civil levels – 5 percent) on Iranian soil have all been suggested and are workable and sensible solutions. But they don’t deal with the real issue, which is not a technical but a wider political problem between Iran and the West.

Iran isn’t North Korea; it resents international isolation, which it views as an affront to its great history and self-perceived role as a major international player. “We are a great nation with 5,000 years of history” Iran’s Ambassador to the IAEA, Ali Asghar Soltanieh, pointed out to me in 2010. This statement goes to the heart of what drives Iran and its foreign policy.

And this offers hope because in the end, what Iran wants is greater involvement. Sanctions are effective, but they are only half the battle and they are only ever a short-term measure. In the long-term, only real and sustained engagement will work because re-integrating Iran back into the international fold is the only real solution. Involving Iran in regional discussions on wider issues affecting the Middle East, and assisting it with securing membership of international organizations (like recent U.S. and Israeli support for its World Trade Organization membership) have also been suggested and must be pursued.

A world with a nuclear-armed Iran would be a far worse place than it is now. The question is what can be done to prevent this coming to pass. The upcoming Baghdad talks offer an opportunity for meaningful engagement with an Iran that may be more willing to compromise than it has been in a long time. Almost a decade ago, the EU3 had a similar opportunity; this time it must not be wasted.

David Patrikarakos is a U.K.-based writer and author of the upcoming book 'Nuclear Iran: The Birth of an Atomic State.' His work has appeared in the New Statesman and Financial Times, among other publications.

Israel’s Reluctant Friend

diplomat_admin — Sat, 12 May 2012 00:35:09 +0000

A new and perhaps surprising country took center stage recently in the ongoing row over Iran’s nuclear program – Azerbaijan. Citing anonymous “high-level sources” from U.S. diplomatic and intelligence circles, a controversial article in Foreign Policy at the end of March suggested the possibility that Israel might have been proffered the use of Azerbaijani airstrips for any strikes against Iran’s nuclear facilities.

The article attracted impassioned rebuttals from officials and observers alike. But the question remains: how did Azerbaijan get sucked into the controversy over Tehran’s nuclear plans in the first place?

Azerbaijan’s relations with Israel developed in earnest 20 years ago, and have grown significantly in depth and scope ever since. With bilateral trade currently hovering around $4 billion, Azerbaijan is Israel’s top trading partner among Muslim states, and the second largest source of Israel’s oil after Russia.

Conversely, Israel represents Azerbaijan’s second largest oil customer, and via the Ashkelon-Eilat Trans-Israel Pipeline, a crucial transit point for Azeri oil flowing to Asia’s growing markets. Israeli companies have also made no secret of their stake in the country’s other key, non-energy sectors, including agriculture and communications. However, it’s the military-defense aspect of bilateral cooperation that has kept Iran on its toes of late.

Israel began modernizing Azerbaijan’s ragtag army after its six year, undeclared war with Armenia led to the loss of the Nagorno-Karabakh enclave and seven neighboring districts. On February 26 of this year, Baku and Tel Aviv inked the latest in a series of arms deals, this time to the tune of $1.6 billion, on the basis of which Israel Aerospace Industries would supply Heron and Searcher drones, anti-aircraft and missile defense systems over the coming months and perhaps years.

This closeness represents everything that relations between Iran and Azerbaijan ought to have been right from the start, given both nations’ deep historical ties. Azerbaijan was a Persian satrapy under the Achaemenid, the Parthian and the Sassanian empires, and the Shiite Safavids credited for laying the foundations of modern Iran were mainly ethnic Azeris, a sub-branch of the Turkic peoples. Only after Iran was twice defeated by the Russians in the 19th century was it obliged to renounce the half of the Azeri homeland located north of the river Araxes.

This disjuncture largely stems from the overwhelming secularism brought on by 71 years of Soviet rule (1920-1991) and Azerbaijan’s palpably pro-West, pan-Turkic and anti-Iranian outlook, especially under former President Abulfaz Elçibey and his Popular Front Party of Azerbaijan, a factor that prompted Iran to support Christian Armenia during the Nagorno-Karabakh war.

