At the same time, East Asia has witnessed architectural and structural changes over the years. Multilateral organizations and institutions such as the East Asian Summit (EAS), the China-Japan-Korea Summit, the ASEAN-Plus-Three, and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) have become increasingly active, and are expected to expand their respective roles. And increasing dynamism for integration and cooperation among the countries in the region has become highly visible and multidimensional. On the other hand, despite efforts to modernize the alliance system, U.S. bilateral alliances have remained relatively static.

Nationalistic sentiment, territorial disputes, and history issues have recently become more contentious among countries in the region, which impedes further integration and cooperation and could become the source of conflict. In some countries, democratization is taking place. Uncertainty over whether this transformation will be smooth is another source of potential instability. In a word, the current major characteristics of East Asia can best be summed up as “iAsia” – integration, innovation, investment, instability, and inequality.

Against this backdrop, the Obama administration has recently announced its policy toward the Asia-Pacific region, which emphasizes a “pivot” in U.S. foreign policy. This reflects the rediscovery of the importance of the trans-Pacific axis in the 21st century, from security to the economy. It seems that two words – engagement and enlargement – capture the basic direction of the Obama administration’s policy toward the Asia-Pacific region. This is quite similar to that of the Clinton administration of the mid-1990s.

The U.S. policy contains the following five elements: strengthening traditional alliances; strengthening partnerships with other regional countries; managing and developing a cooperative relationship with China; participation in and working with multilateral regional mechanisms; and developing and strengthening trade relations (KORUS FTA and TPP). How the Obama administration will implement its Asia policy remains to be seen, but a number of concerns should be taken into account in the implementation process.

The United States argues that it is an Asia-Pacific country. Unfortunately, such statements haven’t been backed up by concrete action. The U.S. has maintained almost the same level of engagement or presence throughout the post-Cold War period. Some argue that U.S. commitment to, and engagement in, the region remain rhetorical or unconvincing, especially in terms of economics. In turn, the credibility of U.S. policy toward the region has been questioned, prompting some countries to seek alternative foreign policies.

The United States has been relatively reactive toward changes in the region. It hasn’t paid sufficient (or due) attention to the unfolding or possible changes or dynamics in the region. Sometimes, issue-by-issue or selective engagement has marked U.S. policy toward the region. This has led some to question whether the United States has a clear vision for the Asia-Pacific region backed up by a comprehensive knowledge and profound understanding of regional dynamics and concerns.

The U.S. approach has been driven by traditional security concerns and concepts. Consequently, it has relied mainly on bilateral alliances (U.S.-ROK. U.S.-Japan, U.S.-Australia) and neglected other mechanisms and institutions. While the United States has often underscored the parallel or complementary development of bilateral and multilateral cooperation mechanisms, it has usually reverted to bilateral mechanisms since its primary concerns have been somewhat traditional. However, regional countries have other security concerns, and they may seek alternative mechanisms that can properly address emerging security issues.

In the face of China’s rising influence, the U.S. pivot toward East Asia will be welcomed by most East Asian states as a stabilizing influence. But the U.S. must tighten its relationship with the region in various dimensions and on a range of issues, not just through verbal commitments, but though concrete actions. It should try to build a “system of systems” for regional cooperation and integration and become a real resident power in the region.

Against this backdrop, China sees some of this as an effort to encircle it, and four of the five elements of U.S. policy toward the Asia-Pacific region could be considered encircling measures. Certainly, it’s not possible to ignore the possibility that U.S. policies might force its allies or partners to make a strategic choice between the United States and China, something that might invite friction between the U.S. and its allies/partners. The relationship between China and other regional powers is extremely complex and complicated, meaning regional countries can’t make such a choice without suffering side effects. U.S. understanding of this is necessary, but whether the United States is able to deepen and widen cooperation with China and strengthen its other four policy pillars is what will determine the success of U.S. policy toward East Asia.

The U.S. and its allies/partners haven’t discussed some of the fundamental issues, namely, the desirable regional architecture for the region. While they are talking about peace, stability, and prosperity, they have rarely thought about the conditions that will bring this about. In other words, a thorough assessment and forecasting of the future strategic environment of the region hasn’t been properly carried out. Without a common vision or efforts to introduce guiding principles for the attainment of this vision, it isn’t possible to overcome strategic distrust.

Ultimately, the United States needs to take into account the concerns of its allies and partners and to enhance its understanding of regional dynamics in East Asia. With that in mind, strategic dialogue with regional countries must be strengthened and expanded to cover broad areas of concern. And its active participation in and contribution to multilateral fora are necessary. Proper development of bi- and multilateral cooperation will help the U.S. to become the resident power in East Asia. 

Kang Choi is a professor and Director-General for American Studies at the Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade. This is an edited version of an article published by Pacific Forum CSIS here.

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The challenges confronting the United States today, Kagan contends, “are not greater than the challenges the United States faced during the Cold War,” when Washington worked to contain Soviet expansion by cultivating ties with war-depleted countries in the Soviet Union’s neighborhood. Today, having established strategic alliances with several of China’s neighbors, the United States is in a more favorable position than China, whose emergence as a rising power started from a “relatively weak” base. According to Kagan, Beijing faces considerable limits due to its geostrategic location, and it’s China’s turn to scramble, while the United States needs only to “stand still,” to “hold on to what it has” and secure its position. If the United States was able to succeed in the Cold War, the argument goes, conditions would appear to favor the U.S. now, as well.

There’s some merit in this, but also grounds for skepticism over the idea that the United States can afford to stand still in the face of China’s increasing competition and influence. Indeed, China’s scramble today in some ways bears a striking resemblance to the U.S. scramble half a century ago, suggesting a bumpy road ahead for any nation that Beijing deems to be standing in its way.

The foundation of U.S. success in the Cold War was its ability to translate economic growth into military capabilities and “soft power” capacity, something the Soviet Union failed to do because of the underlying weaknesses in its economy and overinvestment in the military. In contrast, for all the unease created by rapid increases in China’s military spending, the Chinese defense budget has been kept at a far more sustainable level than that of the Soviet Union. It’s also worth recalling that back in the 1980s, increased investment in the country’s military complex forced the Soviets to halt the production of some other civilian goods. The Chinese defense budget isn’t proving such a drain on resources, and isn’t shackling the economy the way Soviet efforts did. Indeed, while the Soviet economy lagged in comparison with the United States, China’s has been projected to surpass the U.S. in terms of GDP by 2025, by some estimates. As a result, China has the luxury that the United States once had, namely of being able to throw a little money around to try to build support in its neighborhood.

The fact that China is currently surrounded by a web of U.S. alliances in East Asia and the Pacific may seem comforting for the United States, but there are a number of caveats. For a start, many of the closest U.S. allies in the region are also enmeshed in a web of interdependence with China, which explains their reluctance to upset Beijing.

But there’s another interesting point that is sometimes overlooked amidst the understandable attention paid to China’s moves in East Asia. Just as the United States worked hard to develop alliance and influence in Cold War Europe, the Middle East and East Asia, China has been investing economic and political capital in courting Latin America, engaging Europe, expanding its presence in the Middle East and buying off Africa. China, then, may find ways to jump any diplomatic fence erected around it.

