Much has been made over the last decade concerning the rise of Asia – led by China and India – and the continent’s increasingly important role. The announcement by U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton last year that the 21st century would be America’s “Pacific Century” further strengthened the belief that the epicenter of 21st century global politics would be located within Asia. And, as has been well-documented, ongoing economic turmoil has also led to growing numbers of Western countries looking at Asia – particularly China – for financial assistance. In light of various leadership transitions taking place later this year among the major powers, one can expect conditions in Asia to factor significantly in the political discourse of their leaders.

What does Asia’s increasing prominence mean for ASEAN – a ten-member political community whose regional presence has received growing attention from the global community of late? Already Washington has embarked on its “forward-deployed diplomacy” strategy in the region as evinced by Clinton’s attendance at last year’s ASEAN Regional Forum and her landmark visit to Burma in December. The United States’ recent conduct of separate high level meetings with both the Philippines and Singapore over defense and security issues suggests that ASEAN will be a strategic region as far as Washington’s military strategies are involved. In a recent interview on CNN, Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong, for his part, noted that the U.S. presence in the region since World War II has been a “tremendous benign influence” and that it was “a good example for the Chinese to seek to emulate.”

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With the United States and the European Union imposing one of the toughest sanction regimes ever on Iran, the world is inching closer to a potential catastrophic war at the heart of the Middle East. Meanwhile, Israel is suggesting a pre-emptive strike if sanctions fail to deter Iran’s nuclear program, with Tehran vowing to retaliate.

The economic sanctions are targeting Iran’s main exports, namely oil and gas, and increasingly freezing Iran’s central bank out of the global financial system. This has made it extremely difficult for Tehran to engage in large-scale, dollar-denominated international transactions, forcing the country to rely on cumbersome and often unreliable third-party financial institutions to undertake substantial trade deals.

The sanctions have been coupled with an intense diplomatic effort to convince Iran’s major Asian trade partners – including South Korea, Japan, China, Turkey and India – to sever their oil imports. 

An important research finding in the life sciences has galvanized and divided the international scientific and security communities. The creation of a version of H5N1 influenza virus (bird flu) that can be transmitted by respiratory droplets or aerosol between mammals raises hopes that a vaccine can be made – and fears that humans will speed up the process by which this new virus will be unleashed. Research has been suspended while scientists debate the proper course to take. But any solution must be part of a larger regional effort to address biosafety and biosecurity concerns.

The H5N1 virus first appeared in Asia nearly a decade and a half ago, and has since spread around the world.  In that time, the disease has been reported in 576 human cases and there have been 339 deaths. The human fatality rate for H5N1 ranges from 30 percent to 80 percent; experts consider this “one of the most virulent known human infectious diseases.” At present, the disease is only spread by contact with live birds. Scientists fear that the virus could mutate and become susceptible to human-to-human transmission, which could trigger a pandemic on the scale of the 1918-19 outbreak of Spanish flu (H1N1) that killed as many as 40 million people. Late last year, two research teams created an H5N1 virus in the laboratory that could spread in such a manner. 

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Moscow may be facing growing domestic political challenges with opposition forces calling for a post-Putin political order, but its profile in Asia has in many ways improved in recent years.

In the post-Cold War era, Moscow is facing a new global strategic landscape, where Asia is increasingly becoming the center of global economic activity and geo-political competition. Yet while the Asia-Pacific region is host to some of the world’s biggest economies, the West and Central Asian regions are critical flashpoints, with Iran, Afghanistan, and Syria topping the international security agenda.  

In response, Moscow has gradually re-configured its Europe-centric foreign policy by paying more attention to developments in Asia. An indication of Russia’s growing strategic investment in the continent is its membership and growing role within major regional security and economic fora, from the ASEAN Regional Forum and the East Asia Summit to the Six-Party Talks on North Korea and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

The Taiwan presidential election last month sparked renewed debate on social media about democracy in mainland China.  Interestingly, the Chinese Communist Party seemed to hold off a little on online social media censorship. Weibo, China’s version of Twitter, was, by all accounts, buzzing with comments about the election as it happened. Millions followed the campaign, the debates and the results online.

Many netizens in China were eager to participate. A direct voting process was launched in a voluntary online mock election via Weibo, in which Taiwanese President Ma Ying-jeou also enjoyed strong support on the mainland. According to a Sina.com poll of 26,000 Chinese citizens, 55 percent supported Ma, while more than 25 percent supported another pro-China candidate James Song (who received less than 3 percent of the vote in Taiwan). This compares to a mere 20 percent who chose the main opposition candidate Tsai Ying-wen.(And even such mainland support for Tasi and her Democratic Progressive Party was more indicative of backing for domestic DPP proposals than for any pro-independence moves).