South of the Araxes, Tehran remains acutely sensitive to potential Azeri irredentism stoked by the existence of independent Azerbaijan, despite the fact that its own Azeris – a fifth to a quarter of all Iranians including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei (who is half-Azeri) – are generally well integrated.

Baku has for its part accused Iran of supporting radical Shiite elements, including the now outlawed Islamic Party of Azerbaijan, as well as the Talysh ethnic minority inhabiting the border areas. Nationalist rhetoric has also sharpened with calls for the country to be rechristened “North Azerbaijan” as opposed to what some view as the “occupied” South.

Both Israel and Iran have repeatedly accused each other of using Azeri territory as a base for covert operations, and the Azeri authorities haven’t held back from publicly linking a number of locally arrested individuals with Iranian intelligence.

All this suggests that an Israeli “staging ground” may not be that farfetched, despite a 2005 Baku-Tehran non-aggression pact and official insistence – most recently by President Ilham Aliyev during a cabinet meeting – that Azerbaijan would never allow its territory to be used against its neighbors.

However, while Azerbaijan is eminently suited to Israeli interests, the costs of a potential Iranian backlash toward Baku are unbearable for three key reasons.

Israel’s Iran Debate Takes New Turn

Meir Javedanfar — Tue, 08 May 2012 21:03:03 +0000

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s Iran policy has come under intense criticism recently, most notably from former Mossad Chief Meir Dagan and Yuval Diskin, former head of domestic intelligence agency Shabak. The intensity of these unprecedented attacks can’t be ignored. But the big question that should be asked is – why are they doing this?

Although Dagan and Diskin haven’t elaborated on this point, it’s unlikely that they would have created such a fuss if they thought the chances of Netanyahu and Defense Minister Ehud Barak following through with an attack on Iran was zero. Indeed, the very fact that they have been so vocal in their opposition to such a strike is a clear sign that the possibility of a unilateral Israeli attack against Iran can’t be completely ruled out.

This specter of military action looms despite warnings by former Israeli Defense Force intelligence chief Shlomo Gazit that such an attack could actually speed up Iran’s nuclear program, as well as damage relations with the United States. What seems to particularly concern Diskin is what has been described as Netanyahu and Barak’s “messianic belief.” This is a stinging criticism in Judaism of individuals who see themselves as the savior of Israel and its people.

If Diskin truly feels Netanyahu and Barak might base their decision to attack Iran on their belief that they are rescuing the Israeli people, rather than arriving at their decision based on cold, hard intelligence, then Israel’s citizens have much to worry about. Yet judging by the reaction of Diskin and the support that he received from Dagan, this could really be the case and would explain why they’ve decided to oppose the government’s Iran policies in such a vocal manner now, rather than waiting.

The latest public dispute comes at a time when the debate in Israel over how to handle Iran is becoming poisoned with personal attacks. When Dagan criticized the government’s Iran strategy, for example, he was accused of “sabotage against democratic institutions in Israel.” Similarly with Diskin, his view was dismissed as seeking revenge because he didn’t get the job as head of Mossad.

But Netanyahu’s statement on Holocaust Remembrance Day, that “those who dismiss Iran’s threats as exaggerated or as mere idle posturing have learned nothing from the Holocaust,” took the public debate on Iran to a new low. By framing his Iran arguments using the Holocaust, Netanyahu is effectively suggesting that opponents of his policy are willing to allow Jews to face genocide once again.

The use of the Holocaust is inappropriate and counterproductive in a democracy like Israel. The emotional scars of the tragedy shouldn’t be used as a way of assessing the future behavior of a Middle Eastern regime in 2012, one that’s faced with a quite different – and much more powerful – opponent than the individuals that Hitler’s regime picked off. Rather than looking back seven decades, the Netanyahu government should look at Iran as it stands in 2012 – a country that for all its faults isn’t as powerful nor genocidal as the Nazi-led regime of the 1930s and 1940s.

Indeed, rather than rallying the country, Netanyahu’s use of the Holocaust could spark a backlash. It should be noted, for example, that Diskin’s attack against the government’s Iran policies came nine days after Netanyahu’s remarks at the Holocaust memorial.

