Southeast Asia figured prominently in the study, which should come as no surprise, given most governments in the region have paid only lip service to warnings that the lax enforcement of laws had allowed the market for cheap homemade drugs to thrive, not unlike copies of DVDs, brand name handbags or other drugs like Viagra.

According to the study, published in the Lancet Infectious Diseases Journal, a third of all anti-malarial drugs sold in Southeast Asia were fakes. This followed surveys in seven countries and an analysis of 1,437 malaria drug samples that found a third had failed tests, half were incorrectly packaged and a third were simply not genuine.

Drugs tested includedartemether, artesunate, chloroquine, mefloquine, quinine, sulfadoxine-pyrimethamine and tetracycline.

Many of the aspiring middle classes in the region would like to think of Southeast Asia, and in particular the 10-nation Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), as a fashionable part of the world where Asian values have underpinned economic success and outshined those of a bankrupt West.

But the study, led by the Fogarty International Center at the National Institutes of Health (NIH) in the United States, is a sobering read and ranked Southeast Asia alongside Sub-Sahara Africa.

It found, predictably, that poor quality drugs would lead to inadequate treatment and drug resistance. More interestingly, it said that along the Thai-Cambodian border an artemisinin resistance or a tolerance in Plasmodium falciparum, had emerged, making protection of drug supplies an imperative. This has raised the prospect that the drug resistant parasite could travel beyond the Thai-Cambodian border, particularly in light of the heavy human traffic that plies the area.

Studies were also conducted along the Thai border with Burma.

Malaria is endemic in 106 countries, with 3.3 billion people at risk of infection. It kills at least 650,000 people a year and authorities say most fake drugs are produced in China.

“Despite a dramatic rise in reports of poor-quality anti-malarial drugs over the past decade, the issue is much greater than it seems,” wrote Gaurvika Nayyar. “Most cases are probably unreported, reported to the wrong agencies, or kept confidential by pharmaceutical companies.”

Ominously, the surveys authors added that there were no reliable global estimates on the extent of poor quality anti-malarial drugs because there were no standard tests, protocols or drug content requirements, nor an international forum for scientific oversight or accepted international definitions for the different types of inadequate drugs.

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As I have quoted the Political & Economic Risk Consultancy (PERC) before, “the media, even more than the courts, is the forum in which all sides try to wage their battles of defamation.” I’ve repeatedly written about corruption, and The Asia Foundation has supported efforts to bring more clarity to the discussion – to go beyond politicized battles – most thoroughly represented in the book by Michael Johnston.

A year ago there was another impeachment case against the former ombudsman (anti-graft prosecutor) that led The Economist to ask cynically, “Progress or Payback?” Now, one year on, we are faced with the same conundrum: Is the trial of the chief justice part of a political vendetta (since he was perceived to be protecting former President Arroyo), or just the next logical step in removing blockages to President Aquino’s successful 2010 campaign slogan, “If there’s no corruption there’s no poverty?” The plain fact of the matter is that for those outside a small circle of decision-makers it’s impossible to tell. An optimistic read could point to broader bureaucratic reforms (to which I’ve pointed in analyzing presidential power) while pessimists might cite PNoy’s alleged favoritism to classmates, friends, and shooting buddies.

The purpose of this blog isn’t to argue either the pessimistic or optimistic case. Rather, it’s to try to better understand the political economy structure of corruption so as to be able to point to some directions forward.

A long-standing starting point for understanding the logic of corruption is Robert Klitgaard’s formulation: C = M + D – A (Corruption = Monopoly + Discretion – Accountability).

That is, when someone has the monopoly over decisions on how to do things (hire people, contract roads, purchase supplies) and a wide range of discretion in making decisions, there’s likely to be more corruption – which can be reduced by introducing accountability mechanisms like transparency of information, independent audits, and the like. Using this heuristic, the Foundation has supported partners in the Philippines working on procurement (particularly with the Departments of Education and Health), cities whose mayors wish to reduce corruption so as to be more investor-friendly, and general civil society (including business associations) efforts to increase accountability.