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While much of the world may be focused on the U.S. presidential election in upcoming months, North Korea’s Kim Jong-un also has been doing some campaigning of his own. And although the outcome seems inevitable, the political agenda being revealed by Kim’s actions offer some useful insights for understanding the new leadership’s policy direction.

Since the death of Kim Jong-il, Kim Jong-un and the power elites in Pyongyang have been working hard to strengthen the new regime’s legitimacy. With support from North Korean power elites, Kim Jong-un isn’t expected to face any challenges before he assumes the title of General Secretary of the Workers’ Party of Korea. However, it’s well worth watching the agenda that Kim Jong-un promotes before his rise to power is completely secure.

The new regime is promoting two major agendas: military first politics (Sŏn'gun) and Yuhun t’ongch’i, ruling “by the will of the dead.”

Military first politics, also known as Sŏn'gun politics, has been a driving force behind North Korea’s immense military power, and has been the key policy for the last several decades. By concentrating the nation’s resources into its military, the Korean People’s Army (KPA) has remained a pillar for North Korean stability. The new regime’s continuing promotion of this policy indicates the significance of the military for the new regime and the influence it will wield.

Yuhun,from Yuhun t’ongch’I,are literally translated as instructions that the departed left behind. After the death of Kim Il-sung, Kim Jong-il immortalized his father through propaganda and designated Kim Il-sung as “eternal president” in the North Korean Constitution. By rationalizing his leadership through his late father’s will, and by turning the words of his father into an almost eternally binding contract, Kim Jong-Il solidified his position and managed to convince the public and Workers’ Party of Korea to accept his leadership.

In the case of Kim Jong-un, Yuhun t’ongch’i carries both domestic and foreign messages. First, he’s legitimating his position within North Korea just as his father did almost two decades ago. Second, promoting Yuhun t’ongch’i also works as a message to foreign powers – the leader may change, but the management is still the same. Yuhun t’ongch’i not only legitimizes Kim Jong-un’s rise to the top, but also provides a reason to pursue the policies of the old regime. For foreign powers, it’s a statement from Kim Jong-un and the new regime that they will continue endorsing much the same policies, and it acts as a deterrent to foreign powers from exercising their influences on North Korea and its politics.

But it’s not just Kim Jong-un’s policies that offer an insight into North Korea.

Last month, 14 public inspections were reportedly performed by Kim Jong-un; among those inspections, eight were performed on military divisions, and two were on military related institutions. Interestingly, during public inspections, Kim Jong-un was shown not only shaking hands with both male and female soldiers, but also displaying close physical contact with soldiers, including clutching the arms of young soldiers and maintaining direct eye contact with a smile on his face.

Kim Jong-un’s surprising showmanship can be interpreted in the following ways:

First, it could be a sign that “military first” politics isn’t actually disliked by the North Korean public. The approval rate for military first politics can’t be accurately confirmed, but based on recent activities by Kim Jong-un, it seems there’s a belief that it is considered broadly acceptable. The reality is that Kim Jong-un’s young age and inexperience mean the new regime simply can’t afford to attempt propaganda that’s ineffective with the public.

Even though military first politics have been a magnet for criticism by North Korean experts and economists who blame this approach for the demise of the North Korean economy, North Koreans may still think otherwise. Every male North Korean is subject to up to ten years of military service, and the number of female military participants is increasing. Thus, the link between the public and the military could be very strong.

Second, Kim may be trying to appeal to the public by distancing himself a little from his father’s image. During public inspections, Kim Jong-un has been doing things that Kim Jong-Il rarely did – for a start Kim Jong-Il was reluctant to demonstrate or to initiate close physical contact. A string of failed policies that led to problems including famine are believed to have undermined Kim Jong-il’s popularity. His son, then, may see this new, warmer approach as a way of breaking with his father.

In addition, as more and more North Koreans have achieved self-sufficiency, surviving without the government’s failed food distribution system, the distance between the government and public could have widened – another potential motivation behind Kim Jong-un’s attempt at a more “accessible” image.

Indeed, Kim Jong-un has apparently been trying to increase connectivity with the public. His young age means it’s virtually impossible for the regime to falsify an extensive resume, so they have instead turned to efforts to appeal to nostalgic views of his grandfather, Kim Il-sung. Among the eight military units that Kim Jong-un inspected, five units were decorated with the title “Oh Joong Heub No.7 Regiment”; Oh Joong Heub’s regiment was responsible for protecting Kim Il-sung during the anti-Japanese liberation period in Korea, and it has been used as propaganda for decades to promote loyalty and morale among military personnel. Its connection with Kim Il-sung was therefore likely a reason for the inspection move.