But there’s another parallel that should trouble the United States. Ultimately, what brought about the Soviet collapse was a combination of domestic policy failures, which long undermined the country before over exertion on foreign soil exhausted Soviet energy, pushing it into a downward spiral. And the United States today could find itself on its own downward spiral, as it confronts a troubled economy marked by huge deficits and a divided political system that has at times ceased to function. Of course, the Soviet Union problem was exacerbated by a centralized model that contrasts with the U.S. liberal democratic system. But the outcome will remain the same: the accumulation of power by one nation, to the detriment of a distracted and declining force.

The good news for the United States is that China’s attempt to sell its image abroad and wield its own soft power has met with limited success. The U.S. model still holds more sway, from Europe to much of East Asia and in between. But to retain this dominance, the U.S. must press home its advantages. U.S. global influence can be fostered only if the U.S. system itself is able to function and deliver on promises that other systems can’t.

This shouldn’t mean the United States turning inward and retreating from global commitments. Rather, the United States needs to be able to showcase its resilience – at home and abroad – if it is to continue to maintain its appeal. This will mean Washington demonstrating that it is both able and willing to defend global assets, and that it will stand by values that it supposedly holds dear – including an open global trading system, free and fair access to the global commons, and respect for the rule of law.

By reaffirming its commitment to Asia in recent months, Washington is shifting the focus of international attention back to China’s backyard, compelling China to reassess its ambitions in its neighborhood. But this strategy will only succeed if the Obama administration and its successors can prove that such reengagement is serious and durable, and that it is more about substance than public announcements.

All this means that the United States must respond to China’s scramble with its own scramble, both at home and abroad. Standing still just isn’t an option.

Le Thuy Trang is a researcher at the Foreign Policy and Strategic Studies, Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam.

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The last few years have seen enormous changes sweep the world. Of all trends, one of the most notable is the rise of Asia. From your perspective, should Europeans fear the increasing wealth and power of Asian countries?

From a Danish perspective, as we look at the enormous changes in the world, you can choose to be scared and nervous, or you can choose to see opportunities. There’s no doubt that we are seeing this as a great opportunity.

We have to remember that there is a bit of catching up still to do in the rest of the world. If you look at Asia twenty years ago, half the population was living in a situation of poverty. That has been decreased over the last couple of decades. The way that economic growth has been used as a tool in fighting poverty should be acknowledged.

We aren’t going to have a Europe that grows at the speed of Asian countries – we just need to get back to a situation where we lower our unemployment and have normal growth rates. We aren’t trying to achieve 8 percent to 9 percent growth, so there’s a lot of room for Asian countries to grow since they are starting from such very low levels compared to our welfare and prosperity.

In January, former Australian Foreign Minister Kevin Rudd delivered a powerful address to the Royal Institute of International Affairs entitled Asia Rising, Europe Declining, and the Future of the West. He warned that Europe would need to “embrace far-reaching financial and economic reform to provide the platform for renewed growth, rather than economic decline.” However, the world has now seen voters in France and Greece appear to reject their leaders’ vision for reform. How must the Council now respond? And, do you agree that Europe’s role as a “global player” is at stake if real economic growth doesn’t soon return to the continent?

The Western welfare system is under pressure in both Europe and the United States because we have financed it through loans, which of course isn’t sustainable. This is why Europe is working to find solutions to this problem – a challenge of high unemployment, low growth, and a lack of structural reforms. The rising powers of Asia are in the meantime.

If you look back six months and you see how the crisis looked, we were falling into the abyss. But, in the last six months, I would say that European leaders have shown resolve in fashioning solutions to these challenges. We’ve put in place the necessary measures and tools to handle a monetary union that wasn’t fully equipped to handle national financial markets with no control from Brussels. We have negotiated a fiscal compact that says that you can’t finance your welfare with loans, but that you must have a balanced budget and have a system in place to control national financial markets. In order to manage the long-term challenge, we also have put in place a firewall to ensure that the crisis in Greece is addressed and doesn’t spread to other parts of Europe.

We agree that there still needs to be reforms put in place in Europe. The same is the case for other parts of southern Europe and Ireland where what we are doing is buying time for the national governments to put in place the necessary reforms to regain competitiveness for their national economies. We want to make sure that when we come out on the other side, it’s as a stronger Europe than we were before the crisis.

Of course, when you are going through measures with such a direct impact on people’s lives, you need to do it at a speed where politicians in a democratic system get the voters behind them. We have to nurture the basis of the whole thing – our values. One of the key ones is that we are democracies. Unfortunately, when politicians aren’t leading up to their role of leading people and getting voters behind them, there will be problems along the way

But we also have to recognize how much we are asking of the people affected. In some countries, they already have lowered their wages by more than 10 percent, and they may need to do it even more in order to be competitive. They are moving in the right direction and we just need to be patient in order to make the reforms work.

I always say that Europe was a construction that started 50 to 60 years ago. In times of crisis, the answer has always been for more Europe not less. That’s the case again this time around. We are responding by saying that we want more solidarity.

These are hard times. We have high unemployment across Europe, although my own country is doing relatively well because we had healthier financial policies coming into the crisis. So, it will take some time. But these structural reforms will actually increase productivity in Europe and competitiveness of European countries. Once these have been fully implemented, I think that we will come out as a stronger Europe.

You spoke earlier about values. Another point that Rudd made at Chatham House was that the concept of the West lies not in its geography, but in its core values, for which Europe has “stood for centuries.” He argued that Europe “should not talk itself into an early grave politically, economically, strategically or in terms of the core values.” Do you see any risk that Europe’s core values are under threat as a result in the shifting balance of power and global economic crisis? And do you harbor fears that rising European nationalism and racism represent a real threat to Europe’s leadership in the world, particularly on human rights?

I fully agree with that statement. In difficult times, you always see nationalist movements. You see it here in the United States, in Europe, and in other places. You have these populist movements that try to gain support. But I maintain that Europe is built on these values and it would undermine our own basis to move away from those values. So, I don’t see Europe moving away from our core values.

Our challenge will be to regain our strength and continue to promote our core values like democracy and human rights. We believe deep down in our hearts that these are for all mankind to enjoy. When you are struggling with yourself, it becomes more difficult to promote these values. But, we will continue to do so, and sometimes will have discussions with our Asian colleagues who challenge these values.

The way Asia is developing is changing Asia as well. We think that the European system is a very good and unique example of how you can create a very large space for stability and security. We therefore think that we have a lot to offer Asia in terms of our experience in building multilateral systems where all of the different issues between states can be managed.

If you think of Europe 100 years ago compared to today, and think about what impact institutions like NATO and European enlargement have had on stability and prosperity in Europe, then you can see how these things can be exported as an inspiration to Asian cooperation frameworks like ASEAN and other frameworks. It’s my perception that the roots of Asian institutions aren’t as deep as in Europe. But we can help to promote these multilateral institutions in Asia and help to manage all of the issues that will pop up as different countries in Asia develop, like Burma.