A recent paper introduces a considerably more complex formal model that includes a bureaucratic decision-maker, different types of clients with differing willingness and ability to pay, and variations in rules about prices, testing, and allocation of the (abstract) good being provided. A warning to fellow non-economists:  slogging through the equations and derivations can be slow. The general logic is clear and some of the implications are interesting, such as the suggestion that “red tape” is more likely in governments serving the poor since poor people have less ability to pay than what a service is worth to them (and thus are more willing to endure red tape).

In checking the formal abstract model against what is known about corruption in the real world, the authors note success stories such as those related by Klitgaard. As is the experience with our programming in the Philippines with cities or government agencies, these anti-corruption successes “all seem to involve a person at the top of each institution who was eager to implement” reforms. But then the question arises: why aren’t such examples more frequent or sustained?  Why don’t leaders pursue these reforms more often?

Politics, of course, is the answer. Repeatedly, in the Philippines it has been demonstrated that reducing bureaucratic corruption in particular agencies, or in particular cities, is possible with the cooperation of the leaders at the top and in partnership with citizens, businesses, and NGOs. But such successes do not yet seem to touch political corruption – the use of corruption to gain, keep, and exercise power as witness the “hello garci” scandal regarding the 2004 election in the Philippines and the continued pervasiveness of money politics. This is where the analysis of Michael Johnston is valuable in laying out the logic of “Oligarchs and Clans,” which is the political economic situation in which the Philippines finds itself. This is where corruption is the most harmful to economic growth since decisions or policies of one administration tend to be arbitrarily overturned by a subsequent one (even within presidential administrations as one faction takes over, for instance, a department and uses it as a platform for the next electoral cycle rather than technocratic policy-making).

Johnston’s medium-to-long-term prescription is rooted in the need to change the relation between citizens and their elected officials. Under Oligarchs and Clans, voters tend to reward particular favors (from purchased votes to paying health expenses) rather than effective performance in managing government and delivering service. He suggests an indicator and benchmark strategy that picks services important to people (for example, education or health), develops indicators of good performance, publishes them against benchmarks, and helps citizens hold officials accountable. In a sense, this is adding direct governmental involvement to some of the ideas involved in “social accountability.”

A recent book, The Institutional Revolution by Douglas Allen, studies the effect of better measures of performance to explain changes in institutions (such as the military) at the beginning of the industrial era in Britain (roughly 1780 to 1850). For example, purchase of offices used to be the accepted method of staffing a bureaucracy, but after time, distances, tasks, and talent became more accurately measured then meritocracy could become a viable recruitment strategy. In Allen’s historical account, the “sovereign” using benchmarks and indicators was the Crown. In the current version, Johnston is proposing to “deepen democracy” in order to empower citizens to hold government accountable against objective measurements.

Put this way, reducing both the demand for and supply of corruption can take decades. With the modern pace of politics, the campaign for the May 2013 midterm elections (regarded as a rehearsal for the 2016 presidential elections) is already heating up. Necessary as it might be, designing and implementing a long-term strategy is a daunting task.

Steven Rood is The Asia Foundation’s country representative in the Philippines. He can be reached at srood@asiafound.org. The views and opinions expressed here are those of the individual author and not those of The Asia Foundation. This article originally appeared at the Asia Foundation's site here.

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Mitchell’s nomination is the latest in a series of steps the Obama administration has taken to support Burmese President Thein Sein’s nascent political and economic reforms. Previous steps have included the easing of sanctions and Hillary Clinton’s trip to Burma in late 2011, the first time a U.S. secretary of state had visited Burma in more than half a century. Alongside Mitchell’s appointment, the administration announced that the U.S. is suspending, though not removing, all economic and financial sanctions on Burma. U.S. arms embargoes will remain in place, however, and the State Department later said it will seek to “target what we call the spoilers, the bad actors within the system” through other economic instruments.

“As an iron fist has unclenched in Burma, we have extended our hand, and are entering a new phase in our engagement on behalf of a more democratic and prosperous future for the Burmese people,” Obama said on Thursday, echoing a line from his inauguration speech.

Mitchell’s nomination had been expected for some time and was first reported by The Cable on April 5 and confirmed by the Financial Times the following day. The day before The Cable story broke, moreover, the State Department said the administration was “very close” to naming an ambassador and was just waiting on Burma’s approval of its nominee.

