The Asia-Pacific offers enormous potential for Canada. The hard part is balancing economics, human rights and the U.S.-China rivalry.
Successive actions and statements by the Canadian government have highlighted how Asia has become one of the country’s top priorities. The question isn’t so much why this is happening – that should be obvious. After all, China, India, Indonesia, and other ASEAN states boast huge markets, rapidly growing economies, and extraordinary investment potential. By the mid-21st century, these countries (along with Brazil and South Africa) will have a combined GNP larger than the G-8. And while neither China nor India will eclipse the United States as the globe’s premier power in the foreseeable future, the post-war American hegemonic order in the region is waning.
So the key question is can Canada engage Asia in a way that can satisfy a complex web of sometimes conflicting priorities – namely democracy promotion, good governance, human rights and economic prosperity? And can Ottawa do so in a way that leaves the country stronger and more united than it was before the economic crisis, despite the increasing divide between the engines of growth located in western Canada and the weaker performing manufacturing sectors in eastern Canada?
Certainly, on the economic front, the Asia-Pacific has much to offer Canada, and vice-versa. East Asia’s astounding growth rates since 1997 are simple enough to understand and digest, and their policy implications are clear: seek trade deals and investment guarantees, and ride the growing wave of Asia’s middle class. The Canadian government’s ability to secure these deals will rely largely upon its willingness to challenge some of Canada’s relatively well protected domestic industries. But Ottawa faces a handicap in that Asia is a blind spot for most Canadians. If Canadian businesses and universities are going to take advantage of this momentous shift of economic power, they will require nudging from Ottawa, and the government will need to place these “priority countries” at the top of domestic policy agendas, not just guidance documents.
Canada should also devote considerable resources to G-20 diplomacy, given the tremendous risks that large, sustained financial imbalances pose to the global economy (demonstrated by the 2008 financial crisis and the ongoing Eurozone debt debacle, which at its heart, a current account imbalance problem). Establishing a more sustainable savings and consumption dynamic will benefit both Canada and its Asian economic partners in the long-run, and the institutional tools exist: they simply need to be better used.
However, if the implications of Asia’s economic rise are clear for Canada, other facets of a New Asian century are more opaque. Canada has little leverage with China or emerging economic powerhouses such as Indonesia on human rights or democracy promotion. This is a result of both Canada’s modest (but not small) economic clout, and a lack of a history of engaging with Asia-Pacific nations. Still, it throws a proverbial wrench into the new foreign policy plan: how will Canada, for example, promote human rights in China? As Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper has learned, taking a hard tack on that earns one little sway in Beijing. Thus, there is an argument for not linking the human rights agenda to trade talks: it would be folly to sacrifice otherwise beneficial economic deals on the altar of a human rights agenda that we aren’t in a position to defend. Engaging China and others on these sensitive issues is best done slowly, and through quiet and effective diplomacy.
Navigating the Pacific will also require careful charting of a number of shoals and reefs: problems hidden below the surface that are only dangers if one blunders into them. As noted, China and India’s relative rise necessarily means that the United States’ absolute hegemony in the region is ending. Japan and Russia are both experiencing demographic-driven declines. While they aren’t destined to fade out of the scene entirely, they will need to adjust to better accommodate China and a host of fast-growing emerging economies. Canada must fashion its foreign policy with this evolving balance of power in mind. This foreign policy should plan for contingencies beyond issues of democracy and human rights promotion. It needs to be aware of the hard security risks that a rapidly changing balance of power creates, and should focus on contributing to Asia’s evolving security architecture in a constructive fashion.
Photo Credit: Chinese Embassy, Washington
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JohnX
MJWP wrote:”Interesting – so you are suggesting that the countries not party to the dispute should stick their nose in this business? I mean, I am not against it. I am just worried that sticking (the US’s) nose into more trouble spots would also be bad economically for the US right? I mean, I live in the US, and we are still in economic trouble. Further atagonizing China would simply not be in the US’s interests, unless it is willing to sacrifice the welfare of its own citizens? But then the US would look sort of like China – hmmm…”
I am not sure that the US can afford to stay out of the issue even if they want too.