It might still be too early to draw firm conclusions on North Korea’s overall direction, but it certainly seems safe to assume that North Korea will continue its military first politics. Under the juche ideology, military first politics may be seen as rational considering the perceived threats from the U.S. and South Korea. But the new regime will also never see its economy improve under military first policies. The fact is that even if the leadership sustains itself, North Korea will have no hope of escaping poverty anytime soon.

Kyu-toi Moon is a James Kelly Korean Studies Fellow at Pacific Forum CSIS.

This June, world leaders will congregate in Rio de Janeiro to attend the Rio+20 U.N. Conference on Sustainable Development. The conference will mark the 20th anniversary of the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), which culminated in 190 heads of state signing several legally binding environmental agreements.

However, Rio+20 is taking a different approach. The summit’s recently leaked zero draft outcome document, entitled “The Future We Want,” requests that governments set their own targets and work voluntarily towards a global green economy, poverty eradication and sustainable development. But such a proposal isn’t without its challenges.  

The Rio+20 zero draft deserves commendation for various reasons. First, it openly recognizes that most countries have largely failed to meet the challenges and obligations as outlined at UNCED. It also reiterates the “multiple interrelated crises” that we currently face, their adverse impacts on development gains over the past two decades, and the various systemic gaps in implementation of prior commitments. These admissions of past failures and present challenges have resulted in commitments to measurable deliverables and goals, outlined in a comprehensive roadmap spanning from 2012 to 2030.

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The 112th Congress will complete its term in 2012 marked by strong opposition to the policies of President Barack Obama on government debt, budget cuts, health care, and other issues. Adding to congressional-executive gridlock has been an upswing in congressional criticism of China’s policies, resulting in legislation in the Senate and the House challenging the administration’s efforts to sustain moderate policies toward China over currency manipulation, trade disputes, and arms sales and other support for Taiwan. The congressional activism feeds into the echo chamber of often strident anti-China rhetoric by many candidates seeking the Republican presidential nomination.

Nevertheless, forecasts of congressional trouble for the president’s China policy are offset by closer examination of the congressional actions and of U.S. interests supporting and opposing tougher policies toward China. Congress remains preoccupied with other issues and is ambivalent about reasserting its role in foreign affairs and China policy. Conflicting interests in the United States advocating or opposing tougher congressional action on China indicate that the overall effect of recent congressional activism won’t upset the president’s policies. It will prompt some vocal debate and will impede forward movement in U.S.-China relations.

Since the U.S. opening to China, Congress has voiced opposition to the administration’s China policy on several occasions, but has taken substantive action only episodically. The struggles between the administration and congressional opposition over breaking relations with Taiwan and the perceived use of the “China card” against the Soviet Union became intense and lasted for several years during the Jimmy Carter and early Ronald Reagan administrations, with both sides firmly committed to conflicting agendas. At the time, the debate was strongly influenced by widespread congressional efforts to reassert the role of Congress in the making of U.S. foreign policy. One result was the Taiwan Relations Act, which has influenced U.S. policy toward China ever since.

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With the United States formally ending its military operations in Iraq, many are beginning to turn their eye to Iran’s deep influence in the country. And, in light of Tehran’s growing tensions with the West over its nuclear program, Tehran’s maneuvers in Iraq have tremendous implications.

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Last week, South Korean President Lee Myung-bak visited China as a state guest and held a summit with Chinese President Hu Jintao. The two leaders addressed the Sino-South Korean strategic cooperative partnership and how to strengthen the relationship between their countries’ foreign and defense ministries. They agreed to increase trade by $300 billion by 2015 and to initiate discussions on a bilateral free trade agreement (FTA). They also agreed to cooperate in resolving the illegal fishing issue and to work toward the resumption of the Six-Party Talks.

Yet despite both countries’ satisfaction with the summit results, immediate remedies for key longstanding issues are unlikely.

First, the outlook for formal FTA negotiations is pessimistic. From the broad perspective of each nation’s national interests, there are gaps. While China wants to establish an East Asian FTA and separate FTAs with states in the region, Korea is more interested in developing separate FTAs with China and Japan. The idea of creating a Korea-Japan-China FTA also clouds the issue. Although the decision to move forward with official negotiations was announced, it’s difficult to gain momentum with Korean parliamentary elections upcoming in April, followed by presidential elections in December.

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