Mitchell brings strong credentials to the position. An adviser to Obama’s presidential campaign in 2008, Mitchell began the administration as Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs. He served in that position until August 2011, when the White House announced Mitchell would serve in the newly minted position of Special Representative and Policy Coordinator for Burma.

In this role, Mitchell has been the administration’s point man on facilitating an opening with Burma. In 2007, Mitchell had advocated offering incentives to the Burmese government to open up in a Foreign Affairs article he co-authored with Michael Green, an Asia expert who served in the National Security Council during the George W. Bush administration.

In his role as policy coordinator for Burma, Mitchell has worked closely with Aung San Suu Kyi, including holding joint press conferences together. Mitchell reportedly has strong support on Capitol Hill, which should make for an easy confirmation process. The Human Rights Community is also fond of Mitchell; when news of Mitchell’s nomination first broke in April, the Washington Director of Human Rights Watch said, “He’s done a fantastic job and his appointment to be the ambassador would signal that center of action is shifting from Washington to Nay Pyi Taw.”

During the Bill Clinton administration, Mitchell worked as a special adviser on East Asian affairs at the Pentagon. In this role, he was the primary author of the U.S. Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region, which called for bolstering the U.S. military posture in the region, deepening economic ties and promoting democracy. The strategy, which was written in 1998, has yet to be updated.

During the George W. Bush administration, Mitchell served as a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, where he founded and directed its Southeast Asia program.

Zachary Keck is an editorial assistant for The Diplomat.

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For example, Thailand and Cambodia are feuding over the ownership of the historic Preah Vihear temple and the four square kilometers of territory around it. The conflict intensified in 2008, which led to some deadly exchanges of fires between border troops. It strained the relations of two erstwhile friendly neighbors and, more tragically, it reinforced ultra-nationalism and xenophobia in their countries. Last February, renewed clashes resulted in lives lost on both sides.

For several decades, Singapore and Malaysia contested the ownership of several islands, namely Pedra Branca, Middle Rocks and South Ledge, which are all strategically located at the eastern entrance of the Singapore Strait. Middle Rocks consists of two clusters of small rocks, while South Ledge is visible only at low tide. Fortunately, the International Court of Justice in 2008 recognized Singapore as the owner of Pedra Branca and gave Middle Rocks to Malaysia. 

The Paracel Islands, meanwhile, are being claimed by Vietnam, China, and Taiwan, while Indonesia and Malaysia have a longstanding dispute over maritime naval borders in the Malacca Strait, which has led to several coastal patrol detentions of fishing boats of the two countries. Recently, the decades-long maritime dispute in the Bay of Bengal, which involved Burma and Bangladesh, was finally resolved by the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea.

The active flashpoint today is in the Scarborough Shoal, located in the South China Sea or West Philippine Sea. It’s a chain of reefs and rocks claimed by China, the Philippines, and Taiwan. China is accused of using its superior force to assert ownership of the territory. Its decision to dispatch oversized quasi-civilian boats near the shoal is interpreted by many Filipinos as an act of bullying and aggression.

But the main conflict in the region involves the resource rich Spratly Islands, which are being claimed by six countries: China, Vietnam, Taiwan, Malaysia, Brunei, and the Philippines. Tension is permanently high in the area because of the military posts established by the claimants.  If the dispute isn’t resolved diplomatically today or in the near future, it could potentially trigger a broader conflict in the Asia-Pacific.

Could the little spats over Scarborough, the Paracels, Pedra Branca, and the Malacca Strait lead to a bigger clash over the Spratlys? Are they just a sideshow to the main event? Are they just a foretaste of the real tragedy that will befall the region if the Spratlys dispute explodes into a Southeast Asian War? Diplomacy and peace must be given the chance to succeed now.

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Vietnam says the ban, from May 16 to August 1, is “invalid”. The Philippines responded with its own ban, allowing a face saving reduction in tensions amid the month-long stand-off with China over Scarborough Shoal.

Neither believe China is genuinely acting in the best interests of food security, and they suspect its ulterior motive is simply to assert itself over the Spratly and Paracel islands, which has increasingly become a regional flashpoint.