China is a bully in this matter and takes victory by little bites, a nibble here a bite there. If it succeeds in bullying Vietnam and the Philippines to accept its claims and even takes a baroguay of the Philippines then maybe the Indonesian Gas fields are next.
Or the straits between Indonesia and Singapore and then the US may find itself locked out of the SCS all together. No one actually know whats Chinas final goal is as its opaque but its actions speak louder than words.
1994, building a bamboo building as a fisherman’s retreat from the typhoons, 2008 now its a naval resupply base. Slowly,slowly catch the monkey and then what, a skinning and a fire and one mans stomach is full and the monkey is gone.
Oro Invictus
While I certainly appreciate the logic behind temporarily de-linking economic issues with human rights issues so as to gain a foothold in regional politics for later addressing of said humanitarian issues, I fear such a strategy will be limited in success; despite years of growing economic interconnectivity, the PRC has simply become less and less responsive to international calls for greater freedoms and cessation of violations of human rights. The problem is that the authors appear to predicate their entire thesis on the idea that the PRC will respond to closer bi/multilateral ties in the same manner as a multi-party/representative government; autocratic and highly nepotist systems like the PRC government derive their power from the illusion of infallibility, such that they are more ready to sacrifice economic prosperity rather then acquiesce to outside influence. Since the goal of the CPC places the perpetuation of the party above the prosperity of the PRC (as much as is permissible), addressing human rights (which, by the very nature of one-party states, threatens their power and influence) will be met with aggressive refusal and retaliation by the PRC.
While one major example of this sacrificing of trade rather than even discussing such issues would be the row with Japan that resulted in the halting of rare earth shipments, a better example is the PRC’s animosity towards Norway following the Nobel Committee awarding Liu Xiaobo the Peace Prize; although Norway does not have any direct say over the committee’s choices, the PRC has seen fit to vastly curtail diplomatic and economic ties as reprisal, leading to Norway now threatening to block any attempt for the PRC to become an observer on the Arctic Council. Considering the PRC was already unlikely to join the Council given Russia and Canada’s firm opposition to the move, the antagonizing of Norway (which had supported them) will not only add their voice to the aforementioned opposition, but also lessen the support of other diplomatically close nations (like Denmark). Indeed, despite the fact that the PRC has an incredible amount to gain if it gained observer status, Beijing refuses to entertain any sort of reconciliation with Norway on these matters.
Unfortunately, if we afford the PRC more trading opportunities without the prerequisite of addressing human rights, not only does this not help those under the heavy-hand of the CPC but it worsens their position; all such actions will do is encourage the PRC’s oppressive policies towards its people without fear of recompense by the international community.
John Chan
China locked up some rascals, such civilized actions are the norm in the developed world but China is condemned as human rights violation to no end by carrying out its law and order. Meanwhile the developed world carried out bombing and killing indiscriminately and caused millions of innocent civilian death and maimed, such atrocity was never criticized as human rights violation, instead it was praised as doing necessary good for the killed and maimed with best intention under the veil of installing democracy and protecting human rights.
Can the human right activists explain why do such contradiction and hierocracy exit among them? Is it because common people’s moral standards do not apply to them but apply to everybody else? Or because they are the God chosen one? It is their divine right to lecture others shamelessly?
Oro Invictus
@John Chan
Well, despite your indignant braying, nothing you said here actually justifies nor exempts the PRC’s actions; just because another nation commits atrocities does not mean that similar actions by other nations are vindicated. Really, though, that’s besides the point as you’re suggesting a moral equivalence between killings and other repressive tactics against innocents in a domestic theater (for which there is ample evidence of both said deleterious government actions as well as the innocence of said individuals) to casualties inflicted during the course of combat and peacekeeping operations in foreign theaters (in which the nature of such incidents and the intent of individuals is much more nebulous). What’s more, you seem to be forgetting there are numerous groups in such “developed world” countries which actively draw attention to their own governments’ extralegal and/or human rights violations, ensuring some degree of public accountability and censure; while there are groups in China that seek similar goals, they are subject to censoring and harsh punishment by the PRC, unlike (for the most part) those in said aforementioned nations which are allowed to operate freely.
