So Sunday’s election was going to be a referendum on Hatoyama and Ozawa’s politics and personal problems–until both men suddenly resigned from their positions on June 2. A new prime minister, the level-headed, plain-spoken, common man Naoto Kan, was elected the new leader of the DPJ. In spirit, the quick-tempered Kan is nearly the opposite of his wealthy, vacillating and whimsical predecessor Hatoyama, and in policy direction, the nearly exact opposite of the profligate Ozawa. Ozawa, the supposed dark lord of Japanese politics, was dramatically driven offstage and told by Kan to keep quiet for the sake of the country, the party and his own good.
The people erupted in joy at the fall of Hatoyama and Ozawa; the popularity of the DPJ and the Cabinet rebounded. The House of Councillors poll was going to see the coronation of Kan and the celebration of the return of core, pre-Ozawa DPJ values of fiscal restraint and the rejection of pandering to a web of interest groups. It was also to be a celebration of the arrival of the politics of reality, of limits and tradeoffs spelled out in stark detail, contrary to the vaporous wishful thinking out loud of Hatoyama and the impossible-to-keep promises of Ozawa. The new DPJ leadership called the election early, with piles of Diet bills left to gather dust or to die, in order to capitalize on the people’s jubilation.
Except, of course, that rather than resting on his laurels, Kan introduced an idea that had been drilled into his head by both the bureaucrats at the Ministry of Finance and the European crisis over Greece: that the government of Japan was a debt-ridden house of cards in dire need of bolstering–and that the primary means of putting Japan’s financial house in order was a hike in the consumption tax. Kan then jetted off to the G20 meetings, leaving his idea to be picked over by his enemies in his absence.
Kan thought he had bought political cover for the idea of a tax rise with references to the Greek crisis and the manifesto of the LDP, which stated that the at least according to the LDP the consumption tax had to rise to 10 percent. However, Kan’s enemies pounced on the consumption tax, first as an example of his lack of understanding of economics (imposition of a tax hike is likely to severely impact economic growth, which Japan desperately needs) and of the DPJ’s fundamental duplicity–its 2009 manifesto having promised that the party would not raise the consumption tax before the next House of Representative election, which is forecast for 2013.
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Ralph Sato
I agree with Gabriel’s view of the situation in Japanese politics. The LDP’s no confidence vote (which failed) on PM Kan due to his “mishandling” of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster is an example of the meaningless political gamesmanship that has gripped politics in Japan for several decades. The public discerns that this is one cause of the malaise that haunts politics in Japan, when they reacted negatively to the LDP no confidence vote. Broad policy changes may be necessary in some areas like energy policy but overall it would be more desirable to grind through the current political process than to risk upheaval.
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Gabriel
Certainly this election is not meaningless, it will be an indication of just how strong the need for change really was for the Japanese public when they voted in the DPJ this time, unlike the short lived one year term in 1993/94.
The 1993/94 electoral reforms aimed to abolish among other things corruption such as pork barrelling and personalised politics the likes of which had contributed to the almost uninterupted rule of the LDP. It is unfortunate and perhaps a little ironic that the drivers of this ‘long-run’ reform agenda, particularly Ozawa, have now exited for the very evils the reformists were against.
The alternative as it was proposed, among other things, should be elections based on policy, which now are arguably possible with what appears to be the beginnings of a functioning two party system (whereas previously, in the 1993 election, the DPJ was largely successful due to alliances with other smaller parties).
It should also be noted that the undecided or perhaps ambivalent voter is certainly not new to Japan. The dilemma appears to be how to best reach these ‘floating voters’, not, as the article suggests, to create a new national agenda or set of national policy platforms. We should give the Japanese voters more credit, they have elected for change and reform, these things take time.
The other element that contributed to the reign of the LDP was their style of campaigning, and is another reason why this election along with those to come will be important to see whether a less corrupt and fairer election campaign may now evolve. One of the reforms mentioned in this article was the restriction of campaigning to three weeks. This is necessary given the stranglehold the LDP had over the election campaign through its overrepresentation in rural areas, strong second/third/fourth generation local support groups (koenkai), and their ability to provide localised, personalised rewards to these voters. Three weeks may be a prudent amount of time to capture the interest of the undecided cohort, rather than too little.
The results of this election then from the perspective of a reform agenda set in motion almost 20 years ago will be very significant indeed.
Dr. Mahendra Prakash
Democracy has always provided space for people of a particular country to get associated with through voting (decision power). In Japan, if people are not interested much in any election, that is very dangerous for the democratic pattern adopted by the politicians. Politicians should make contact with voters and appeal comprehensively for their support in the elections. The interest generated by the politicians and their parties would certainly emphasize interest among the people to take part in the elections and, further, this act will be helpful for democratization process in Japan. Japan is an advance country; the unwillingness by the masses for the ‘election’ will reflect the non-commitment of political leadership. This must be corrected for the political future of the Japan.
Ryosuke KAMI
Meaningless election is a taboo word. If an election is conducted sans violence, fraud, or “miscount” as in Japan, however the result may seem pointless, democratic election is never meaningless. Once an election should be conceived as such, a path to ugly despotism, be it of the extreme rightist streak or of the extreme leftist variety, will be gaping ahead. Germany saw it. Japan saw it. Election, evidently, never comes with complete satisfaction to any voter. It is always a compromise. Japan may lack quality leaders, Japanese voters, I trust, still can discern the difference between a political party whose end goal is just winning an election and never beyond, or one whose perceived mission is administering the affairs of state.
Dr Michael Vaughan
There is certainly a great deal of voter disillusionment with the political process in Japan. Many voters see no connection between the politicians they elect and the effect (beneficial or otherwise) they have on their lives. Prime Minister Kan’s greatest tactical (and electorally costly) error was to change policy mid-stream over the hated consumption tax. It should be remembered that this issue brought down the Hashimoto Government in 1997; and it could badly erode the lack-lustre 40% support polls currently give to the now-struggling DPJ. This Election does have meaning – but with one in three voters (or 35 million people) not knowing or not caring for whom they will cast their ballot – Japan’s leaders must fashion a new set of goals and values for the nation to follow.