By David Axe
Sealing the porous border with Pakistan will be essential if Afghanistan is to have any hope of stability. ISAF has its work cut out.
They attacked in a human wave, hundreds strong. It was October 30, 2010 in the town of Margah, in the remote province of Paktika along Afghanistan's border with Pakistan. Just months prior, the US Army had shifted about 50 fresh infantrymen into a tiny, neglected outpost outside Margah's main bazaar. The reinforcements, part of the Barack Obama administration's Afghanistan ‘surge,’ doubled the manpower at the outpost—and provoked a massive Taliban reprisal.
The army aimed to boost the outpost's ability to monitor and interdict insurgents and their supplies moving into Afghanistan from Taliban safe havens in Pakistan. Recognizing the danger the expanded outpost posed to their supply lines, in mid-October the Taliban began probing the Margah outpost with rocket and gun attacks. And on October 30, several hundred extremists massed for a full-scale assault.
But they didn’t succeed this time, and the assault ended in a lopsided tactical victory for the Americans. At least 92 Taliban died under bombardment from US machine guns, mortars, artillery, helicopters and jet fighters. Five Americans were wounded, none of whom died.
The attack highlighted the Taliban's continued ability to move large numbers of people and weapons across the border with Pakistan. But in failing to destroy the outpost in Margah, the Taliban also failed to reverse the US military's ongoing expansion into Paktika's border regions.
Still, the Taliban's failure doesn’t equal success for the Americans and their allies in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). In Paktika and other border provinces, the Taliban travel along a large number of roads, trails and footpaths passing through official and unofficial border crossings nestled between imposing mountain peaks.
Halting insurgent border traffic will take far more than 50 extra troops—or, for that matter, the roughly 5,000 additional ISAF troops deployed across Paktika since last year. Sealing the Afghanistan-Pakistan border will require sustained security operations followed by a massive expansion of Afghan government infrastructure. ‘It’s a challenge,’ says US Army Col. Sean Jenkins, commander of forces in the province.
All wars are fought at three levels of increasing breadth: tactical, operational and strategic. With insurgents planting at least 1,300 Improvised Explosive Devices every month and ISAF forces controlling the sky, the Afghanistan war has become a tactical stalemate. At the strategic end of the spectrum, Kabul's latest effort to reintegrate insurgent combatants—thus paving a path to a political resolution of the conflict—has stalled. On the operational level, ISAF's inability to seal the porous border with Pakistan means insurgents possess safe havens and can sustain their resistance indefinitely.
Until it can control the border, ISAF stands no chance of resolving the Afghanistan war on its own terms, a point not lost on the alliance. ‘The border is our priority right now,’ Jenkins says at his sprawling base in western Paktika. Like so many ISAF outposts in Afghanistan's border regions, Forward Operating Base Sharana has doubled in size in the last year, and is now one of the biggest military facilities in the country.
Photo Credit: US Army
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Mark Thomason
The border cannot be “sealed.” It is worse terrain than the Mexican border, against a more difficult challenge. There is no way to prevent them freely walking across.
You may as well say they should be “cleansed” from one or both countries. Nonsense.
Jonathan
I am glad you have stated a common conception amongst senior policy makers and military leaders enabling me the chance to respond in some detail. This is the very thinking that we must continually question if we are to be successful in Afghanistan. Ask a Soviet veteran of the Afghan War what the one thing was that the Soviets could have done to win, or inversely, what was the one thing that caused their defeat and the answer is clear, consistent, and stark. SECURE THE BORDER/FAILURE TO SECURE THE BORDER! This statement is echoed by veterans of the Vietnam conflict that point to the failure to cut off the communists from cross-border, state support and sanctuary (Ho Chi Minh Trail) is why we lost. What is just as telling is that both the ISI handlers of the Mujahedeen and the Communist Vietnamese Generals all agree that is how the Soviets and the Americans respectively could have won. These losses as well as any real effort to secure the U.S.-Mexican border have burned an artificial reality into the thinking of many American’s today that borders can’t be sealed so we shouldn’t try. This conditioned belief is evident in the divergence in candid responses from American officers as opposed to Israeli, German, or South Korean officers. When proposing border initiatives to the non-American officers, the idea is genuinely consider and the merits are quickly recognized. This is because outside of the US, military officers often have a close personal experience with effective border security.
In defense, I would offer a sampling of the large pool of data that supports my claim that borders can be effectively secured when a counterinsurgent with the means (such as the US/NATO) sets that as a military goal. I would welcome counter claims that offer better explanation on how insurgencies that raged for years abruptly ended usually within weeks of effective border security being implemented. This extremely close correlation in time (usually between 2-8 weeks) between effective border security implementation and cross-border insurgency collapse makes other viable explanations highly suspect when in most cases, the host of “other” COIN techniques had already been exhausted to no avail.
