While much of the world may be focused on the U.S. presidential election in upcoming months, North Korea’s Kim Jong-un also has been doing some campaigning of his own. And although the outcome seems inevitable, the political agenda being revealed by Kim’s actions offer some useful insights for understanding the new leadership’s policy direction.

Since the death of Kim Jong-il, Kim Jong-un and the power elites in Pyongyang have been working hard to strengthen the new regime’s legitimacy. With support from North Korean power elites, Kim Jong-un isn’t expected to face any challenges before he assumes the title of General Secretary of the Workers’ Party of Korea. However, it’s well worth watching the agenda that Kim Jong-un promotes before his rise to power is completely secure.

The new regime is promoting two major agendas: military first politics (Sŏn'gun) and Yuhun t’ongch’i, ruling “by the will of the dead.”

Military first politics, also known as Sŏn'gun politics, has been a driving force behind North Korea’s immense military power, and has been the key policy for the last several decades. By concentrating the nation’s resources into its military, the Korean People’s Army (KPA) has remained a pillar for North Korean stability. The new regime’s continuing promotion of this policy indicates the significance of the military for the new regime and the influence it will wield.

Yuhun,from Yuhun t’ongch’I,are literally translated as instructions that the departed left behind. After the death of Kim Il-sung, Kim Jong-il immortalized his father through propaganda and designated Kim Il-sung as “eternal president” in the North Korean Constitution. By rationalizing his leadership through his late father’s will, and by turning the words of his father into an almost eternally binding contract, Kim Jong-Il solidified his position and managed to convince the public and Workers’ Party of Korea to accept his leadership.

In the case of Kim Jong-un, Yuhun t’ongch’i carries both domestic and foreign messages. First, he’s legitimating his position within North Korea just as his father did almost two decades ago. Second, promoting Yuhun t’ongch’i also works as a message to foreign powers – the leader may change, but the management is still the same. Yuhun t’ongch’i not only legitimizes Kim Jong-un’s rise to the top, but also provides a reason to pursue the policies of the old regime. For foreign powers, it’s a statement from Kim Jong-un and the new regime that they will continue endorsing much the same policies, and it acts as a deterrent to foreign powers from exercising their influences on North Korea and its politics.

But it’s not just Kim Jong-un’s policies that offer an insight into North Korea.

Last month, 14 public inspections were reportedly performed by Kim Jong-un; among those inspections, eight were performed on military divisions, and two were on military related institutions. Interestingly, during public inspections, Kim Jong-un was shown not only shaking hands with both male and female soldiers, but also displaying close physical contact with soldiers, including clutching the arms of young soldiers and maintaining direct eye contact with a smile on his face.

Kim Jong-un’s surprising showmanship can be interpreted in the following ways:

First, it could be a sign that “military first” politics isn’t actually disliked by the North Korean public. The approval rate for military first politics can’t be accurately confirmed, but based on recent activities by Kim Jong-un, it seems there’s a belief that it is considered broadly acceptable. The reality is that Kim Jong-un’s young age and inexperience mean the new regime simply can’t afford to attempt propaganda that’s ineffective with the public.

Even though military first politics have been a magnet for criticism by North Korean experts and economists who blame this approach for the demise of the North Korean economy, North Koreans may still think otherwise. Every male North Korean is subject to up to ten years of military service, and the number of female military participants is increasing. Thus, the link between the public and the military could be very strong.

Second, Kim may be trying to appeal to the public by distancing himself a little from his father’s image. During public inspections, Kim Jong-un has been doing things that Kim Jong-Il rarely did – for a start Kim Jong-Il was reluctant to demonstrate or to initiate close physical contact. A string of failed policies that led to problems including famine are believed to have undermined Kim Jong-il’s popularity. His son, then, may see this new, warmer approach as a way of breaking with his father.

In addition, as more and more North Koreans have achieved self-sufficiency, surviving without the government’s failed food distribution system, the distance between the government and public could have widened – another potential motivation behind Kim Jong-un’s attempt at a more “accessible” image.

Indeed, Kim Jong-un has apparently been trying to increase connectivity with the public. His young age means it’s virtually impossible for the regime to falsify an extensive resume, so they have instead turned to efforts to appeal to nostalgic views of his grandfather, Kim Il-sung. Among the eight military units that Kim Jong-un inspected, five units were decorated with the title “Oh Joong Heub No.7 Regiment”; Oh Joong Heub’s regiment was responsible for protecting Kim Il-sung during the anti-Japanese liberation period in Korea, and it has been used as propaganda for decades to promote loyalty and morale among military personnel. Its connection with Kim Il-sung was therefore likely a reason for the inspection move.

It might still be too early to draw firm conclusions on North Korea’s overall direction, but it certainly seems safe to assume that North Korea will continue its military first politics. Under the juche ideology, military first politics may be seen as rational considering the perceived threats from the U.S. and South Korea. But the new regime will also never see its economy improve under military first policies. The fact is that even if the leadership sustains itself, North Korea will have no hope of escaping poverty anytime soon.

Kyu-toi Moon is a James Kelly Korean Studies Fellow at Pacific Forum CSIS.