Oh, also, I believe the word you were looking for was “hypocrisy” in your second paragraph, rather than “hierocracy” (unless you were trying to suggest nations which concern themselves with human rights are theocratic/ecclesiastical in nature); mind you, considering that you are accusing me of taking the moral high ground while you’re seeking to do that very thing when you have incidents like the current unrest in Tibet (just today another two unarmed Tibetans were reported shot dead by security forces with another one self-immolating), I can see why you might have some difficulty with that particular word.
John Chan
@Oro Invictus,
I have not seen you raised critical human rights violation questions on the bombing and killing of the developed world on the innocent civilians as enthusiastically you criticize China, I also have hardly read any critical human right violation questions on the atrocity carried out by the developed world on the innocent civilians in western media as energetically as they bash China.
Nobody is suggesting two wrongs make one right; it’s a question of level playing field and fairness, as well as the motive behind such skewed presentation.
Canadian government has more sense to express the concern on the mistreatments of China’s internal migrant workers instead of focusing on the western proxy LXB and those monks who want to the turn the clock back to the inhumane theocratic dark age on the Tibetans like you.
Western civilization exceptionalism is hypocrisy.
Oro Invictus
@John Chan
Actually, I have criticized “Western” practices quite a bit on this blog though, admittedly, not to the same extent of the PRC as A) This is a site which focuses primarily on the Asia Pacific region, which is not where most of the “Western” violations occur and B) The PRC’s human rights violations, in both nature and scale, are far more egregious and abhorrent in nature. I’ve made it no secret I’m no fan of any of the current nation-states nor their governments, but I also think that certain ones are, comparatively, better in their ability to ensure societal sustainability and prosperity (“the lesser evils” as it were).
Also, “Tibetans like you”? I’m not Tibetan, be it in terms of nationality, citizenship, nor ethnicity (though, the latter is unimportant, generally only gaining importance when dealing with xenophobes and bigots); I’ve already stated, multiple times, I’m Canadian (in terms of both place of birth and citizenship). I have not nor will I attempt to be facetious and claim I am Tibetan (or Chinese, for that matter) to give myself any additional air of personal experience and argument vindication in these matters; I rely instead on my studies into these matter, my presentation of logic and information, personal experiences garnered during visits to the area, and the simple capacity to empathize with my fellow man to support my comments. In any case, it hardly requires a particular nationality, ethnicity, or degree of learnedness to see your argument for preventing greater Tibetan autonomy on the grounds of some hypothetical oppressive feudal system emerging in the future is utter bollocks; particularly when considering the PRC’s current cultural genocide and quasi-apartheid directed towards not simply the Tibetans, but all non-urban and non-Han Chinese.
John Chan
@Oro Invictus,
your argument is based on the “Seven years in Tibet” and the fabrications from the western mainstream media; your argument is loaded with such propaganda terms. Denying the dark theocratic history in Tibet is not going to make your argument more creditable. Pretending neutral and dishing out propaganda material to undermine China can not hide you are the grad of Dick Cheney School of Imperialism. Working to free the Acadians from hundreds of years of Anglo-Saxon suppression probably is more meaningful than meddling a place far away that you are bias against.
Oro Invictus
@John Chan
I don’t know what I find more ridiculous: The thought that you believe that you are presenting a rational, believable, and coherent argument or the notion that you do not see how much you are projecting your faults onto me (honestly, you’re accusing ME of lacing my posts with propaganda? Really?).
John Chan, as I’ve said before, I’m not arguing with you (your posts do not warrant such, for they neither refute anything said nor make meaningful points), I’m simply pointing out how ridiculous your blathering is; the fact that your ego apparently cannot accept the fact that people reading this view your bigoted and propagandist diatribes with naught but disbelief, irritation, and scorn serves as a useful analogy as to how much of the world views the CPC’s own actions. You, without exception, absolutely fail to address any of the points I bring up and offer only baseless and extraneous rambling; your own bigotry, irrationality, and utter contempt for your fellow man is far more damning to whatever “point” you are trying to make than any criticism I could level. My responses here are purely done as a courtesy and, to some extent, out of the hope you might just see how foolish you are acting and mend your ways (fruitless, I know, but I refuse to turn my back on any person).