Election Year = No Iran Deal

Robert Dreyfuss — Thu, 03 May 2012 14:39:06 +0000

Since the conclusion of a first round of talks between Iran and major world powers, including the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council plus Germany, in Istanbul on April 13 to 14, both Iran and the United States have sent signals that they’re prepared for a deal. But don’t expect anything concrete to emerge when the parties sit down again to talk in Baghdad on May 23.

Although the leadership in both Tehran and Washington has cooled confrontational rhetoric and both appear to desire an agreement, in both countries politics at home is likely to prevent either side from making the concessions needed to unblock the talks, according to several analysts in Washington.

“My guess is that they will slow-walk this,” says David Mack, an experienced Middle East hand who served as former U.S. deputy assistant secretary of state for Near East Affairs, in an interview with The Diplomat. “Neither the Iranian side nor the American side want to come to a deal real soon. I don't think a deal would be real good for domestic politics for either one.”

Over the last several weeks, officials on both sides have edged closer to public recognition of what it will take to reach an agreement: acceptance of Iran’s right, under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, to enrich uranium on its own soil to 5 percent purity, or fuel grade, in exchange for a halt by Iran of its current enrichment to 20 percent, ostensibly for its medical research reactor, the export of existing 20 percent stockpiles for reprocessing, and a rigorous regime of inspections as mandated by the NPT’s Additional Protocol, aimed at ensuring that Iran does not produce uranium enriched to 90 percent, or weapons grade.

For months, the United States has quietly been letting it be known that accepting enrichment by Iran might be in the cards. In an April 17 interview, Gary Samore, Obama’s chief adviser on arms control, said: “We recognize that Iran has the right to a peaceful nuclear energy program once it has addressed concerns about its nuclear activities. What we haven't done is specify exactly what the elements of that nuclear energy program would be. And that is a matter for negotiation.” Then, speaking anonymously, a senior U.S. official told the Los Angeles Times that the United States is willing to put uranium enrichment on the table and that “maybe we can get there, potentially.” The official made it clear that there’s a consensus developing within the Obama administration that calls for Iran to halt or suspend all enrichment are a nonstarter.

Meanwhile, various Iranian officials, including some notably close to Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran’s supreme leader, have expressed optimism about the current round of talks. Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi – who, according to Washington scuttlebutt, could be Khamenei’s choice to succeed Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as president in 2013 – called the current talks “a turning point in the Iran-West dialogue” and suggested that Tehran might be willing to revise its nuclear policy. As reported by Al-Monitor, other senior Iranians close to Khamenei expressed similarly positive sentiments, including Ali Akbar Velayati, adviser to Khamenei and member of a powerful political clan, and Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati, the leader of the all-powerful Guardian Council, which appoints the supreme leader and controls access to Iranian politics. Jannati called the recent talks a “good achievement” and noted, with some exaggeration, that the West now “accepted that uranium enrichment is Iran’s right.”

Give Democracy a Chance in Syria

Madhav Nalapat — Tue, 24 Apr 2012 23:07:51 +0000

Even in Dubai, as I’m waiting to catch a flight to Damascus, it’s clear that the Gulf Cooperation Council monarchies have adopted a strategy of constricting Syria in such a way that the Assad regime falls. An Emirates Airlines desk dealing with the issue of 96-hour transit visas for those wanting a stopover in Dubai advised me that while citizens of India could take advantage of the facility, those from Syria could not.

A media delegation from Delhi had to spend the night in the airport waiting room, apparently because the Syrian Tourism Ministry’s request for overnight accommodation was denied at the last minute, when the group was already airborne from Delhi. Even the airport money changers have been co-opted into the strategy, with many no longer exchanging other currencies for Syrian pounds. Several international credit cards have reportedly ceased to work in Syria, while international flights to and from its cities have been reduced to a trickle. It’s small wonder that tourist arrivals have plunged. Almost all European and allied states have issued advisories to their citizens against travelling to Syria and, as a consequence, even getting insured for the visit is proving a problem.

Trying to make Syria tourist friendly had been one the most visible of Bashar Assad’s modest reforms since taking over from his father Hafez a decade ago. Damascus, Aleppo and other cities have been spruced up, with new hotels and diversions that include clubs for the weary and the adventurous to while away the hours in. The country can also boast a visible history dating back millennia, and in location after location there are the physical signs of past greatness, most notably the Roman ruins near Sweida and Shahba.