This June, world leaders will congregate in Rio de Janeiro to attend the Rio+20 U.N. Conference on Sustainable Development. The conference will mark the 20th anniversary of the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), which culminated in 190 heads of state signing several legally binding environmental agreements.

However, Rio+20 is taking a different approach. The summit’s recently leaked zero draft outcome document, entitled “The Future We Want,” requests that governments set their own targets and work voluntarily towards a global green economy, poverty eradication and sustainable development. But such a proposal isn’t without its challenges.  

The Rio+20 zero draft deserves commendation for various reasons. First, it openly recognizes that most countries have largely failed to meet the challenges and obligations as outlined at UNCED. It also reiterates the “multiple interrelated crises” that we currently face, their adverse impacts on development gains over the past two decades, and the various systemic gaps in implementation of prior commitments. These admissions of past failures and present challenges have resulted in commitments to measurable deliverables and goals, outlined in a comprehensive roadmap spanning from 2012 to 2030.

Read more...

The 112th Congress will complete its term in 2012 marked by strong opposition to the policies of President Barack Obama on government debt, budget cuts, health care, and other issues. Adding to congressional-executive gridlock has been an upswing in congressional criticism of China’s policies, resulting in legislation in the Senate and the House challenging the administration’s efforts to sustain moderate policies toward China over currency manipulation, trade disputes, and arms sales and other support for Taiwan. The congressional activism feeds into the echo chamber of often strident anti-China rhetoric by many candidates seeking the Republican presidential nomination.

Nevertheless, forecasts of congressional trouble for the president’s China policy are offset by closer examination of the congressional actions and of U.S. interests supporting and opposing tougher policies toward China. Congress remains preoccupied with other issues and is ambivalent about reasserting its role in foreign affairs and China policy. Conflicting interests in the United States advocating or opposing tougher congressional action on China indicate that the overall effect of recent congressional activism won’t upset the president’s policies. It will prompt some vocal debate and will impede forward movement in U.S.-China relations.

Since the U.S. opening to China, Congress has voiced opposition to the administration’s China policy on several occasions, but has taken substantive action only episodically. The struggles between the administration and congressional opposition over breaking relations with Taiwan and the perceived use of the “China card” against the Soviet Union became intense and lasted for several years during the Jimmy Carter and early Ronald Reagan administrations, with both sides firmly committed to conflicting agendas. At the time, the debate was strongly influenced by widespread congressional efforts to reassert the role of Congress in the making of U.S. foreign policy. One result was the Taiwan Relations Act, which has influenced U.S. policy toward China ever since.

Read more...

With the United States formally ending its military operations in Iraq, many are beginning to turn their eye to Iran’s deep influence in the country. And, in light of Tehran’s growing tensions with the West over its nuclear program, Tehran’s maneuvers in Iraq have tremendous implications.

Read more...

Last week, South Korean President Lee Myung-bak visited China as a state guest and held a summit with Chinese President Hu Jintao. The two leaders addressed the Sino-South Korean strategic cooperative partnership and how to strengthen the relationship between their countries’ foreign and defense ministries. They agreed to increase trade by $300 billion by 2015 and to initiate discussions on a bilateral free trade agreement (FTA). They also agreed to cooperate in resolving the illegal fishing issue and to work toward the resumption of the Six-Party Talks.

Yet despite both countries’ satisfaction with the summit results, immediate remedies for key longstanding issues are unlikely.

First, the outlook for formal FTA negotiations is pessimistic. From the broad perspective of each nation’s national interests, there are gaps. While China wants to establish an East Asian FTA and separate FTAs with states in the region, Korea is more interested in developing separate FTAs with China and Japan. The idea of creating a Korea-Japan-China FTA also clouds the issue. Although the decision to move forward with official negotiations was announced, it’s difficult to gain momentum with Korean parliamentary elections upcoming in April, followed by presidential elections in December.

Read more...

Since the 1990s, when the Office of Net Assessments first identified the threat Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) strategies can pose to unimpeded passage, U.S. military strategy has undergone a remarkable transformation. But with two counter-insurgencies, a “Global War on Terror” and various humanitarian interventions and peacekeeping operations having seized Washington’s attention, some have argued that A2/AD issues have been somewhat overlooked.

More recently, the AirSea Battle Concept,which first appeared in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, has raised hopes for rapid development of capabilities that will allow the United States to confront A2/AD challenges.  But despite the excitement, much of the commentary so far on the issue has seemed largely speculative.

That has changed somewhat, though, with the Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC) having breathed some fresh air into the topic. The document appeared several weeks ago, and its version 1.0 was finally officially signed and released by Gen. Martin Dempsey yesterday. It’s an excellent start, coming from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and lays the foundation for a more systematic approach to “forcible entry operations.”

Read more...

The Diplomat is running a series of interviews with Washington DC-based ambassadors on defense, diplomacy, and trade in the Asia-Pacific region. In this sixth interview in the series, conducted by Washington correspondent Eddie Walsh, Ambassador Shankar P. Sharma, of the Federal Democratic Republic of Nepal discusses regional diplomacy and security.

