By The Diplomat
The Diplomat speaks with Matthew Hoh, director of the Afghanistan Study Group, about the group's report on the future of US forces in the country.
The Afghan War has often been dubbed by supporters as the ‘good war’ by those contrasting it with military action in Iraq. At what point would you say it became clear that this was no longer the case, or should that have been clear from the start?
Our involvement in Afghanistan in its current form began nine years ago this month, so nearly a decade's worth of involvement. Importantly, it must be remembered, recognized and understood that we entered into a conflict—a civil war—that had been continuous in one form or another since the mid to late seventies. So while we view the conflict as being primarily about us, because of al-Qaeda's attacks on the US in 2001, the Afghans understand the conflict to be about themselves, with a good deal of regional involvement—Pakistan, India and Iran—and a conflict that predates 2001 and al-Qaeda.
I do believe we went there in 2001 for justifiable reasons and our initial presence did stabilize the country for a short period of time. However, our failure to understand the nature of the conflict, a civil war, and our failure to address the underlying political issues of that conflict, plus the establishment of a strong central government the like of which had never been successful in a country where governance traditionally resides at the lowest levels possible resulted in the conflict resurfacing and then worsening over these past five or six years.
So in short, I think the initial reason we went there—al-Qaeda—was a success. However, we also entered into a conflict which we didn't fully understand and are now still there.
The report you co-authored and which is being released at the New America Foundation today, A New Way Forward for Afghanistan, is pretty scathing about the Hamid Karzai regime, stating that: ‘President Karzai has had nearly six years to build a legitimate and minimally effective government, and he has manifestly failed to do so. His re-election last year was marred by widespread fraud. Karzai has been unable or unwilling to crack down on corruption or rein in the warlords on whom his government still depends.’ Could we have been in a very different situation had the Afghan leadership been more effective?
I think so. Some of the problem is the form of government we created. In a country that hasn’t had a traditionally strong central government—the monarchy did keep the country stable for the majority of the 20th century, but reigned by not reigning in a manner of speaking—and in a country that has multiple fractures and schisms along ethnic, regional, tribal, etc lines, we created a very strong executive and a very weak legislature.
The result of this is that power is centralized with Karzai and so, if you aren’t in his clique then you’re outside of it. Additionally, as I said, the situation in Afghanistan is a civil war, and this form of government has continued that conflict as one element of the civil war. The rural Pashtuns, from which the Taliban draw their support, are effectively excluded from the government, its resources and security forces.
If we’d created a more inclusive government—let alone this current one, which is the very definition of a kleptocracy—and had created a government much more localized and not centralized, I think many of the issues that form the bulk of the political grievances of those groups that support the Taliban may have been reconciled. Remember also the Taliban isn’t a monolithic organization, but composed of multiple local groups with local grievances.
Photo Credit: US Army
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pir
I think this report is very vlued,but the frist point “decentralisation”shluod be consultited by afghans.
Jason Mauritin
I gree with the Mr Porjosh’s comments.
Read the article, below, to see how plans to recruit more Pashtoons into the Afghan army have faultered despite offering descriminatory incentives. Mr Hoh’s view appears to have been inspired by Pashtoon nationalists with whom he has been in contact during his postings in a remote Pashtoon area.
“Efforts to Recruit Pashtuns in Afghan South Falter”
The Wall Street Journal
By JULIAN E. BARNES
SEPTEMBER 12, 2010
KABUL
porjosh
As a citizen of Afghanistan, I agree with Mathew’s assessment that the power should have been decentralized. But strongly disagree with a number of his other views, such as:
1. He says Afghan army is extention of Northern Alliance and this has alianated rural Pashtoons. This is typical blackmail borrowed from Pashtoon elites. The reason Pashtoons won’t serve as soldiers are: poor pay and possible backlash from insurgents. And while the bulk of the aide money is flowing to the Pashtoon areas, and with lucrative drugs trade, Pashtoons don’t see serving in the army as an attractive incentive. Why should they work as soldier for $150/month, while they can make more than that by associating themselves with the Taleban or by working on poppy fields? On top of this, the south and east are awash with aide money – leaving only poor non-Pashtoons to become soldiers. You even hardly find many soldier from well-off non-Pashtoon area. Then, the blackmailers call this the extention of the northern alliance!!?
2. He says hasn’t seen a “single” Afghan who call for the division of the country. This big lie is borrowed from Pakistani author Ahmad Rashid. Such claims severely dent the prestige of this group who calls itself expert on Afghanistan issues. Have a look at an opinion poll on Afghan http://www.Jawedan.com. Some 40% of 11,900 voters go for partition, 29 for a federal system, 28 for none and 3.6% for Taliban return. Are there any love lost for medieval Taliban/Pashtoon rule and their brutalities that no one calls for a partition?? The problem with the West is that their writings and knowledge of the country is derived from mainly Pashtoon elites. The same elites blackmailed the West into going for a strong central government with the aim of maintaining Pashtoon supremacy. Now the flaws of the very system have badly backlashed and have alianated the non-Pashtoons who make up at least 60% of the population.