Vietnamese and Philippine claims are on the basis of a U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea and a rule that gives maritime nations the right to explore, exploit and develop areas within their 200-nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ).

China insists the overwhelming majority of islands of the South China Sea – also known as the West Philippines Sea and the East Sea in Vietnam – fall under its sovereign jurisdiction despite many of the islands being located within the well defined EEZ territorial limits.

However, it says the EEZ convention doesn’t give maritime nations the right to undermine the sovereignty of other countries, adding the disputed waters have been traditional fishing grounds for Chinese fishermen for centuries.

Vietnam’s foreign ministry labeled the Chinese ban as unilateral, while local media have interviewed fisherman who say they intend to ignore the Chinese ban, first imposed in 1999, promising to set sail for the Paracel Islands and challenge the Chinese ban.

This follows the detention and alleged beating of 20 Vietnamese fishermen seized by Chinese authorities while diving for sea cucumbers near the Paracels in February. A heated diplomatic row followed. Hanoi insisted on an unconditional release while China claimed it had acted legally as the islands are within its sovereign jurisdiction.

Most of the islands are uninhabited but are believed to contain large oil and gas deposits. The fishing grounds are rich and the narrow shipping lanes of strategic importance to commercial and military maritime traffic.

In a bid to limit any confrontation in the disputed seas, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has attempted to find an agreement among its members on the Declaration on the Code of Conduct. which would provide a means for dispute resolutions and limit any escalation in tensions. However, China is unimpressed by the document saying it wants to deal with individual members of ASEAN when it comes to sovereign issues as opposed to a united ASEAN front.

 Still, as Trefor Moss noted last month, ASEAN is drafting a Code of Conduct governing behavior in the South China Sea, and is due to present Beijing with its proposals in July. China will be under diplomatic pressure to accept the ASEAN formula.

China has also indicated it was prepared to escalate the issue if their latest ban is flouted saying through the official Xinhua News Agency that fishing in the waters would be viewed as “blatant encroachment on China’s fishing resources.”

Ominously, the piece declares “Violators will face punishments such as fines, license revocations, confiscations and possible criminal charges, according to a statement issued by the fishery bureau under the MOA.”

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All this comes as Facebook readies itself for a an IPO that will potentially value it at about $100 billion, which will add several more billion dollars to Saverin’s personal coffers and expose him to an unwanted U.S. tax bill from the income earned on future stock sales. Singapore, his new home, likes rich people, and there’s no capital gains tax there.

Tax, and those who avoid it, is a sensitive subject on Main Street, USA. And the likes of Saverin have the good ’ol boys a tad upset. At 13, Saverin’s name was discovered on a gangster’s list of potential kidnap targets in his native Brazil. His family fled north.

He went to what the Americans believe are all the right schools, including Harvard University where he befriended Mark Zuckerberg, the future Facebook crew and, according to the New York Post:  “Now he’s shunning the United States – the place that gave him personal safety, along with immense opportunity and wealth – by stiffing us for a possible $600 million in taxes.”

Saverin’s “people” have argued that the decision to move permanently to Singapore was more of a business opportunity than a tax dodge. Such gratuitous thinking in regards to one’s citizenship will only further fuel anger among ordinary taxpayers who helped bail out Wall Street following its collapse.

Upon hearing the decision, the Rupert Murdoch-owned tabloid also quoted tech-industry billionaire Mark Cuban as saying: “This pisses me off.”

The now 30-year-old, who was played by Andrew Garfield in the award winning movie Social Network, has lived in Singapore since 2009 and with citizenship he will become one of Southeast Asia’s richest people with the sanctity of an all important Singapore bank account.

Singapore citizenship will also allow Saverin to circumvent recently passed U.S. laws – the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act – that make it exceedingly difficult for Americans to open banks accounts abroad.

As a result, bankers, stock brokers, government bureaucrats and their ilk will no doubt be chaffing at the bit. After all this is what the Singapore government wants, namely gazillionaires to live in their shimmering glass and steel skyscrapers.