The Afghan Border as well as virtually any other border can be effectively sealed. The common group think, as you aptly stated, is that this is impossible. However, one must first recognize the difference between a poorly policed border that domestic politics have demanded remain open (Mexico) and a militarized border, which have been repeatedly established over and over throughout history as effective. In fact, desert and mountainous borders are the easiest to secure. If the senior elites actually took a moment to open a few history books and study “effective” military strategies against insurgencies, they would quickly find effective border security is a key critical element that is totally viable. To support this claim, the northern Legions of Rome controlled Gaul and southern Brittany through the effective use of physical border security against raiding German and Scottish tribes for hundreds of years. Perhaps one will remember the American Civil War and the successful Anaconda Plan? This plan used a blockade of the South to cut it off and defeat it in a massive border security endeavor. Not convinced? Take a close look at the correlation between the closure of the Yugoslav-Greek border during the Greek Civil War. The communist insurgents that had fought doggedly for years collapsed in weeks. The French showed this could be done over a vast expanses of remote desert and rugged mountains in Algeria in as little as two months. The Algerian insurgents are famous for claiming that once in effect, they were only able to move “40 men and 40 rifles” across the border, which is far too little to maintain military significant operations. It is also important to note that the distance of border secured by the French correlates to within 100 kilometers of the same distance as the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. The Morice Line as it is known today devastated the Algerian insurgency’s ability to operate and if not for the political capitulation of General De Gaulle, the French would have been successful. Many will also cite how impossible mountains are to secure. This simply is not the case. The Indians in Kashmir, the Turks on the border with Iraq, and most impressively, the Chinese on the Indian/Napalese border all had no problem effectively securing their borders in as little as a few months. In the case of China, it would be hard to argue that the Afghan border could not be secured if the Chinese were able to effectively secure the mountainous Himalayan border 50 years ago with at the time an extremely poorly trained and equipped military. The Greek border with Yugoslavia also happened to be extremely rugged mountains and was closed effectively within two weeks as UN observers verified. We even have great case examples from the Soviet War in Afghanistan. For example, the Soviets after launching a large scale operation to clear the Panshir Valley, walled off the mouth of the valley. The now famous tribal warlord Ahmad Massoud was forced to broker one of the only effective ceasefires of the war, which held until the Soviets unilaterally broke it. For those that still are not convinced that borders can be effectively secured, I have a standing bet within anyone that believes they can successfully cross the DMZ between North and South Korea!
Sarcasm aside, the case studies go on and on and on for the open minded strategist willing to actually look at facts rather than rhetoric. Many contemporary examples abound and have been shown to be extremely effective…in some cases nearing 100% effective in stopping successful infiltration across the border and terrorist attacks. Doubt this? Ask any Israeli living beside Gaza or the West Bank where (for better or worse), the Palestinian areas have been sealed extremely effectively (as well as the borders to the north with Lebanon and Syria). Saudi Arabia also seems to believe in the effectiveness of border security and has undertaken a multi-billion dollar program that has effectively sealed its borders stopping Islamic extremists from infiltrating into the Kingdom. Again, those that disagree should contact the Saudi border police for an interview. I have walked these places and can tell you first hand they are effective. What is most amazing is perhaps the fact we haven’t even learned from ourselves. The impact of cutting Sadr City in half with barriers and surrounding Tal Afar was immediate and decisive. Even FM 3-24, our military COIN manual admits as much. In both cities years of fighting was brought to a halt within just a couple short weeks. Even in the worst areas such as Ramadi we systematically cordoned the city into secure blocks in much the same fashion as the British in North Ireland fighting PIRA (albeit at a much lower level of combat) to much success.
As the above short list of case studies illustrate, history has a strong precedent for effectively sealing borders of all lengths, sizes, and terrain types by far inferior armies when compared to the US/NATO resources, heavy construction capabilities, finances, manpower, training, equipment, command and control, firepower, and mobility. Further, with deeper analysis, one will quickly see that when dealing with cross-border insurgencies, fighting will rage for years until the counterinsurgent gives up and is defeated or seals the border and decisively defeats the insurgency. Simply put, decisive gains will never be made against a cross-border insurgency unless the border is sealed. Some say doing this would be too expensive and to that I ask what is the cost of losing the war. In fact, securing the border is actually one of the cheapest and most effective strategies we could employ. For less than the U.S. spent on about a two weeks of the War in Iraq at its height, the Afghanistan-Pakistan border could be sealed with the most high tech systems available. At that bargain, we have nothing to lose in trying as nothing else we have spent billions of dollars on has proved decisively effective. Even the most skeptical can’t help but admit that curtailing at least some movement of items such as truck loads of bomb making ammonium nitrate and putting locals to work would have a positive impact on Afghanistan’s stability. Considering that the time and money we have already spent in Libya, we could be half way done securing the Afghan-Pak border and already reaping decisive gains should make rejecting this idea seem crazy.
