What Next in Afghanistan?

By The Diplomat

One of the recommendations in the report is providing subsidies and loans to local agricultural producers, construction and companies and artisans as part of reconstruction efforts. Would you envisage bypassing central government with these kinds of initiatives?

I think it’s important to work through the government in order to strengthen and legitimize it, however, I think this should be done at provincial levels.  This also provides an argument for a regional system of government to provide for economies of scale in assisting multiple provinces without having it be administered nationwide from Kabul. Ultimately, efforts like this should be facilitated by NGOs and international organizations as US and European government institutions—USAID and DFID for example—have proven to be ineffective.

Aside from reducing the footprint in Afghanistan the report says the US should move more broadly to improve its overall image in the Islamic world. What would you like to see done?

We need to be much more consistent in our actions, thinking longer term rather than shorter term and understanding events in other nations for their root causes and not for the issues that affect us or that we impose.  For example, understanding the conflict in Yemen as having decades-long causes and not linking it explicitly to al-Qaeda, as I fear we are currently doing.  The same with Somalia. With al-Shabaab, we automatically assume extreme international Jihadism as motivation for their supporters, when it’s very likely that the current popular support al-Shabaab enjoys among some elements of the population is caused by the actions of an invading Ethiopian army or Uganda peacekeepers.  

By conflating al-Qaeda with opposition groups to Muslim governments, we’re letting al-Qaeda hijack issues and narratives that aren’t theirs.  Additionally, we must be much less hypocritical.  We can't criticize last year's Iranian elections but then condone and support the stolen Afghan elections by sending more troops.  Likewise, we can't say we are in Afghanistan because of al-Qaeda when there are only 50 to 100 al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, while we leave Iraq where last month the State Department reported 1000 to 2000 al-Qaeda members. This discredits our efforts and our message.

 

Matthew Hoh is a former Afghanistan-based official with the US State Department and US Marine Corps and director of the Afghanistan Study Group.

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    1. pir

      I think this report is very vlued,but the frist point “decentralisation”shluod be consultited by afghans.

      Reply
    2. Jason Mauritin

      I gree with the Mr Porjosh’s comments.

      Read the article, below, to see how plans to recruit more Pashtoons into the Afghan army have faultered despite offering descriminatory incentives. Mr Hoh’s view appears to have been inspired by Pashtoon nationalists with whom he has been in contact during his postings in a remote Pashtoon area.

      “Efforts to Recruit Pashtuns in Afghan South Falter”

      The Wall Street Journal
      By JULIAN E. BARNES
      SEPTEMBER 12, 2010
      KABUL

      Reply
    3. porjosh

      As a citizen of Afghanistan, I agree with Mathew’s assessment that the power should have been decentralized. But strongly disagree with a number of his other views, such as:

      1. He says Afghan army is extention of Northern Alliance and this has alianated rural Pashtoons. This is typical blackmail borrowed from Pashtoon elites. The reason Pashtoons won’t serve as soldiers are: poor pay and possible backlash from insurgents. And while the bulk of the aide money is flowing to the Pashtoon areas, and with lucrative drugs trade, Pashtoons don’t see serving in the army as an attractive incentive. Why should they work as soldier for $150/month, while they can make more than that by associating themselves with the Taleban or by working on poppy fields? On top of this, the south and east are awash with aide money – leaving only poor non-Pashtoons to become soldiers. You even hardly find many soldier from well-off non-Pashtoon area. Then, the blackmailers call this the extention of the northern alliance!!?

      2. He says hasn’t seen a “single” Afghan who call for the division of the country. This big lie is borrowed from Pakistani author Ahmad Rashid. Such claims severely dent the prestige of this group who calls itself expert on Afghanistan issues. Have a look at an opinion poll on Afghan http://www.Jawedan.com. Some 40% of 11,900 voters go for partition, 29 for a federal system, 28 for none and 3.6% for Taliban return. Are there any love lost for medieval Taliban/Pashtoon rule and their brutalities that no one calls for a partition?? The problem with the West is that their writings and knowledge of the country is derived from mainly Pashtoon elites. The same elites blackmailed the West into going for a strong central government with the aim of maintaining Pashtoon supremacy. Now the flaws of the very system have badly backlashed and have alianated the non-Pashtoons who make up at least 60% of the population.

      Reply

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