A final point Rudd made was that the West should “engage China and other emerging economies within the existing and emerging framework of the global and regional rules based order, so that future Chinese leaders embrace the need for such an order to continue, although with political and economic power appropriately shared within it.” In Europe's view, what level of accommodation is appropriate? And do you believe that emerging economies like China will find the political and economic power that Europe will be willing to concede sufficient to sustain the status quo in the international system?

I very much agree with (Rudd’s remarks). I was working for the United Nations before coming here and one of the challenges for the U.N. is to continue to be relevant as a global organization. What’s needed is to adapt to the new reality and reform our international institutions so that they can be a framework to handle international and regional issues.

We are therefore pushing to reform these international institutions to accommodate the needs and new power of rising powers like Brazil, India, and China. If we don’t do it, global issues will be handled outside of the existing international frameworks, which isn’t in our interest. They will be handled in new frameworks where we won’t have the opportunity to promote our solutions.

Of course, the multilateral system of the 20th century, which was built on Western values, will have to be reviewed. When you have new, powerful players coming onto the world scene, there will be a challenge to those structures. You have to look to develop new structures to enable those new players as they become economic and political powers. We want to find ways to work with Asia to find common solutions to the great global challenges that we will face moving forward.

Look at the International Monetary Fund. We are working to rebalance the board. We have agreed there might be too many Europeans there and we – Europe – are willing to give away a bit of power and increase the power of emerging powers.

But, if you look at the U.N. or Rio+20, those powers who claim to still be developing countries must also realize that they have a different role now. They can’t just push the Group of 77 in front of them. We need to have a realization that with these new changes come responsibilities from those who deserve a better place at the table.

One area where Denmark and Europe has sought a leadership role is on climate change. However, earlier this year,  the BASIC (Brazil, South Africa, India, and China) group of countries vehemently opposed the European Union’s decision to charge airlines for carbon emissions, saying such charges “violate international laws and jeopardize global efforts to fight climate change.” Although some compromise may be reached, it appears Europe will be unable to advance its climate change agenda on the international stage, especially in the face of strong opposition from emerging economies. From Europe’s perspective, what can be accomplished in the next five years with respect to climate change on the world stage? And can Europe still emerge as a leader on climate change if it lacks the political and economic leverage to induce emerging economies to follow its path?

We tried (unsuccessfully) for many, many years to find a solution within a multilateral framework. And so we put into place (our own) system. It’s not discriminatory. It doesn’t differentiate between European and third country airlines. It’s not extra-territorial. We think this is the right way forward, even though we see grave opposition toward it.

What is possible in the next five years? On climate change, we’ve already come a long way. Are we moving too fast ? Maybe so. But we don’t have a lot of time. The clock is running out. If we continue the way we do, the temperature will rise, according to the scientists, by six degrees Centigrade – four more than the goal established in Copenhagen.

Europe is moving forward. We are trying to set the example for the rest of the world that you can continue to have economic growth and be energy efficient. In the last 30 years in my country, we have grown about 76 percent and kept energy consumption totally flat by measures to become more energy efficient. We actually have even lowered our carbon dioxide emissions. So this can be done. Of course, we need to go into green financing so that it isn’t going to be hampering the development in the rest of the world. We also need to find the right way to transfer technologies to those countries.

A lot can be achieved leading by example. I continue to believe that a multilateral deal like what we attempted in Copenhagen is going to be difficult. The goal in Durban was to develop a legally binding instrument by 2050. I think the E.U. will be ready to sign on to that. But I’m not sure that the United States will be able to move forward on climate or energy legislation in the political quarters of this country. (In fact), there needs to be movement by both the United States and China. China also needs to accept that what they are doing nationally is something that you need to reflect internationally.

So I’m not ruling out the possibility that something can be accomplished. I’m just saying that it’s not a slam dunk, or something easy to accomplish by 2050.

As a member of the Arctic Council, Denmark will play a critical role in managing an open Arctic. There are concerns that non-Arctic countries, particularly China, could take a revisionist stance on the rules and norms advanced by Arctic countries. Do you think these concerns are at all warranted? Do you harbor any fears that the Arctic could become a region of instability as a result of the shifting global balance of power?

The Arctic is really opening up. Our approach in Denmark has been that we need governance in place before the whole thing explodes. If you have such governance in place, there will be no unstable developments.

So, the five Arctic coastal states – Russia, Norway, Denmark/Greenland, Canada, and the United States – took the initiative to have the Ilulissat meeting, (where) we said that we have the legal framework in place to handle the various legal issues which will come up. We agreed that the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and on-the-line customary international law (represent) the legal framework that we are going to use to handle judicial issues. We also said that the Arctic Council is the institution that will manage the opportunities and challenges that (arise) when the Arctic opens up. In the 2011 Arctic Council foreign ministers’ meeting, we renewed this commitment to governance and put political emphasis on the Arctic Council.

To your point though, we have long been proponents of including all who have a stake in the Arctic. For example, where you have a new sea lane going through the Arctic, we know very well that you must have the necessary rules in place to avoid another Exxon Valdez. We need to have standards in place to ensure that ships going through aren’t unsafe to the environment.

We know that these ships aren’t going to be just Danish, Russian, and American but also Chinese, South Korean, and others. So, we want them to be inside the tent, not outside. We therefore have been pushing for the Arctic Council to allow for observers to participate and be part of the debate. This is China, Japan, South Korea, and the European Community.

We are still pushing for this because we believe this is the solution for the challenge. Sweden and Norway (support us). The U.S. also believes in allowing observers in the meeting. But there’s still some hesitancy before some Arctic states move forward with this.

Andrew Erickson and Gabe Collins have pointed out that “Danish diplomatic assistance is opening the gate for China to establish a strategic foothold in the Arctic.” In their view, “Danish diplomacy is literally following the money as some of the country’s policy elites turn away from the U.S.” Do you agree with their characterization of Danish bilateral relations with China and the U.S.?

We’ve had a very close cooperation with the U.S. on the Arctic. These quotations presuppose that the U.S. wants to keep China out of the Arctic. I don’t see that in any way in my conversations. We want to work with the U.S. to establish the necessary framework to manage the Arctic – our last new frontier – as best we can. Our leaders believe the best way to do that is through bilateral and multilateral cooperation and building governance. The fact that China is interested in the natural resources of Greenland or Canada or the northern part of Russia doesn’t really change that.

We have home rule in Greenland so Danish Greenlanders decide a lot of what goes on there. But I do know that they would welcome closer U.S. interest in developing some of the resources in Greenland, such as oil and gas, rare earth metals, and other minerals. Our wish in Denmark is that (Arctic development in Greenland) is done in a way that promotes the Greenlandic population so that they benefit and prosper from the new opportunities that open up from the exploitation of natural resources.

Its been reported that Denmark intends to boost its exports to emerging economies by 50 percent over the next five years. What new policies will Denmark put in place to accomplish this goal? Which BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) countries will be of particular emphasis?