In conclusion, no matter what one ultimately decides to believe, ignore, embrace, reject, etc., there is no question the War in Afghanistan will be a strategic failure if the US/NATO forces continue to stick to their current COIN strategy. In four years of strategy and policy research, I have yet to find a senior person willing to bet me something of substantial value that our current strategy will yield success. This is criminal negligence and demands we go back to the drawing board. As this summer approaches and the insurgency grows in new areas such as in the north east, links into greater Islamist movements in Uzbekistan, and retakes ceded territory in Kunar and other provinces, it will become blatantly clear that the Afghan forces are unable to hold their ground without the Americans and withdrawal of troops will become synonymous with retreat and defeat in much the same manner as how the Soviet withdrawal, turn-over, and ultimate failure played out.
All the best to our troops on the ground. They deserve our best.
Jonathan
Mark Thomason
I know ideas are hopeless when they return to disasters. “failure to cut off the communists from cross-border, state support and sanctuary (Ho Chi Minh Trail) is why we lost.”
You also talk of the French success in Algeria to support your thesis, but fail to note that Algeria was a disastrous French failure.
If the Ho Chi Minh Trail and France’s Algeria are you recipes for success, my point is proven.
Jonathan
At some point, one must concede that no amount of evidence, logic, or detailed analysis will convince some people to consider other options. As such, detailing case studies of Vietnam and Algeria would serve no purpose. However, it is worth noting that in the case of Vietnam, we know why we lost and we know it was preventable. Refusal to learn solid lessons from our failures in Vietnam makes zero sense. Specifically, we know that our failure to remove sanctuary and shut off the flow of weapons and personnel, primarily due to fear of provoking WWIII, led to our defeat. We also know that the McNamara line was an example of how not to implement border security and an example of why I have consistently argued that half hearted initiatives are never effective. To twist that into an argument of why border security initiatives should not be undertaken is quite a feat of revisionist history.
In the case of Algeria, the brutality of the French military operations inside Algeria arguable poisoned their ability to ever peacefully coexist with the non-European Algerians (note that many French had lived for generations in Algeria). This eventually led to a political decision to grant Algeria its independence. However, anyone that has studied the war will quickly note that it is possible to isolate numerous lessons, both political and military. Just as in all operations, we study and learn what worked and what didn’t. With regards to the effectiveness of the Morice Line, it is a matter of historical fact attested to by both the French military and the Algerian insurgents. The border security was without question effective in ending the insurgency’s ability to continue military significant operations. Considering that the US has not acted with unrestrained brutality against the Afghan population and thoroughly alienated it, the idea that the border could be effectively secured is extremely viable. In fact, it is the cross-border Tier I Taliban that is the primary problem and not local Afghans. Preventing these fighters and weapons from entering Afghanistan and destabilizing it is critical to the US having any chance of making decisive gains and achieving an actual victory. It is fundamental that our strategy recognizes that failure to prevent that, whatever the cost, will result in failure. It is also worth noting that if we moved to secure the borders, we may stand a chance at stemming the insurgency from further spreading into Uzbekistan, which will cause a dangerous destabilization of the entire SW Asian region. Identifying problems is always easier than offering solutions and solutions are in short supply right now. As such, I recommend anyone with good ideas that have a solid analytical precedent for success should do all they can to bring them to the forefront.
Mark Thomason
Both the French and the Germans studied and learned the lessons of WWI. The Germans of 1940 had learned the right lessons, and the French had learned the wrong lessons. Saying your prescription is a lesson of experience does not make it correct. The lessons are the key to success.
I disagree that a correct lesson of Vietnam is either the invasion of the North or some action that purports to seal the Ho Chi Minh Trail. I say this not from politics, but from serious study of military lessons. I agree such study is rewarding, I just disagree with your study.
Jonathan
I applaud David Axe, the author, for having the courage and intellect to shine some light on the fact the war will be won or lost at the border. Even sites like “The Small Wars Journal” have shrunk away from addressing this fact. Fail to effectively secure it and NATO will meet certain defeat. Successfully control it and the insurgency will collapse. Studying most of the named cross-border, state supported insurgencies that have occurred in roughly the last hundred years, this fact is decidedly pronounced. To illustrate these very profound, and to date, “rejected” facts (the US Department of Defense has been briefed multiple times on this information, but refuses to acknowledge it), I will highlight some examples from previous case studies.