However, how popular the decision proves among ordinary Singaporeans – who have to contend with late trains and an exorbitant supermarket bill – is another matter.

In Singapore, the person on the street is voting with his feet, and the two biggest social issues confronting the government are the wealth gap dividing the rich and poor and an influx of foreign workers. Saverin’s citizenship is unlikely to help in either department.

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Bersih (clean), an electoral reform movement, surprised the government when it successfully mobilized thousands of people in the streets on April 28. It was reported to be the biggest rally ever held in Malaysia. But before Bersih, there were several “people power” initiatives that deserve recognition, such as the Occupy Dataran Merdeka, the student march against the “inefficient and exploitative” national school loan program, and the popular indignation against the operation of a rare earth refinery in the town of Kuantan. 

Bersih has three demands: the resignation of the Election Commission, the cleaning up of the electoral roll, and the presence of international observers at the general elections. The government claimed that it had already addressed the concerns raised by Bersih, but its response didn't impress protestors, who were violently dispersed by the police. The fact that Bersih managed to gather a record number of protesters in the streets of Malaysia and in other cities around the world should be placing genuine pressure on the ruling coalition, which has been in power for the past 55 years, to rethink its tactic of nonchalantly dismissing all reform advocates as proxies of the opposition.

Despite the insistence of its leaders that Bersih is nothing more than an electoral reform movement, it has already evolved into a credible and powerful network of citizens who want to remove the nondemocratic aspects of Malaysia's system of government. In fact, the campers at Occupy Dataran and the student protesters early last month openly advocated the demands of Bersih even though their campaign and activities aren't directly related to Bersih.

What bound the campers at Occupy Dataran, who simply wished to reclaim the public space where the grassroots can gather and discuss the meaning of transparent governance, and the Bersih participants, was their shared commitment to expose the anti-people and anti-democratic policies of the government. The student protesters who are complaining about excessive fees in the student loan program are similar to young people in the Bersih march who are frustrated with the structural weaknesses of the electoral system. Many students who supported the march for free higher education also joined the Bersih event.

Another outstanding example of citizen protest in Malaysia is the campaign against the operations of Lynas Corporation, an Australian company that was permitted by the government to construct the world's largest rare earth refinery plant. Residents living near the plant have petitioned the government to stop the operations of Lynas because of safety and health concerns. So far, the government has failed to convince the residents to support the project. Protests have already erupted in Malaysia and even places like Australia to show solidarity with the communities that will be affected and displaced by the controversial investment.

Change is being demanded by a significant constituency that has already emerged in Malaysia. We've already seen the manifestos and the tactics of this rising movement in recent weeks, and this force has the potential to influence the results of the general elections this year. This force can become stronger if it can combine the broad appeal of Bersih, the passion of the campers at Occupy Dataran, the youthful idealism of student protesters, and the grassroots initiative of the anti-Lynas campaign.

The question now is whether this force can defeat the battle-tested ruling coalition, which has access to state resources and superior political and election machinery?

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Ampon’s death may finally help catalyze a broader movement to reform Thailand’s archaic and now brutal Lèse-Majesté (LM) laws. Unfortunately, the Yingluck Shinawatra government continues to say that it won’t favor reforming such laws.

Yet, at the same time as this case is getting media attention, other more under the radar news in Thailand should prove extremely worrying to U.S. policymakers. In an interesting piece in Asia Times, two retired U.S. army officers who frequently write on the Thai military note that the Thai armed forces are currently beefing up their strength, working to promote closer intra-army unity, and essentially preparing for a potential conflict with the elected government should Thaksin return to the country, or should the elected government try to carve into the army’s political independence.

Though these two writers can be at times hyperbolic and incredibly pro-army in their writings, the news they detail echoes stories from other army sources, and suggests that another coup in Thailand is hardly out of the question after Thaksin’s imminent return. U.S. policymakers should be prepared for such a possibility – and should be prepared with extremely harsh measures should the Thai military stage a coup.