There is a new discussion underway in Denmark. In the past, we saw a need to invest in the workforce. But we realize workforce innovation isn’t enough. We also need production – it provides the basis for innovation. We are therefore now moving aggressively to keep hi-tech production in Denmark.

In terms of emerging markets exports, there are four sectors where we particularly aim to grow: 1) Cleantech; 2) Pharmaceutical and Biotech; 3) Healthcare; 4) Food Technology. We are focusing on exports to all of these. But we are also focused on second tier countries as well.

The next economic boost in the world will be in Asia, and maybe a little later in Africa. If you establish yourself in these countries now, you’ll have competitive companies there when it takes off instead of trying to access these markets when other competitors already have the lion’s share.

Although we didn’t talk about it here, we think that what has happened in Asia could and should happen in Africa. The focus is so much on Asia. If African can get some of the same development, it could have a major impact not only on fighting poverty there, but also ending some of the armed conflicts on the world’s most war torn continent. Hopefully, it will come soon. We must remember that Asia came much faster than we envisioned.

Eddie Walsh is a freelance journalist who covers Africa and the Asia-Pacific. He also serves as a non-resident fellow at Pacific Forum CSIS and a full member of the International Network of Emerging Nuclear Specialists. Follow him on Twitter: @aseanreporting

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Clearly, Syria is in the midst of a protracted humanitarian crisis. With thousands killed and ongoing deadly clashes between security forces and armed opposition – including a bombing attack Thursday in Damascus that killed dozens and shaved the facade off a military intelligence building – the international community  is still struggling to effectively implement a roadmap to peace.

Ongoing shelling of opposition strongholds, especially in Homs and Idlib, has further intensified calls for some kind of international intervention, sentiments given voice at the Friends of Syria Summit at the end of March in Istanbul. Yet it’s also clear that there’s little appetite, especially among many NATO countries, for intervention, whether in the form of establishing humanitarian buffer zones or the imposition of a no-fly-zone.

On top of the mission creep associated with the Libyan intervention, Syria’s superior defensive capabilities, relatively astute and intact leadership, densely populated landscape, and lack of hydrocarbon resources has so far deterred any direct intervention. Yet what makes Syria so special is the degree to which it enjoys tremendous operational, diplomatic, and strategic support from three Asian powers: namely, Iran, China, and Russia.

This means that there only two realistic options: first, the Gulf Cooperation Council’s (GCC) plan to step up its logistical and financial support for the Free Syrian Army (FSA) in order to reverse the regime’s military edge; or an international mission followed by independent monitoring and an eventual political settlement between the government and all relevant factions in the opposition, especially the Syrian National Council (SNC).

So far, it seems that the second option has been enjoying greater international resonance. However, regional states – from GCC members to Turkey – have reserved the right to some kind of intervention.

But whereas in Libya a coalition of NATO and Arab forces – emboldened by the acquiescence of Eastern powers – decided the fate of the Gaddafi regime, the Syrian crisis is undoubtedly contingent on the sustained and genuine cooperation of these Asian powers, which have so far stood by Bashar Al-Assad’s regime.  The idea behind the Annan mission, led by former U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan, was to take into account this geopolitical fact, and Annan’s strategic foresight has played a pivotal role in the crafting, lobbying, and implementation of his so-called Six-Point Peace Plan.

There are three reasons why the Annan plan appeared to have a chance for success (or at least of improving conditions on the ground). First there was his acceptance of the fact that the Assad regime still wields considerable control over the country, so Annan chose to deal directly with him. Second, Annan employed the help of Syria’s main Asian partners through continuous lobbying and high-profile diplomatic visits to Moscow, Beijing, and Tehran. Finally, instead of getting caught up in the regime change discourse, Annan focused on the most essential elements, namely the immediate cessation of violence, putting monitoring teams on the ground, providing much-needed humanitarian aid to affected areas, and paving the way for a political resolution.

The best way to dissuade Assad from further large-scale security operations is by putting pressure on the regime’s external patrons, who have played a significant role in allowing the regime to survive amidst the economic meltdown and political chaos. Besides, if the regime – with or without Assad – is intent on surviving, and avoiding total international isolation, it needs to agree to some form of diplomatic settlement with the international community.

On the other hand, Syria’s Asian partners are also feeling the pressure, and have started to encourage the Syrian regime to suspend its deadly security operations. Even Tehran, Assad’s most important ally, has called for a political solution and cessation of violence.  This is precisely why Assad agreed to the Annan plan.

It’s noteworthy that the “Asia 3” backed the Annan plan, and they are likely to continue to do so as long as two conditions are met: first, there no direct calls within it for Assad to step down; second, any resolution or measure should not exclusively blame the regime for the violence, instead placing appropriate blame on the opposition.

All three Asian powers have their own interest in seeing a peaceful and diplomatic resolution to the Syrian impasse.

Syria hosts Russia’s sole naval base in the Mediterranean, allowing the latter to project its power in the waters along Europe’s southern borders. Syria is Iran’s most important regional ally, allowing Tehran to project its power throughout the Levant. For China, energy security is a concern. Any military intervention in Syria could potentially drag its most important regional ally, Iran, into the picture, precipitating a regional war that could lead to disruptions in oil supplies.

Russia and China also have another reason to back Syria: they are not only interested in asserting their international presence, but are concerned another intervention in the Middle East could set a further precedent for intervention in their own backyards. After all, both Russia and China are facing separatist and/or insurgency movements within their own peripheries.

In addition to troubles in the Russian Caucasus and Xinjiang Province, rising popular discontent with the rigidities of the Russian and Chinese political systems, coupled with economic uncertainty, is also raising serious concerns over the possibility of large-scale democratic upheaval in the coming years.

All three powers have direct interests in keeping the Syrian regime in power, preventing the emergence of a failed state or a hostile revolutionary government. Thus, any political settlement will need to properly employ the influence of these three powers by recognizing their unique set of interests.

Javad Heydarian is a Manila-based foreign affairs analyst focusing on international security and development issues. His articles have been featured or cited in Foreign Policy in Focus, Asia Times, UPI, the Transnational Institute and the Tehran Times, among other publications. He can be reached at: Jrheydarian@gmail.com.

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It’s also not inconceivable that the Bo Xilai affair could increase expectations for the party to expedite political reforms. And while this may not always be perceived positively by individual party members, it has nonetheless made clear the need for change at a higher level. Still, all this may also heighten party tensions, particularly in the short-term, over how the leadership transition ought to take place.  

On the foreign policy front, Beijing has its hands full with a range of regional and global challenges. Closer to home, there are China’s ties with North Korea, which have come under increased scrutiny. The recent claims that China sold North Korea components for a military transporter aren’t likely to go down well with Beijing’s policymakers. And while the decision by Beijing to throw its lot in with the international community in rebuking Pyongyang over its latest missile test marked a rare break from its usual support for its neighbor, the fact that China-North Korean ties were reaffirmed in a high-profile meeting shortly after suggests that Beijing’s dealings with its neighbor are likely to be characterized by continuity rather than change.