SP
Thank you for the comments. However, let’s make sure we lay our logic out when discussing this: if the CPC is highly resistant to coercion and will tolerate losses to avoid budging on human rights issues, then linking Canada’s trade and investment activity to human rights makes little sense. It hurts Canada while hurting the Chinese people simultaneously, and, if what is argued below is correct, will not affect the CPC’s decision-making calculus. The problem with the logic presented below is that it suggests the CPC is highly concerned about demonstrating weakness to the point where they will fight against perceived “attacks” (to put it loosely), as acquiescing might embolden human rights proponents. Oro Invictus suggests that logic is mirrored — if we trade and invest with the CPC, we will embolden them. Call it a spiralling human rights dilemma.
However, whether you think that a human rights agenda will be advanced in China via some sort of international socialization, by influencing CPC bureaucrats, or via coercion or bargaining (trading economic ties for movement on the human rights agenda), all three of these mechanisms require closer ties with China and the CPC.
I would also argue that observer status on the Arctic Council, while a nice perk for China, is not a particularly rich prize. The Council is typically a body for coordinating scientific research (i.e. climate change, persistent pollutants, and the like) and tends to veer away from touchier issues involving economic resources, territorial claims, military activity and the like. While the CPC would like to have observer status (which would not confer a great deal of sway upon them), losing that bid will not hurt too much.
It is also worth questioning the assertion that the CPC is willing to trade off growth for an iron grip. Economic grievances popped up in the 2011 protests from time to time. In the short run, economic growth may help keep order, and China is battling significant inflation (particularly in household staples) at the moment. The trade off between a looser grip and strong growth may fall on the side of growth. In the long run, there is a weak, but positive, correlation between economic prosperity and what we would generally refer to as “human rights.” While some states become fabulously without loosening the reigns on the political and public spheres, they tend to be small and homogeneous. Its not clear that the CPC can replicate the Saudi experience.
Oro Invictus
@SP (I’m going to assume that this stands for Simon Palamar, given the nature of the comment, though I apologize if this assumption is incorrect)
I apologize if I gave the impression (though, I am fairly certain I made it clear I was referring only to future economic dealings) that I was advocating stagnating and/or downgrading diplomatic ties with the PRC; as I mentioned previously (most recently under the article concerning Tibetan self-immolations and freedom), the PRC is simply too large and too interconnected with the world for any such isolationism or diplomatic freezing to be effective. Rather, I recommend ensuring human rights is placed at the forefront of any economic dealings; while the PRC can resist such talks for a time, their desperate need to diversify imports alongside Canada’s massive abundance of said resources, will eventually force them to the table (as, while such a move will harm said “aura of infallibility” of the party, over-dependence on particular sources of resources is a far more dangerous threat to party power). Even if the PRC still refuses, we should be willing to sacrifice our economic benefits for the good of the Chinese people who languish under party rule; as I have cited before, more trade has simply made the PRC more oppressive, rather than less (thus making the argument that not engaging in additional trade with the PRC harms the Chinese people [at least] somewhat questionable if not spurious). While I respect that we must also be flexible in our dealings, and ensure the PRC does not overcompensate due to refusal to discuss human rights in trade and enforce a degree of self-isolationism as it pertains to certain lateral ties, it is of the utmost import not to neglect our (if you’ll forgive the term) moral obligation to the Chinese people’s welfare.
I also must note I find your dismissal of the importance of Observer status for the PRC on the Arctic Council as somewhat curious; while the access to resources in international waters and the clout and prestige gained by joining such a group is already considerable enough, the issue of trade routes is absolutely incalculable in terms of worth. Unless (and, actually, from an ecological standpoint, this would be great if it happened) the Arctic glacial masses melt at a much slower rate than what is predicted, there will soon be an easily accessible Arctic route between Asia and Europe, vastly decreasing the time and effort needed to ship goods. I need not tell you that, as an Observer on the Council, the PRC would not only gain unmitigated access to but also a degree of authority over said route, making trade with Europe vastly more profitable. Even if you still are doubtful about the benefits conferred by Observer status for the PRC, the fact they have recently been investing tremendous amounts of money in ice-breakers, Arctic mapping, and other matters related to future trade via the Arctic should make it apparent that the PRC clearly sees the value in said position; if they are willing to sacrifice all of this potential profit alongside the enormous amounts already invested just so they not lose face in the spat with Norway (well, domestically anyways, as their current actions have been doing just this internationally), I doubt limiting trade with Canada should it decide to bring up human rights will bother them overmuch.