About 10 percent of Syria’s 24 million people are Christian, while Shia (including the Assad family) account for 12 percent. But it’s the rule by a Shiite family of a country that has a Sunni majority that seems to have impelled Qatar, Turkey and Saudi Arabia to join hands with the United States and the EU in seeking regime change in Damascus. In the case of the U.S. and the EU, the target is really Iran, with Syria being the low-hanging fruit that needs to be harvested before turning the full attention of the alliance on Tehran.

It was Mahatma Gandhi who said that “means are, after all, everything.” And it is the means now being employed by the Ankara-Doha-Riyadh trio to prize Syria loose from the Assads that may create immense headaches in the future, both for themselves and for their friends. Since mid-2011, the three have reportedly been assisting both financially and logistically any group in Syria that seeks the overthrow of Assad. This includes those who seek the fall of any stable governance structure because of their links to organized crime and terrorism. By not discriminating between such elements (some of which have links to the narcotics trade) and those seeking political change for reasons of ethics and ideology, the trio are empowering disparate groups of individuals as impossible to control as many of the armed gangs that have created their own fiefs in Libya.

Can U.S. Get out of Afghanistan?

Joshua Kucera — Thu, 19 Apr 2012 18:23:53 +0000

The U.S. is facing a number of roadblocks in its effort to secure routes to pull its equipment out of Afghanistan, with erstwhile allies Pakistan and Uzbekistan making it clear that the U.S. can’t rely – as it has been until now – heavily on them. But in its effort to diversify its supply routes, it’s gaining cooperation from an unlikely source: Russia.

With plans to withdraw its forces from Afghanistan starting in 2014, the Pentagon is busy setting up what it calls “retrograde transit” agreements with countries neighboring Afghanistan. The U.S. already has a number of shipping routes in place, mainly through Pakistan and through the ex-Soviet republics of Central Asia, a collection of routes known as the Northern Distribution Network.

But in November, an errant NATO airstrike killed more than 20 Pakistani soldiers, and Pakistan immediately cut off all transit to coalition equipment. Those routes, which once carried about a third of the coalition's equipment to Afghanistan, remain closed, though U.S. officials have expressed optimism that they will be able to negotiate to reopen them.

The U.S. had set up the Northern Distribution Network as a strategic hedge against Pakistan’s unpredictability, a decision that proved wise when Pakistan implemented its blockade. But the first round of agreements that the U.S. signed with the Central Asian governments didn’t provide for taking equipment out of Afghanistan, only bringing it in. Now, the U.S. has signed agreements with all the Central Asian countries for reverse transit, but some of the countries appear to be lagging on the implementation of those deals.

Uzbekistan, in particular, is reportedly raising prices it charges for the transit and creating bureaucratic delays. When one of the major NDN contractors, FMN Logistics, carried out its first retrograde transit shipment on February 29, it notably did so via the so-called KKT route, crossing Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. That route is longer and uses much worse roads than the Uzbekistan route, but those countries are more cooperative. However, the KKT route is still an incomplete solution: during winter, it’s all but impassable.

Amid these difficulties, the U.S. is getting assistance from a country many regard as the United States’ biggest foe: Russia. Russia had already agreed to allow transit through the country (it is the best way to get to Europe after passing through Central Asia), but is now negotiating with the U.S. over opening a transit hub in the Volga River city of Ulyanovsk.

The Ulyanovsk facility would be used for the U.S. and NATO to fly goods from Afghanistan into Russia, and then by rail onward to Europe. That is more expensive than surface transport all the way to Europe or the U.S., but less expensive than flying the goods the whole way. As such, it provides an acceptable alternative to Uzbekistan and Pakistan.

Why the Right Hated the Iran Talks

Robert Dreyfuss — Wed, 18 Apr 2012 15:25:27 +0000

Most of the world reacted with cautious optimism, and some relief, when the April 13 to 14 Iran talks in Istanbul ended on a positive note, with an agreement to hold a second round of more formal negotiations in Baghdad on May 23. World oil prices fell on the news, currency and stock markets in Iran rose, and in the United States, editorial writers and columnists expressed satisfaction that U.S.-Iran tensions appeared to ease.