The standoff with the Philippines over the Scarborough Shoal over the past few weeks, meanwhile, has also raised the possibility of conflict. At present, there’s little sign that either Beijing or Manila will acquiesce to the other’s demands. Philippine President Benigno Aquino, for example, is reported to have said that the disputed areas belong to the Philippines and that it would continue to “show the flag” despite the presence of China’s maritime vessels.

China, for its part, has by some accounts described the South China Sea as a core national interest, meaning that it won’t back down from its own claims. As such, any new leadership in China is expected to project a strong front as far as China’s territorial interests are concerned, something that could further aggravate relations between China and its maritime neighbors, especially those with similar littoral claims.

These are testing times for China, posing the most severe of tests for the Chinese government since Tiananmen more than two decades ago. How will Beijing respond? There’s a Chinese saying that “hidden in every crisis is an opportunity.” How the current leadership reacts to its latest challenges – and whether it really can find such opportunities – will plot the course for the fifth generation of leaders.

Liu Liu is a Research Analyst in the China Program. Benjamin Ho Tze Ern is an Associate Research Fellow at the Centre for Multilateralism Studies at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.

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ANZUS recently celebrated its 60th anniversary. To remain relevant, the terms of the treaty must be regularly updated to account for the changing security environment. For example, the Australian and U.S. governments announced earlier this year that a cyber attack on either nation would trigger the treaty. However, some say there are larger questions to be answered than just what new threats fall under the treaty. There are issues of strategic responsibilities and shared costs which can't be overlooked. So, from your perspective, what is the current state of ANZUS? What more needs to be done to modernize the treaty, and how is Australia responding to America’s call for its allies to contribute more to global security within the context of ANZUS?

Most people – Australians included – have a fixed view of the American-Australian alliance. ANZUS is just part of the relationship – a sort of boilerplate document that underpins it all. So, there's a sort of assumption that it was there in 1951 and it's the same now. It isn't. It changes constantly. It changes quantitatively in the characteristic of the relationship between the two countries and the things they do together. It also changes geo-politically as the area that Australia inhabits alters in terms of importance to the United States.

One of the reasons it took so long to get ANZUS in place from 1945-51 across successive Australian governments was because the South Pacific was no longer relevant to the United States once World War II was over. The focal points of the Cold War were already relevant by the end of the 1940s. The global political system of the Cold War had as its focal points Europe, North Asia, and to a degree the Middle East because of oil. Particularly after the Vietnam War, the Nixon Doctrine assumed not much importance to Southeast Asia and none at all to the South Pacific. So, the zones of fascination to Australia were barely important to the United States.

Our significance to the United States was the product of two things. In 1941, our significance was that we had to sign the Japanese peace Treaty, and ANZUS was an exchange of that signature. It was the 1960s that dramatically changed that relationship though. As John F. Kennedy decided that the focal points weren't the only things at stake in the Cold War, Southeast Asia was temporally put on the table as the United States sought allies in Vietnam, which upgraded the relationship with Australia until Australian training of troops in South Vietnam was successfully sought in 1962.

Even more important, (U.S. Defense Secretary) Robert McNamara completely reinvented the U.S. strategic deterrent, which gave the U.S. new requirements for communications, early warning systems, and intelligence gathering systems. Australia was the quiet continent that was the perfect ground station for installation of systems of those kinds. Those systems and agreements associated with them are at least as important in characterizing the relationship between the United States and Australia as ANZUS. They've changed technologically as technological changes have occurred in the U.S. military. They remain important, and they are if you like the ballast of the relationship between Australia and the U.S.

There are now many other things being done. Technological change has now put cyber on the table, and the agreements that we have in place are pretty advanced. The world in which we now live places at least as much premium on intelligence gathering as the Cold War did – probably a bit more on the HUMINT side than the Cold War did. So the intelligence relationship is increasingly significant.

The real increase though of Australian significance to the U.S. is geographic. The conclusion of the Cold War assumes a new central dynamic in the word system. That central dynamic is the rise of new economic powers – most of which are situated along the Asia-Pacific.

All of a sudden, Australia has gone from the backwater strategically – with the exception of those joint facilities – and is now the Southern tip of the focal point of the global political system. So, where does the alliance go? Pretty much strength on strength on the basis of that argument.

The Iranian nuclear program has garnered headlines for the last year. The U.S. Secretary of Defense’s comments a few months ago that an Israeli attack on the program is probable in the coming months have only fueled concerns that we are on the verge of another major conflict. What are your views on the clear and present threat that Iran poses to the world? Do you think that a major escalation in the conflict is likely in the next six months and what is at stake if Israel or others commit to a major attack on Iran?

We think it's tremendously important that the Iranian government understands completely that the rest of the globe is concerned that Iran has failed to answer serious international concerns with its nuclear program.

The effects of Iranian nuclear weapon development could cause instability in the Middle East and beyond. Then we would have a totally different world where nuclearization is general and there is greater possibility of devastation in any particular conflict. Those are big stakes, and therefore we've done everything we can as a government to advocate against it, including at the United Nations and in our dialogue with other countries who are interested in the issue.

We do everything we can do ensure that those sanctions are hard enough that it will change the opinion of the Iranian government and will change the direction of where it is going because the long-term consequences if they do go down the nuclear road are horrific. If they persist and it becomes a conflict, then we all bear the economic struggles.

Many observers believe that U.S.-Pakistan relations are at an all-time low. New efforts in Congress to cut Pakistan aid potentially raise new issues that undermine Pakistani confidence in the U.S. relationship and will do little to help the Obama administration repair relations. From Australia’s perspective, do you think that the West’s engagement with Pakistan is on the verge of a radical shift?

We take a very firm view that Pakistan must be encouraged. While it's not an easy thing to do, it has to be done. When everybody is frustrated with Pakistan, and many countries are frustrated with them, at the end of the day, you sit down and think it through and the conclusion you come up with is that you should stay engaged.

We have a strong relationship with Pakistan ourselves. We continue our relationship with the Pakistani military because it's a very important contribution, so we stay in conversation with the Pakistanis. We simply hope that Pakistan succeeds as a country and that Pakistan plays a constructive role in things like Afghanistan.

The U.S. Defense Department recently announced the launch of a new Air-Sea Battle program. But, as the press pointed out following the press conference at the Pentagon, the U.S. military has done little to articulate what unique contributions the Air-Sea Battle provides to the U.S. military and how it differs from the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s existing responsibilities. As an important ally of the United States whose national security rests largely on your air-sea gaps, what is your perception of the concept and do you believe that the new office offers any distinct contributions to your national security interests? Does it send a message to you when they have O6s stand up and say they will focus on air-sea battle after the Darwin speech?

We have said since 1992, the defense of Australia is maritime defense. The maritime defense in the first instance is the capacity to sufficiently use surface and sub-surface forces to defend Australia from anyone and anything with technical ability that exists within the region if circumstances arise that those who possess those technological capabilities have changed their intent (and) intend to do us harm.

Maritime strategy and maritime defense is therefore something Australia is entirely familiar with. And so, when the Americans say they have given considerable effort in developing doctrine around the concept of the air-sea battle, i.e. maritime strategy, we are definitely in (on) it.

