The problem for US ties with its Korean ally is that South Koreans might (or so some in Washington fear) misinterpret American non-proliferation objections as reflecting a mistrust of Seoul’s intentions rather than a concern for how South Korean policies could affect the calculations of other potential proliferators. No one in Washington thinks that Seoul will soon make atomic bombs as long as the United States remains committed to South Korea’s defence. And of course South Koreans have the right to engage in peaceful nuclear activities. The problem is that the world can’t long survive if 100 countries have the capacity to make nuclear weapons in a matter of months because they want to enrich uranium or reprocess nuclear fuel.
Of all the regions in the world, Asia is a particular proliferation concern since China, India, Pakistan, North Korea, and the United States all have major nuclear weapons programmes, while Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea already have the industrial capacity and scientific-technical expertise to launch such programmes. Throw in additional evidence that appeared earlier this year that Burma may be seeking to develop the capacity to ultimately make nuclear weapons and the dangers become clear.
But a solution to all this does exist, and it’s one that could help head off what may otherwise be just the first in a string of disputes between Washington and Asian nations–allow South Korea to engage in uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing, but within the framework of a multinational East Asian nuclear fuel bank under IAEA oversight. The arrangement would allow countries with nuclear reactors but not indigenous fuel-making capabilities (which could include perhaps a dozen Asian states) to obtain reactor fuel from an international nuclear service centre, perhaps even one based in South Korea, rather than develop their own independent uranium enrichment or plutonium reprocessing technologies. This would mean that South Korea could sell nuclear fuel to the repository and nuclear reactors to its foreign customers, with the centre requiring acceptance of both the IAEA’s comprehensive safeguards and its Additional Protocol as a condition of receipt.
Two years from now, Seoul will host the second nuclear security summit, whose aim is to curb nuclear proliferation and terrorism. At the first such summit in Washington this April, the Obama administration successfully lobbied on Seoul’s behalf in recognition of South Korea’s strong non-proliferation credentials. The 2012 summit therefore provides a real opportunity to launch the proposed multinational fuel service initiative, under joint South Korean-US leadership.
Whether this chance will be taken or not, though, remains to be seen.
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J
This article is yet another example of the US trying to mantain an exclusive nuclear club. Forbidding a democratic government which hasn’t violated any of the nuclear non proliferation treaties and which is ALSO a robust ally of the US from selling domestic nuclear technology is absurd.
nick
this seems to exactly mirror gun control laws. prohibit law abiding countries from having anything so only bad guys have weapons. then fail to punish the bad guys for having them.
not allowing south korea to reprocess nuclear fuel in hopes that such prohibitions will convince north korea to give up their nukes is laughable.
cm
Whether South Korea develops nuclear weapons or not, it won’t stop nor hinder the bad guys in Asia to develop the weapon.