Joshua Kurlantzick is a fellow for Southeast Asia at the Council on Foreign Relations. He blogs at Asia Unbound, where this piece originally appeared. You can follow him on Twitter: @JoshKurlantzick

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As with previous territorial disputes in East Asia these days (see China-Vietnam, China-Japan, and Korea-Japan), the political, diplomatic, and military maneuvering has a cyber component. On April 20, Chinese hackers attacked the website of the University of the Philippines. The next day, Filipino hackers struck back with the defacement of Chinese websites. On the 23rd and 24th, the two sides again traded tit-for-tat attacks (a very useful timeline up until April 30 can be found here). Attacks have continued over the last week; attackers have also pasted the Chinese flag on the website of the Philippines News Agency.

From almost the beginning of the attacks, the Philippines government has called for both sides to stop. On April 22, a Philippines government spokesperson said, “We call on citizens, including ours, to exercise civil temperance.” On April 25, the Philippines’ Department of Science and Technology and Information and Communications Technology Office declared that the attacks were neither sanctioned nor condoned, and on May 10 a spokesman went further in warning that such attacks “will not benefit anyone and could possibly lead to bigger problems in the future for the Philippines and China and escalate the already tense situation at Panatag Shoal (Scarborough Shoal).” This is not a misplaced worry as freelance attacks could make it much more difficult for the two sides to communicate and signal intentions.

Unfortunately, there has been silence from Beijing on the issue. China’s leaders seem to be embracing the conflict, or at least the prospect of conflict, as a welcome distraction from the problems of Chen Guangcheng and Bo Xilai. As Michael Yip and Craig Weber argue, the Chinese government – after years of enrolling students in patriotic education that stresses a history of national humiliation – needs to align itself with and divert away from nationalistic responses to real and perceived slights. Political hacking acts as a diversion – venting resentment away from the regime, focusing web users’ ire on outside actors, and maintaining the government’s nationalistic credentials.

When China’s Minister of Defense General Liang Guanglie was at the Pentagon this week, he talked about how China wanted to work to improve cybersecurity. Beijing could gain a great deal of credibility by doing what the Philippines has done: call on both sides to stop the attacks.

Adam Segal is the Ira A. Lipman Senior Fellow for Counterterrorism and National Security Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. He blogs at Asia Unbound, where this piece originally appeared. Follow him on Twitter @adschina.

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In threatening to mobilize 30,000 people, the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) also described the hottest artist in contemporary music as vulgar, very dangerous and argued that her sense of dress were threatening to a child’s sense of morality.

About 25,000 concert tickets have already been sold and threats to intercept Lady Gaga at the airport have sparked an angry backlash on social media from her fans, known as Little Monsters.

So far, her tour –the Born This Way Ball – of Asia, Australia and New Zealand has prompted small protests from Christian groups in South Korea and the Philippines, but Lady Gaga has stuck to her mantra and refused to tone down her provocative performances.

A spokesperson for the FPI went so far as to tell reporters: “Lady Gaga insults all religions. Even Christians in Korea opposed her. She is promoting the worship of Satan.”

Unsurprisingly, Lady Gaga hasn’t included Malaysia on her global tour. Over there, Islamic hot heads with grievances over Western art forms have been even more tyrannical in demanding others conform to their sense of piety, with the government often acceding to their whims.

In 2006, a concert by a Norwegian black metal band was banned after officials took a dislike to their slogan “Bringing hell to your doorstep,” which was interpreted as a type of satanic worship. Other acts to feel the branding iron of intimidating Malaysian officials include Madonna, Brittany Spears, The Black Eyed Peas, and Enrique Iglesias.

More than 45 songs have been censored or banned in Malaysia since 2010, among them seven songs from Lady Gaga herself, including her worldwide hit Bad Romance.

As far as moralistic killjoys go, the FPI rank among the best. They’ve also been described by the International Crisis Group as an “urban thug organization,” and according to the U.S. embassy via cables released through WikiLeaks, the FPI receives funding through the local police.

With a population of 240 million spread over 12,000 islands, Indonesia has won widespread praise for its handling of Islamic militancy throughout the War on Terror.

It has also shown a mature reluctance to bow to any of the many extreme demands often made by a firebrand clergy within the FPI, which pretends to speak for all. Gaga’s fans won’t be the only ones hope the Indonesian authorities allow her fans to enjoy what is, after all, just a pop concert.

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