(The fact that senior U.S. military staff are raising the issue) doesn't send a new message because Americans have been talking about, especially in its internal discussions, where it wants to focus its defense spending. There have been a lot of discussions that focus on maritime security and capacity to ground operations…The U.S. has been discussing that for a long time.

Eddie Walsh is a freelance journalist who covers Africa and the Asia-Pacific. He also serves as a non-resident fellow at Pacific Forum CSIS and a full member of the International Network of Emerging Nuclear Specialists. Follow him on Twitter: @aseanreporting

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Relations between Japan and India are often criticized for lacking initiative. However, as commentators and strategists alike increasingly speak of the “Indo-Pacific” rather than the narrower “Asia-Pacific,” Japan and India are putting this broader concept into practice.

India first really appeared on Japan’s radar because of its impressive economic growth and the enormous potential India’s consumer and labor markets had for Japanese businesses struggling to cope with a shrinking population at home, and concern with over-dependence on China abroad. At the turn of the century, the “dot com” bubble, which highlighted India’s IT aptitude, coincided with some impressive results resulting from economic liberalization reforms initiated a decade earlier.

Still, trade remains at disappointing levels of $18 billion, just 1 percent of Japan’s total trade, even after the signing of a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) in 2011. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in India, however, while declining overall, has quadrupled from Japanese sources. Japanese companies see enormous potential in India’s young, aspirational and vast population – of India’s approximately 1.2 billion people, 60 percent are under the age of 30.

Today, over 800 companies are operating in India, focusing on automobiles, white goods and pharmaceuticals. The flagship project – the Delhi-Mumbai Industrial Corridor (DMIC), a 1,400 kilometer long link between the hubs of Mumbai and Delhi – is currently being implemented following Tokyo’s further commitment in late 2011 of more than $4.5 billion over the next five years.

With this promise and activity in mind, on April 30 Japan and India held their first “Strategic Economic Dialogue” in New Delhi. Issues discussed during the meeting included infrastructure, railways, rare earth exports and energy.

But the security dimension of the bilateral relationship is of particular importance to the region and international observers. Despite political uncertainty, catastrophic natural disasters and economic instability, Japan and India have recognized their common cause on several security issues.

Shared maritime security interests were the first to be noted, and continue to hold center stage. Both countries rely heavily on the safe passage of energy supplies through the Indian Ocean and, less explicitly, are concerned with China’s aspirations to build a blue water navy that could challenge the current regional power balance.

Japan and India have previously participated in the U.S.-India-led Malabar Exercises in 2007 and as a result of the sixth Strategic Dialogue between Foreign Minister Koichiro Gemba and his Indian counterpart, S.M. Krishna, joint exercises between the Indian Navy and Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Force will take place later this year. In addition, a “maritime dialogue mechanism” is to be launched to further anti-piracy off the coast of Somalia and improve information sharing. As former Ambassador to Japan H.K. Singh notes, through these efforts Japan and India can create “regional public goods.”

In December, during Noda’s trip to India, Japan relaxed its four-decade long arms export ban. Whether India will take advantage of this remains to be seen. Thus far, the U.K. has been the major beneficiary, which some see as consolation for London losing out on the Eurofighter bid to replace Japan’s next-generation fighter jet.

India hasn’t explicitly called for joint development, but military experts in India have voiced interest in Japan’s advanced technology. In 2011, India was the world’s biggest importer of arms, reflecting a shift towards the modernization of its military hardware. India’s ports in particular require attention, while according to some reports, the Indian Navy is currently evaluating the Shinmaywa US-2 amphibious aircraft, which has a range of 4,700 kilometers.

India remains hesitant over suggestions that ties with Japan come at the expense of others in the region. India’s location means it’s surrounded by often antagonistic neighbors, as well as Russia and China. In April, Krishna traveled to Moscow to meet his Chinese and Russian counterparts as part of the Russia-India-China trilateral partnership that has become increasing less relevant since the establishment of the BRICS meetings.

Gradually, however, India and Japan are recognizing the benefit of such “mini-laterals” On April 24, for instance, Japan hosted a Japan-India-U.S. trilateral dialogue in Tokyo, the second such session since the forum was inaugurated in Washington, D.C. in December 2011. The discussions received relatively little attention, but considering China’s opposition to previous attempts to group like-minded nations – such as the failed Quad initiative (with the addition of Australia) in 2007 – Beijing’s muted response was a positive development.

Even on the most politically sensitive subject of nuclear energy, Japan and India are pushing forward with negotiations on Japanese nuclear exports, since they began in June 2010.

A bilateral treaty hasn’t been concluded and certain elements of disagreement need to be addressed. These most likely refer to India’s continued refusal to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Japanese officials have admitted this doesn’t in itself represent a barrier to a conclusion, but will cause delays domestically due to bureaucrats who are eager to placate anti-nuclear fears that have taken hold following the Great East Japan Earthquake.

For much of Japan and India’s dialogue, solely bilateral issues have been pursued. However, shared security concerns over third parties are gradually beginning to enter into the dialogue.

North Korea’s nuclear program has never directly threatened India, which has understandably shown greater concern for Pakistan's nuclear capability. However, India seeks a greater regional role and Pyongyang continues its provocations, New Delhi has been encouraged to take a position.

Burma’s reforms are another potential topic for discussion. Japan has never been truly comfortable with the Western approach to Burma, instead preferring greater engagement than the U.S. or Europe. India has also sustained channels to Burma’s leadership – channels the U.S. has recently started incorporating into its own efforts to encourage political reform.

In July, meanwhile, Tokyo will be hosting an international conference on Afghanistan, a country whose stability remains a high priority for India. As bilateral trust increases, cooperation on such third-country issues is likely to continue.

Of course there are some reasons for caution. India’s economic miracle has weakened in recent months, with growth slowing to 6.9 percent in 2011-2012. High inflation and charges of complacency among Indian elites, who are hesitant to enact further economic reforms, coupled with high-profile cases of corruption continue to taint the Indian record.

Furthermore, India’s strategic direction is still unknown. India’s dynamic economy has won it a seat at the high table of international politics, but New Delhi has continued to be indecisive in formulating a policy to respond to global challenges such as the Arab Spring.

Nevertheless, in both capitals, Japan-India relations enjoy cross-party support as well as encouragement from the United States. Although U.S. overtures towards India in recent years have no doubt accelerated Japan’s own efforts, Tokyo and New Delhi are taking the lead in developing one of the most important relationships for both their futures.

Japan-India relations are yet to reach their full potential, but as the recent meetings demonstrate, in fields including economic, disaster relief, military and strategic dialogue, significant progress is being made.

Victoria Tuke is a Daiwa scholar based in Tokyo.

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Both sides frequently dispute the others’ analysis. However, a recent Brookings report by Kenneth Lieberthal and Wang Jisi underscores how entrenched these views are, and just how prickly things are ahead of this week’s Strategic and Economic Dialogue in Beijing.