Examples of how effective border security quickly and decisively ends cross-border, state supported insurgencies such as seen in Afghanistan-Pakistan are numerous, but to date, unlearned by the UN/NATO forces. For example, the Chinese successfully closed the world’s most rugged border (the Himalayan Mountains) with India and Nepal to bring down the Tibetan Insurgency, Tito’s closure of the rugged and mountainous Yugoslavian border inadvertently allowed the Greek Nationalist forces to finally smash the communist insurgents after years of conflict, and even recently, the cutting of Sadr City in half by US forces effectively ended years of fighting within the city. These examples and many others all have some basic lessons in common that the US/NATO force in Afghanistan refuses to learn. First, these examples show that battles/wars that have raged for years that could not be brought to closure by any other means (soft power, peace deals, major combat action, training and advising of local forces, heavily arming local forces, providing air support, intelligence collection, etc.) can be decisively ended with effective border security. Further, these fights were brought to closure (end of military significant operations) within a couple weeks to a couple months once the borders were effectively sealed. For cross-border, state supported insurgencies, it really does seem to be that their center of gravity hinges on their freedom of movement from a sanctuary and not hearts and minds or some other nebulous rational as routinely parroted by General Petraeus and his staff. When this center of gravity is removed, it quickly precipitates decisive events and the end to hostilities in favor of the counterinsurgent.
I note in the last paragraph that effectively sealing the border precipitates decisive events. This is a key phenomenon of border security that moves any cross-border insurgency past a tipping point where they can no longer carry out effective military operations. To highlight this effect, David Axe made special mention of the actions in Margah where insurgents attacked in mass and lost heavily. This is a one of the most historically consistent and important of the lessons learned in defeating insurgencies and is rather basic in logic. In short, an insurgency generally went cross-border for survival. As such, the ability to maintain their lines of communication between their sanctuary and the contested area is key to the insurgency’s continuation. When cut, the insurgency is faced with two choices, attack and overcome the border obstacles, or become a non-issue in the contested area. If the latter, that means defeat. As such, insurgents historically have thrown themselves en masse against border posts in vain attempts to overcome counterinsurgent inherent strengths in firepower, suffered unsustainable casualties, and then ultimately were defeated or had to sue for a negotiated peace from a position of weakness. This mass attack phenomena would allow US/NATO forces to apply their strengths in training, firepower, command and control, reconnaissance, and mobility in a manner that actually achieve decisive gains in an area where minimal collateral damage would be incurred. Instead, our losing strategy pits our weaknesses against insurgent strengths in a failing attempt to filter insurgents from the population that is continually further alienated by inadvertent killings of civilians.
Second order effects are just as important. These include placing local civilians into jobs supporting the construction and maintenance of a border barrier, demonstrating long term commitment, and perhaps most important of these, curtailing illicit trafficking of weapons, materiel, and manpower. This last fact directly undercuts the financial resources of insurgent leaders and prevents insurgents from obtaining critical resources to sustain combat operations. As such, licit trade increases, warlords are undermined, the insurgents run out of ammo, the legitimate government gains power, and the insurgency ultimately folds.
Sadly, even when faced by an actually strategy with well documented historical precedents for success, unlike our current COIN strategy, the thoroughly brainwashed at the senior echelon will defensively point out “we can’t secure the border” while simultaneously acknowledging that only through removal of the sanctuary could we win. This logic is as weak as it is wrong. As noted above, the world’s most rugged borders have been quickly and effectively closed. In fact, open desert and rugged high mountains such as in Afghanistan are two of the easiest types of border geography to control. In open desert, it is nearly impossible to move without being detected and in rugged mountains; dominating observation posts can control the only passable routes, which funnel insurgents to a finite number of controllable passes. This statement also demonstrates our senior commanders’ ignorance of military history as it is ripe with examples of effectively secured borders from the Roman limes and Hadrian’s Wall, the effective Anaconda Plan employed during the American Civil War, and the modern closure of the DMZ between North and South Korea (as an extreme example).
In my research, which has been presented to members of Congress, senior DoD staffs, and the intelligence community, these facts have been ignored to date. If embraced, we could turn the war around within months. However, continued adherence to our current strategy correlates with a near 100% probability of failure against these types of cross-border, state supported insurgencies. The research is much broader and more detailed than can be presented in a short blog post, to include how insurgencies finally die once hemmed into their sanctuary, but I recommend everyone interested in winning access it at: http://knol.google.com/k/jonathan-owen/border-security-in-coin/34umcc91z8y5h/3# Please feel free to cite this research, hang it on Facebook, tweet about it, and tell your friends and representatives. This is just too important to neglect.