On Saturday, China agreed to provide Nepal with $119 million in foreign aid. According to reports, part of this aid relates to technical assistance for the Nepali police. Some have suggested that such aid will be used to suppress anti-Chinese activity among the Tibetan population of Nepal. From your perspective, are these concerns justified? If not, is the government still concerned that this aid could undermine the international community’s confidence in Nepal's human rights commitment?

Nepal police have given emphasis to a training program to make the police force capable of handling the changing demands of society efficiently and effectively. The organization has gone a long way towards reforming the training of criminal justice and safeguarding human rights along with other improvements. The assistance will be utilized in achieving these goals. These concerns are totally unjustified.

Many have argued that the death of Kim Jong-il could lead to Chinese-style economic reform. Yet, even if his son and successor Kim Jong-un indicated a willingness to implement such restructuring, supported by a reformist group in Pyongyang, could the regime achieve such a goal? After all, economic reform is inevitably accompanied by an inflow of information from the outside.  In order to implement economic reform effectively, then, North Korea would have to accommodate and attract foreign investment to upgrade its outdated infrastructure and modernize agricultural and industrial capacities.

And of course, foreign direct investment in the 21^st century requires the wide use of information and communication technologies, meaning that although North Korea would have little choice but to accept the spread of certain means of communication such as the internet and cell phones, such change could pose a significant threat to the regime.

The reality is that the Kim family is afraid of information penetrating from the outside world because the regime’s rule rests upon the politics of fear. Kim Jong-il disseminated false information about South Korea’s economic size, quality of life and political system for decades. Pyongyang has indoctrinated North Koreans with propaganda based around the idea that South Korea is economically inferior to the North, while North Koreans are taught that South Koreans are subject to U.S. colonization. A web of lies has therefore been spun to conceal the truth about South Korea, and Pyongyang’s nervousness over the emergence of black markets across North Korea is due in large part because of the implied loss of control of information flowing from the outside.

Recent comments by top U.S. officials suggest that Asia will assume greater prominence in global politics – and play a bigger role in U.S. strategic considerations. And one issue that’s likely to receive increased attention is the nuclear security, a topic that Asia is very familiar with.

Ever since China live-tested its first nuclear weapon in 1964, Asia’s nuclear footprint has steadily grown to cover uses in both the civilian and military realms. At present, eight Asian states, namely Japan, China, Taiwan, South Korea, North Korea, Burma, India and Pakistan, possess nuclear capabilities. In addition, at least half a dozen more – particularly in Central and Southeast Asia – have indicated a desire to explore the use of nuclear power to fuel their countries’ energy needs.

In November, nuclear energy experts from the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) study group met in Hanoi to discuss a range of nuclear security-related matters. Among the issues debated were nuclear export controls, denuclearization talks on the Korean peninsula and post-Fukushima nuclear safety. The group also produced a memorandum that eyes reducing and ultimately eliminating the use of nuclear weapons from “security strategies and operational doctrines.” In addition, the memorandum urged states with nuclear weapons to demonstrate greater transparency as well as to establish confidence-building measures aimed at reducing reliance on these weapons in military doctrines.

Read more...

As we mark the passing of 2011 and begin a new year, the rise of Asia is becoming an old story. The new Asian narrative is what happens after Asia rises, and in particular, key strategic choices that consequential powers have to make over a spectrum of issues without historical parallel. For the first time in history, three great Asian powers have assumed center stage at the same time – China, Japan, and more recently, India – together with key middle powers such as South Korea, Australia, Indonesia, and Vietnam.

The consequences of Asia’s economic success, the growing irreversibility of its linkages with the world system, and Asia’s increasingly sophisticated power projection capabilities mean that Asian choices are going to reverberate far beyond Asian shores. But if Asia has accrued unprecedented power over the past five decades, it has also taken on unparalleled responsibilities. The United States will continue to play a crucial role in maintaining regional stability, but the brunt of maintaining regional security must be borne by Asian states.

How Asia manages to use its power, and the responsibilities it chooses to shoulder, is arguably the most important task for the second decade of the 21st century. In this respect, the contours of Asia’s “VIP” – the values, interests, and purposes it seeks to embody – are critical in the shaping of a new Asia and equally pertinent, the need for contending, democratic, and innovative Asian voices. Along with China’s rise, it has become fashionable to equate China’s voice with Asia’s. While China has a significant stake and role in the formation of a new Asia, its voice isn’t representative of Asia’s. Indeed, Asia and the world would be ill-served by a monotone Asia – one that’s dominated by China’s weltanschauung, the values it chooses to expound, such as increasingly nationalistic authoritarian politics, and a desire to expand its military footprints from the Yellow Sea to the tip of the Indian Ocean.

Instead, the world needs to hear Asian voices that are synonymous with universal values such as abiding respect for human rights, freedom of information and navigation, and equal attention to social justice, good governance, and firmly embedded democratic institutions. In this regard, the role of U.S. Asian allies are crucial since they have shown the possibilities of an Asia that is prosperous, globalized, and democratic but also equally at home with rich cultures and heritages that were developed and honed several millennia before the advent of the West.

Read more...