The logic behind the report is that “each side can better manage the issue of strategic distrust if its leaders have confidence that they have an accurate picture of the way the other leadership thinks on the issues that produce this distrust.” Based on this logic, the core of the report tries to understand each side’s point of view, with the aim of increasing mutual understanding. However, if one looks closely into the issues discussed in the report, it’s not clear whether it’s actually a lack of understanding so much as specific disagreements that are at the root of the distrust.

U.S. arms sales to Taiwan provide a good example. The report listed this issue as a source of Chinese suspicion of U.S. intentions, and tries to reduce mistrust by clarifying positions on both sides:

“U.S. weapons sales to Taiwan are viewed in Washington and Taipei as a necessary ingredient for sustaining the confidence of U.S. support in Taipei necessary for Taipei to continue to develop wide ranging cross-Strait relations. Those same sales in Beijing are viewed as confirming American arrogance and determination to interfere in China’s domestic affairs and to prevent peaceful unification from occurring, thereby harming a clearly-articulated Chinese core interest.” 

Be that as it may, these positions aren’t unknown to the leaders of both sides. In fact, after regular wrangling over this issue, each side knows very well the other’s thinking. With this in mind, it’s clear mistrust arises not from a lack of understanding, but more from fundamental disagreements intrinsic to the differences between the two countries’ political institutions, value systems and geostrategic interests.

Likewise, China’s concerned response to U.S. reconnaissance activities near China’s coast, and U.S. suspicion of a Chinese anti-access and area denial strategy, is listed in the report as another source of mistrust. Despite claims of freedom of navigation, U.S. surveillance activities along China’s coast are largely driven by its suspicion of China’s military intentions and capabilities. Chinese leaders understand U.S. thinking on this, while U.S. leaders also know that China is sensitive to the security of its coastal areas. These “mutual understandings” can be attested by official and unofficial pronouncements and publications on both sides. Nevertheless, both sides still carry on their potentially provocative activities. This is clearly not because they are unaware of each other’s thinking on the matter, but because they just don’t agree with each other, and both want to change the other’s behavior. In essence, their fundamental interests are at odds.

To be sure, misunderstandings, misconceptions or miscalculations between the two countries do exist and are something that can be worked on. But mistrust between the United States and China, especially when stemming from military and security issues, is inextricably intertwined with history, differences in political systems and values, and sometimes irreconcilable conflicts of interests. Such differences defy resolution unless mindsets or circumstances change. When the report asked the central question of “what array of military deployments and normal operations will permit China to defend its core security interests and at the same time allow America to continue to meet fully its obligations to its allies and friends in the region,” the answer essentially suggests that no middle ground has yet been found.

However, such profound disagreements by no means indicate that the U.S.-China relationship is ultimately a zero-sum game. The competitive part of the relationship, especially the military domain, may in fact be zero-sum, but this competitive domain is only part of the relationship. There remain many issues, such as in the non-traditional security arena, where the two countries’ leaders can find common ground to build trust and confidence.

Unfortunately, despite being well-intentioned, the report has been misinterpreted by alarmists as yet another manifestation of the troubling hostility between the two countries, and has been misused as evidence of zero-sum thinking in the Chinese leadership that calls for stronger hedging measures from Washington.

Yet setting the report aside, mistrust has actually been a normal state of affairs for U.S.-China relations, a situation that appears unlikely to become unmanageable under current circumstances as long as both sides exercise self-restraint. Long-time observers of U.S.-China relations know that there are always ups and downs in the relationship, and today’s mistrust by no means qualifies as a low point in bilateral ties. Indeed, it might be inevitable that today’s more regular engagement and better understanding between the two countries might actually increase the number of potential areas of friction.

Regardless, some degree of friction is still better than the almost complete lack of engagement of decades past. Without ignoring the potential danger from mutual mistrust, the current disagreements are in some ways a healthy sign of a maturing relationship. And given how much these two large countries differ politically and culturally, what exists today might not be so bad after all.

Yaping Wang is Program Manager of the Asia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. The views expressed are the author's own.

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The idea of a resource curse was developed in the 1980s, as economists noted that countries, particularly post-colonial ones, with large reserves of natural resources were often not developing as successfully as they potentially could. Sometimes, problems stem from economic causes, such as those faced by the Netherlands in the 1960s and ’70s, after huge reserves of natural gas were discovered in the North Sea. The export of this fossil fuel put tremendous strains on the economy’s manufactured goods, by driving up the exchange rate and making exports more expensive. Furthermore, human resources are drawn away from export-oriented industries, further eroding the competitiveness of the manufacturing sector. These economic pressures came to be known as “Dutch disease.”

There are also political consequences associated with a resource boom. When there’s a lack of manufacturing to begin with, a country’s elites are incentivized to fight for control over the resource base, rather than producing wealth by other means. It’s easier for them to distribute resource wealth to secure their own positions and enrich their political allies. Nigeria is an oft-cited example of this.

Both the economic and political pressures brought by control of a valuable resource can be mitigated in a variety of ways, including good governance through strong institutions. Norway is an example, with its oil revenues parked in a sovereign wealth fund, which is only allowed to invest overseas. This prevents pork-barrel spending and limits the inflationary impact of resources.  Distribution of oil wealth is also heavily regulated.

North Korea, by all accounts, is rich in valuable natural resources, particularly coal, iron ore, gold ore, zinc ore, copper ore, limestone and graphite. North Korea is a statistics abyss, however, leaving a lot of guesswork for economists who keep an eye on the country. South Korea’s estimates put the North’s mineral resources figure at over $6 trillion.           

There’s growing interest in exploiting these resources for export through joint ventures. There are more trade fairs in Pyongyang than ever before, and last autumn, Rason became the first city outside of the capital to host an international trade fair. North Korean investment officers we have worked with on economics and business training have been incredibly busy sending delegations out on investment roadshows, and two major organizations were set up in the last two years to bring in investments.

Most of that foreign investment is Chinese, of course, and Chinese companies have redoubled their focus on securing North Korea’s underground wealth over the last several years. For those willing and able to navigate a very trying business environment, the combination of cheap labor and accessible resources can potentially pay large dividends.

According to KOTRA, China’s trade with North Korea has tripled since 2005. Recent data suggests North Korea’s trade deficit with China has improved on the back of natural resources: A joint Yonhap-IBK Economic Research Institute study concluded that China imported 8.42 million tons of minerals from North Korea from January to September last year, worth $852 million. This was triple the amount imported during the same period of 2010.

Some North Koreans have expressed wariness over the country’s increasing dependence on China. Nevertheless, since North Korea is unable to revive its transportation network, energy supplies, or manufacturing base on its own, the country appears to have little choice. Seoul, incidentally, is also concerned about China’s ever-greater ownership of North Korean resources, but not enough to overcome internal divisions over approaches to North Korea

The new leadership recognizes that it can’t rely forever on exhortations to sacrifice for the stake of security and must find a way to deliver economic results. This requires foreign currency, and therefore sellable products, of which North Korea has few. North Korea’s growing interest in exploiting resources through joint ventures can be seen in the radically increased authority that investment agencies have been endowed with compared to their predecessors 3 to 4 years ago, as well as in the investment pitches they’ve made to investors abroad.