I am also well aware, as I noted before, that economic prosperity and party legitimacy is not an “either-or” scenario; the two are irrevocably interlinked with one another. Rather, I posit that, while the CPC requires a certain level of economic growth to maintain power, it is economic growth which has also condemned the party and its monopoly on state power. Recent economic progress has brought about greater global interconnectivity which, in turn, has brought about greater awareness in the Chinese people of their rights. Indeed, historical precedent and current events virtually demand that domestic forces will eventually bring about a lessening or end to single-party rule; the influence of outside groups beyond being used to facilitate dissemination of information to the public will be negligible in initiating political reform.
My concern, then, is what the role of outside forces will be as it pertains to any such shift in the government, which is of paramount importance. The more we trade with the PRC without bringing up the issues of human rights will not simply embolden them, but also further delay reform and, when said reform occurs, it will be amidst much more chaotic and tumultuous circumstances. Through weakening party capacity to maintain such a strangle-hold on power via resources provided by trade we will help lessen the party’s ability to resist political reform from internal forces (fears of the PRC degenerating into a macrocosm of North Korea, while worrying, are highly unlikely given said nation’s size and dependency on the global economy); while some may still hope that the CPC can be encouraged to uphold human rights in its capacity as sole ruling party, the nature of autocratic governments necessarily prevents this from happening. Instead, it will either be a case of reforms instituted through popular demand over time culminating with the CPC releasing sole ownership of power like the KMT in Taiwan or it will be a virtual implosion of the country, bringing widespread ruin not simply to China, but the stability of the Asia for decades to come; as responsible members of the global commons, it is Canada’s (and every other nation’s) duty to prevent the latter from happening at all costs.
Adhe
Please take more rosubt action to convince China that the rest of the world and particularly us in UK are very concerned about their treatment of Tibetans and Tibet.Human rights are important and should be respected.
Cata
Can I call on the British grenovment to take practical, meaningful actions to support Tibetans in their struggle to end China’s oppression of Tibet.And make public statements calling for the release of the Kirti monks and those arrested and detained for peacefully protesting in Ngaba and Kardze.
Tino
I urge the gnorenmevt to consider the plight of Tibetans and to urge China to review its policies and end the oppression of the Tibetan people’ Time is of the essence enough is enough.
JohnX
Very Good points.
You could also include certain actions or statements made by China to its local neighbors when piqued. The notion that the dispute in the South China Sea is simply between China and the Philippines and Vietnam and doesn’t concern any other nation doesn’t seem to hold water if you look at the growth in other countries military in the region.
They watch the dispute but improve the cards that they are holding in their hands. Some of the disputes such as the one you noted in regards to Norway appear to be rather immature and do get noticed even if not always commented on.
MostJustWantPeace
Interesting – so you are suggesting that the countries not party to the dispute should stick their nose in this business? I mean, I am not against it. I am just worried that sticking (the US’s) nose into more trouble spots would also be bad economically for the US right? I mean, I live in the US, and we are still in economic trouble. Further atagonizing China would simply not be in the US’s interests, unless it is willing to sacrifice the welfare of its own citizens? But then the US would look sort of like China – hmmm…
nirvana
Concerning the disputed islands in the SCS, no other countries than the 6 claimants (Brunei, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Taiwan and Vietnam) are involved in the conflict.
But it is China that has enlarged the dispute to almost the whole SCS, by its 9-dotted line claim, by its unilateral fishing moratorium, by its cutting of Vietnam’s seismic cable in places as close to 120nm of Vietnam’s coast, by harassing Philippines in places as close as 50nm of Philippines’ coast. China did not declare that the islands are China’s “core interest”, BUT THE SCS ITSELF.
The SCS does not belong to any of the said 6 claimants. The law of the sea is an issue that concerns each and every countries that have signed the United Nations Charter.