But not everyone was thrilled. On the right, a chorus of strident voices in Washington and Jerusalem arose to demand that the administration of President Barack Obama avoid anything that eases the pressure on Iran.

Benjamin Netanyahu, the Israeli prime minister, and a coalition of hawkish and neoconservative think tanks and policy analysts responded with alarm to the idea that Washington and Teheran might strike a deal.

Their fierce objections, reinforced by allies in Congress and in the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), are probably strong enough to prevent Obama from making American concessions to Iran in search of a mutual, step-by-step plan to resolve the standoff over Iran’s uranium enrichment program. But make no mistake: what they fear is that an U.S.-Iranian accord, even a shaky one, would tilt the world’s focus away from the Israel-Iran conflict and back to the Israel-Palestine dispute. As Akiva Eldar, a columnist for Haaretz, an Israeli daily, wrote tongue-in-cheek, Netanyahu’s real concern is what Eldar imagined as the prime minister’s lament: “What are we going to do without the Hitler of Tehran? Who will we say is threatening us with a second Holocaust?”

So far, at least, Obama seems undeterred by Netanyahu and his American allies’ rumblings. One day after the Istanbul talks ended, Netanyahu delivered his verdict on the agreement to resume talks in May. “My initial impression is that Iran has been given a freebie,” he said. “It has got five weeks to continue enrichment without any limitation, any inhibition.” But Obama responded almost instantly, directly contradicting Netanyahu in decidedly undiplomatic language: “The notion that somehow we’ve given something away or a ‘freebie’ would indicate Iran has gotten something,” said Obama, adding that the onus is on Iran in the next round. At the White House and the State Department, officials delivered surprisingly upbeat assessments of the Istanbul talks in briefings to the media, and, according to the New York Times, in the aftermath of the talks a senior U.S. official said, “We believe there is a conducive atmosphere, but we need to test it.”

But the Wall Street Journal summed up the right’s response to the U.S.-Iran dialogue: “Renewed negotiations between Iran and international powers over Tehran’s nuclear program this weekend already are facing fire from Israel and American lawmakers, who fear the Islamic Republic is seeking to use the revived diplomatic track to forestall additional economic sanctions while continuing to advance its nuclear work.” In Congress, there was agitation for yet another package of even tougher economic sanctions against Iran, and conservative analysts delivered scathing reviews of the talks.

“A careful reading of the history of nuclear diplomacy with Iran…provides little reason for optimism,” opined the Foreign Policy Initiative, a think tank founded by William Kristol of the right wing Weekly Standard, even before the talks were underway. “Iranian leaders not only have repeatedly used negotiations to buy time as they steadily improve their capability to make nuclear weapons on increasingly shorter notice – but will almost certainly do so again with the planned talks in Istanbul.”

At the American Enterprise Institute, another neoconservative think tank, its chief foreign policy analyst, Danielle Pletka, fretted anxiously that Obama had “signaled” his readiness for a deal with Iran and that Iranian officials, such as Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi, envision one as well. And she, too, writing as the talks began, predicted outright failure: “Talks begin tomorrow between the P5 + 1 (the five permanent U.N. Security Council members plus Germany) and Iran. Today, the P5+1 group is having a prep meeting. Talks with Iran are destined to fail, not because I want them to, but because every piece is in place for failure.”

Iran Deal Possible, Just Not Now

Robert Dreyfuss — Sat, 14 Apr 2012 15:11:15 +0000

All things considered, it’s highly unlikely that the just-resumed talks between Iran and the so-called P5+1 world powers will result in a breakthrough. According to analysts in Washington, the best result that might come from this week’s talks in Istanbul are an agreement to continue negotiations in a second round, possibly within weeks, in search of a compromise over Iran’s uranium enrichment program.

But success is likely to be postponed until the summer of 2013, at the very earliest, even though Iran’s chief negotiator, Saeed Jalili, has hinted that he’ll bring new ideas to the table.

That’s because neither the United States nor Iran, whose domestic politics are roiled by hardliners and who both face presidential elections, have maneuvering room to compromise.