New investment laws, whether well-drafted or not, and public pronouncements in favor of investments, whether supported by effective actions or not, make clear the government’s intentions. Over the last few years there have been multiple organizations competing for investments, suggesting a certain degree of competition at the apex of North Korean society. Cross-agency communication is notoriously bad in North Korea. Indeed, part of the country’s philosophy of centralized rule means that organizations share information upward, while remaining stovepiped from parallel organizations. Different investment agencies appear to have had different patrons and belong to different patronage networks. North Korean government officials have described the competition for investments as “intense.”

As many agencies take a cut of the investments they bring in, the blurred lines between profit-seeking and regulatory responsibilities, combined with some degree of competition with rival organizations, means that a development strategy based on foreign investments could degenerate into rent-seeking by rival patronage networks if the process is managed poorly.

Recent reports from North Korea indicate that the two main agencies dealing with investment are in greater contact with each other. The Joint Venture and Investment Committee and the Daepung Investment Group operate under new investment laws passed in 2010 and amended in January this year. These laws are North Korea’s attempt to clarify the legal status of joint ventures along the lines of China’s own investment laws. Unifying competing institutions and revising legal codes are both positive signs.

However, it remains to be seen how the relationship between JVIC and Daepung will develop. Discussions with North Koreans indicate that understanding of the rule of law and property rights remains weak, that transparency is a major issue, and that much commercial activity takes place outside of the legal framework put down on paper. This exposes business people without the right connections and backing to arbitrary penalties.       

If managing resources and overcoming the so-called curse is a matter of concerted, institutional commitment and the corresponding development of effective economic institutions, North Korea will struggle to avoid the trap, both in economic and political terms. Pyongyang will increase trade and exports, but resources could go to supporting different – sometimes overlapping, sometimes competing – groups of elites. The issues with rule of law and competition at the top of society, combined with large payouts from mining joint ventures, could actually lead to a “resource-driven equilibrium.” Marketization without good governance could result in a stagnant and isolated economy, much like Burma over the last decade, as broad-based economic development is ignored while a narrow elite is enriched and existing power structures are strengthened by resource wealth.

We use the term marketization to mean both the reduction of controls over State-Owned Enterprises as well as a relaxation of restrictions on smaller business people or the informal markets. The commanding heights of the economy will be firmly in control of various groups of elites. Lower down, trade and market activity might be tolerated. Yet at the same time, the additional wealth at the top can be invested in apparatuses of control. While living standards will improve marginally, Burma’s situation over the past decade shows that this isn’t enough to sustain broad-base economic development.

North Korea’s system has shown resilience to the encroachment of unofficial sources of news and information that have been growing since the mid-1990s. A more marketized economy with greater engagement with the outside world may allow more outside information in, yet paradoxically serve to bolster, rather than erode, this resilience. We might see a more internationally engaged economy, but one that’s still harnessed to maintain the social and political structures essentially as they are.

That marketization will naturally lead to other positive social and political changes in North Korea is too often assumed, and not questioned enough. Natural resources will provide more income for North Koreans. Nonetheless, we need to be prepared for the possibility that resource-fueled growth can lead to equilibrium where the economy is marketized, broader economic development remains a pipedream, and existing political structures that dominate North Korean society today are reinforced.

Andray Abrahamian is an Executive Director at Choson Exchange (www.chosonexchange.org), a Singapore-based non-profit focused on economics, business and legal knowledge exchange with North Koreans, and a lecturer at the University of Ulsan. Geoffrey See is a Managing Director of Choson Exchange.

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Without doubt, Singapore has the most technologically advanced armed forces amongst Association of Southeast Asian Nation states. Aside from its Integrated Knowledge-based Command and Control project, the Singaporean Defense Ministry has made numerous acquisitions over the past decade that indicate a shift towards both amphibious and precision strike capabilities.

These acquisitionsspan the air, ground and naval services of the armed forces, and include: Endurance-class Landing Platform Dock Ships; Formidable-class Stealth Frigates; F-15SG Multirole Fighters; F-16D fighters; the Bionix II Infantry Fighting Vehicleand the Gulfstream 550 Airborne Early Warning aircraft (G550-AEW). Moreover, Singapore’s Defense Minister Ng Eng Hen recently stated that Singapore is currently evaluating the possible procurement of the F-35 fighter.

Yet, despite these impressive force structural developments, at leasttwo glaring problems exist in the country’s armed forces that could cause problems in orientation at the operational and tactical levels.

First, Singapore’s defense planning has been more scenario-based and less threat-based (even though Singapore has often had uneasy relations with Indonesia and Malaysia). That is, Singapore’s security concerns have focused on a wide-range of contingencies within its immediate periphery by state and non-state actors. The Singaporean armed forces have also taken part in multilateral operations such as the Combined Task Force 151 to counter piracy in the Gulf of Aden. Yet the downside of Singapore’s varied roles is that as the number of scenarios multiplies, the scenarios could become increasingly hypothetical, overstretching Singapore’s capacity to prepare effectively.

Second, due to its lack of strategic depth, the armed forces are pegged to consistently maintain a forward-deployed stance with a high-level of operational readiness. The advantage is that the military is disciplined, and is ready to perform at a high level even with very little warning time. Yet questions remain over whether the country has adequate counterstrike capabilities to quickly thwart a threat, and if not, whether it has the stamina to sustain its forces in prolonged contingencies.

In both cases, there’s no perfect remedy, largely because of Singapore’s natural geopolitical characteristics. Yet while these problems are unlikely to bring the armed forces’ defense planning to a screeching halt, mishandling them could slow the benefits of Singapore’s military modernization efforts.

Singapore now needs to focus on how its military’s capabilities are used, rather than what capabilities are used. Without this adequate balance, Singapore’s defense planning could slip into technology-based planning, which not only increases the economic burdens, but also risks creating further strategic uncertainties.

This doesn’t mean that Singapore needs a wholesale overhaul of its defense planning. Rather, it should focus on fine-tuning and balancing the technological innovations in the armed forces. Now that the C4I Community has been put in place, the armed forces will need to perfect procedures and protocols so that the three service branches can mobilize in a cohesive and efficient manner.Additionally, it could also work on fostering a culture in which all branches of the armed services become properly attuned to its 3rd generation capabilities.

Singaporetakes a no-nonsense,corporate approach to military capability management, something that has allowed its armed forces to maintain a high level of operational preparedness. However, it is of the utmost importance that the operational and tactical aspects run in parallel with the impressive structural developments, rather than letting the technological aspects take on a life of their own. Ensuring this balance will be the key toadvancing Singapore’s role in regional security.

Ryo Hinata-Yamaguchi is a security affairs analyst affiliated with the FM Bird Entertainment Agency Scholar Project, a Sergeant First Class in the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force Reserve Component, and a non-resident SPF Fellow at Pacific Forum CSIS. The views expressed in this article are entirely the author’s own.

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