‘The outbreak of violence is only partially about Islam and the state. It’s also about central control over regions which have never been fully under the control of Dushanbe,’ writes John Heathershaw, an expert on Tajikistan at the University of Exeter, in the upcoming issue of the Caucasian Review of International Affairs. ‘It is about the brutality of conscription as an institution, the hopelessness generated by the difficulties of migration and the hidden resentment against the government in many peripheral regions.’
The Institute for War and Peace Reporting reported that a government delegation went to Rasht in September to try to gain Ahmodov's cooperation in capturing Abdullo. But if that was the case, it apparently failed, and government officials subsequently named Ahmadov as the ringleader of the ambush, and claimed that he and Abdullo had been running Islamist terror training camps for youth.
Although the conflict's roots are primarily local, it could have regional implications. While the rebels don't appear to have the ability to take over the central government in Dushanbe, nor does the central government appear to have the capacity to defeat the rebels. That suggests the possibility a long-term power vacuum in a part of Tajikistan that borders northern Afghanistan and southern Kyrgyzstan, both of which are themselves becoming more and more unstable.
It could also draw in the big powers. Russia maintains a large military base outside Dushanbe and while Tajikistan's relationship with Russia has lately deteriorated, some in Dushanbe believe that the government may eventually have to call on Russian help. The United States, too, has announced plans for a counterterror training facility in Tajikistan.
This month, the government announced that it was withdrawing troops from the Rasht Valley, and Rahmon said the situation is ‘under control.’ At this point, that seems a little optimistic.