In the United States, President Barack Obama has quietly signaled his readiness for a compromise that would allow Iran to continue to enrich uranium, under its own control and on its own soil. But Obama won’t make the concessions needed to persuade Iran to strike a deal in advance of the November 2012 election, in which he’ll face a Republican challenger, backed by a coalition of hawks and neoconservatives and by Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who intends to make Iran a focal point of the anti-Obama campaign. Once reelected, as Obama recently hinted to Russia’s President Medvedev in connection with U.S.-Russia relations, he’ll have additional flexibility in making foreign policy decisions.

Iran, too, will probably await the outcome of its own presidential election in June 2013. At that time, one big advantage is that Iran will have a president not named Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, whose provocative antics and over-the-top comments have allowed his American and Israeli critics to demonize him, making U.S. concessions to Iran significantly more difficult. By mid-2013, Iran’s president – who is nearly certain to be a conservative closely attuned to the desires of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, unless Khamenei decides to abolish the presidency entirely and take the reins of power himself directly – will rule over an Iran far more politically unified than it’s been since the Green Revolution upsurge and Ahmadinejad’s subsequent falling-out with Khamenei. And that president will be able to present a new face to the West, especially to the United States, at which point serious negotiations may be possible.

In the current round of talks, which began in Turkey on April 13, the United States has adopted what on the surface appears to be a tough opening stance. According to the New York Times, which based its reporting on information from senior U.S. officials, the Obama administration will demand the closing of a fortified, underground refining facility at Fordow, outside Qom, a halt to Iran’s efforts to refine uranium to 20 percent purity, and the transfer of its entire stockpile of its 20 percent-enriched fuel to a third country. In particular, the American call for Iran to shut its Fordow plant seems like a nonstarter, since that facility’s very existence was designed to safeguard it from military attack by Israel or the United States, and thus it appears as if the United States is demanding that Iran retain only plants that are more vulnerable to bombs.

Japan’s Middle East Soft Power

diplomat_admin — Thu, 12 Apr 2012 19:07:26 +0000

Through a dirty, misty morning haze, Ajloun castle rises up over the north Jordanian town of the same name. In a cold classroom, a pair of Japanese teachers lead a class of five and six year-olds through a song well known to any Japanese child. “Ito maki maki,” they sing. “Ito maki maki. Hite hite. Ton ton ton.”

Ai Matsui, one of the teachers, has been living and teaching in Ajloun for 14 months and will be here for 10 more before heading back to her teaching job in Tokyo. She seems to be enjoying the experience, and says she’s developed a taste for mansaf, a local dish of lamb with milk and rice.

She’s one of a small number of Japanese in Jordan – there are only around 300 in all, including diplomatic staff. An hour or so up the road in Irbid, several others are teaching children in a Palestinian refugee camp. Like Matsui, they are volunteers for the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA).

Japan doesn’t have a particularly deep history in the Middle East, but its economic prosperity is closely tied to the region. Some 90 percent of Japan’s oil comes from the Middle East, according to the Yomiuri Shimbun, so it has a vested interest in promoting stability. The way it has chosen to do so is via such volunteer programs mixed with development aid.

“The Middle East is economically important for Japan,” says Tanaka Toshiaki, chief representative of JICA in Jordan. “That’s a basic reason why we’re involved in the area. But it’s also important to keep peace. Once peace goes, then everything is affected.”

Across the region, JICA has a network of offices, supporting projects ranging from an agro-industrial park in Jericho and a maternal and child healthcare drive in Ramallah in the West Bank, to educating refugees in the north of Jordan and a museum in Karak further south.

Indeed, it’s Japan’s lack of history in the region that allows it to embark on the extensive program it has developed. As an example, Toshiaki points to a Japanese-funded program to send Jordanian farmers to Israel to learn about farming in dry conditions. Once they return home they in turn train others. JICA has sent around 100 people so far.

“This kind of cooperation can be achieved because we are seen as being between the two sides,” he says. “We can enhance trust. If the U.S. tried to do this program it might not work as well because people would feel the U.S. has political intentions.”

In many ways, Japan’s policy is an object lesson in the use of soft power, using its skills and finance to encourage cooperation between communities and across borders. The key idea underpinning the policy is a concept known as the Corridor of Peace and Prosperity, which was developed by Japanese diplomat Hideaki Yamamotoin 2006. This tries to encourage greater regional cooperation which, it is hoped, will lead to economic growth, greater trust and eventually peace.