Given this political backdrop it’s hardly surprising that the Pakistani security establishment is again in an intransigent and unforgiving mood. Allowing the civilian regime to engage in serious negotiations with New Delhi would mean abandoning an opportunity to make New Delhi pay a significant price for its existing troubles in Indian-administered Kashmir. It would also mean that the Pakistani military would have to finally rein in its chosen instruments, various jihadi groups that it has spawned and nurtured, to pique and harass the Indian state in Kashmir and elsewhere. Why else would the normally urbane Qureshi make a tortured and impassioned comparison between the statements of Pillai on the interrogation results of an indicted terror suspect, David Headley, and the xenophobic and scurrilous outbursts of the Lashkar leader?
The military’s pivotal role in shaping the fortunes of Indo-Pakistani relations can’t be underestimated. A quick survey of history shows that without its nod or its temporary removal from the political scene, discussions are all but futile. For example, under considerable diplomatic pressure from the United States and the United Kingdom in the aftermath of the disastrous Sino-Indian border war of 1962, India agreed to several rounds of talks with Pakistan. These talks, which ultimately concluded in failure, nevertheless came quite close to reaching a resolution of the Kashmir issue on terms quite favourable to Pakistan. But even though a civilian, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, spearheaded these talks, they were conducted under the aegis of a military regime, that of Mohammed Ayub Khan.
The second fruitful negotiations came in the wake of the complete rout of the Pakistani military in the 1971 Bangladesh war. The military, thanks to its brutality and incompetence in East Pakistan, was back in the barracks licking its wounds. Consequently, Bhutto, who was the new civilian leader of Pakistan, was in a position to negotiate with much leeway with counterpart Indira Gandhi at Shimla in 1972. It’s to his credit that even as the leader of a defeated nation he managed to coax much out of a politician as astute as Gandhi without conceding much.
And again, after the mysterious death of Gen. Zia-ul-Haq and the military’s return to the barracks, Bhutto’s daughter, Benazir, initiated a dialogue with Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. These talks had actually shown some signs of progress until the abrupt outbreak of an indigenous ethno-religious insurgency in Indian-controlled Kashmir brought them to a close.
Although Bhutto was certainly responsible for stoking tensions through irresponsible rhetoric, the security establishment’s role in transforming the uprising in Kashmir remains undeniable. It moved with much dispatch and considerable dexterity in transforming what was an internal revolt against the Indian state’s political malfeasances into an externally funded, religiously motivated, extortion racket.
Other examples of the military’s complicity abound. Just as the military’s absence facilitated the Shimla Accord, its looming presence during the second Nawaz Sharif regime effectively torpedoed the efforts of Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee. After the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests of May 1998, Vajpayee had initiated a dialogue with Pakistan and had sought to put into effect a series of confidence-building measures under the terms of the Lahore Agreement. Within months thereof, however, the Pakistani army had breached the Line of Control in Kashmir along the trackless wastes of Kargil. The ensuing conflict effectively put the negotiations into cold storage yet again.
Despite Manmohan Singh’s grim determination to continue talks with Pakistan in the hopes of a diplomatic breakthrough, it’s far from clear that any discussions in the near future are likely to be any more fruitful than last week’s meeting. As long as the Pakistani military establishment feels at liberty to dictate terms to an insecure civilian regime, future discussions are merely the chronicle of a death foretold.
Sumit Ganguly is a Professor of Political Science and holds the Tagore Chair in Indian Cultures and Civilizations at Indiana University, Bloomington.
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Jim Guy
Anyone who is familiar with history of Pakistan knows that the real power does not lie in the hands of the Civilian Gov. It never has and never will. It’s a sad state of affairs but the simple fact. If A Civilian Gov ever challenges Non Civilian authority these are the few outcomes they can expect. Coup, Exiled, Hung or simply assassinated. In fact all of the above have taken place in Pakistani politics thanks to the Non Civilian who don’t want Civilians to rule the country.
In such a state no agreement can ever be made between Civilian Ruled India and a Non Civilian Ruled Pakistan.
David
Tony, if you notice he says “reasonable to assume”. If you say you assume something it means you don’t have to present the source or confirmation, otherwise it’s not an assumption, is it?
Tony Khan
‘It is entirely reasonable to assume that Qureshi was adhering to a script prepared at GHQ Rawalpindi’.
No sources? No references? No confirmation? Is this what goes for journalism in India. The world according to Mr Gangulay’s neurosis!