Beyond the Second Front

Across in Malaysia there are no shortages of victims from the conflicts in the Southern Philippines. Hundreds of thousands of them live in UN-sanctioned and illegal refugee camps scattered on the east and west coasts of Sabah, the Malaysian state in north Borneo.

Two generations have grown up in water villages like Palau Gaya, off the coast of Kota Kinabalu, and in Kampong Hidiyat or The Icebox on the outskirts of Tawau. They offer a stark and embarrassing reminder of the decades of war and the moral paralysis within the United Nations to afford some kind of comfort for the victims.

And in security circles the east coast of Sabah–a short boat ride from the Southern Philippines–is also known as a transit route for smugglers, bandits and terrorists moving between Mindanao and Indonesia.

Here, authorities have intensified security along the maritime border because of the continued strife in the Southern Philippines that erupted after the November massacre and mid-January warnings from the United States and Australia against travel to remote islands where the ASG has kidnapped and killed foreigners in the past.

On January 27, Malaysian authorities announced they had arrested ten people with links to international terrorists. Sources in Malaysia reportedly linked the ten to al-Qaida and the Nigerian student who attempted to blow-up a US-bound flight on Christmas Day, while in the Philippines there were suggestions of links to JI and the ongoing mess in Mindanao.

The Rajah Solaiman Movement is the fanatical fringe of Balik Islam, a movement of Christian converts (who prefer to be known as ‘reverts’) to Wahabi Islam. They specialize in urban sabotage and are allegedly funded with Saudi money through charitable fronts in Mindanao.

‘It’s arguable that Abu Sayyaf and other groups such as Rajah Solaiman produce large numbers of victims through bombing campaigns. But this is just one part of a much larger picture in which violence is effectively condoned,’ Loveard says. ‘In reality the national security picture in the Philippines is an extremely complex picture of violent groups and an almost complete lack of real control on the part of the government.’

Manning-up

What Manila will do next is a subject that has gripped the nation with all the trappings of the tawdry B-grade movies that made Estrada, the former actor turned president, rather famous.

Commentators and analysts are united in calling for a speedy trial, a ban on civilian militias and private funding of the police and military, while the ICG says the international community should step in and assist in forensic analysis of the massacre site, witness protection and in freezing any international assets held by the Ampatuan clan abroad.

It also urged the MILF and the government to pursue suspects of the Ampatuan private army, which would add some momentum to any peace talks, and called on the international media and civil society ‘to keep the case front and centre in the public eye to demand prosecution,’ even as the country moves into the election.

International assistance has been forthcoming, and given the media’s record on dealing with its own, the Maguindanao Massacre will continue to command public attention for a long time to come and the Ampatuan clan will be rewarded with a fitting place in history.

But whether Arroyo and the authorities in Manila have the nerve to prosecute, end the patronage game and deal with the militias is a question that is providing a dramatic backdrop for the upcoming poll.

Unfortunately, Philippine history hardly encourages faith in the government to handle such matters.

‘The external impact of the massacre has been to draw attention to the country’s complex skein of multi-layered clan and tribal based groups that provide political support to the centre in exchange for a high degree of local autonomy,’ Greenwood says.

‘Clearly the deal broke down on November 23 from Manila’s perspective, but the nature of Philippine society and political culture rooted in the ruling ‘latifundias’ reliance on informal extra-legal support from regional warlords to impose an approximation of order through a local version of Danegeld means that little action will–or can–be taken to dismantle the system.’

In other words, as long-time observer and author of Marcos and Beyond Karl Wilson put it: ‘That’s just the way it is here.’