By Jason Miks
Writing in a policy paper earlier this year Lin argued: ‘After signing ECFA with (China), then Taiwan, ASEAN and (China) will form the hub-and-spoke framework, that is, the preferential trade arrangement only exists between Taiwan and (China) and between ASEAN and (China), but there is no preferential trade arrangement between Taiwan and ASEAN.’
I asked Taipei-based blogger Leonard Chien if there were concerns among the public about the economic impact of the deal. Perhaps not surprisingly, he highlighted a by no means Taiwan-specific fear of an influx of cheap labour (fears that would have found a sympathetic audience with British worried a few years ago about Poles massed on their borders). But Chien also said there are concerns about what comes next in the multi-staged negotiations, with some worrying that some time in the near future Taiwan will be requested to open up its services or financial sector.
But even supposing the deal is clearly in Taiwan’s interests, why didn’t Ma take the option of the political cover of a referendum (after all, the public has been strongly in favour of one, even after Ma’s superior performance in a televised debate with the opposition leader over the pact in April).
And, as Taiwan-based analyst J. Michael Cole noted to me yesterday: ‘In good old Chinese Communist Party style, most of the negotiations were conducted behind closed doors and only very recently were the “early harvest” lists—the items from each side that will be receiving preferential tariff treatment—made public.’
Cole also noted the accelerated negotiation timetable—about six months—and the curiously specific deadline for the deal’s signature, which as he says is never a good sign. But more than this is the issue of Taiwan negotiating with a hugely powerful neighbour that simply doesn’t recognize its right to exist as an independent entity, and it’s this fundamental point that makes this more than just another free trade agreement. And it should be giving Taiwan pause over the apparently sweet concessions that China appears to be offering now.
One of my favourite quotes is one by Confucius: ‘It does not matter how slowly you go so long as you do not stop.’ I believe this goes to the heart of how China views the annexation process of Taiwan.
China has been upfront about the fact that it sees the trade deal as a step toward greater political integration. If Ma believes that this is the best path for Taiwan, he should have the courage of his convictions and take a deal that clearly has political implications to the people. In the meantime, though, he should remember that he was elected president of Taiwan, not governor of China’s 23rd province.
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J. Michael
Magnus T.M.: Chen did speak out the name of the country he represented — Taiwan. The Republic of China (and its constitution) was imposed upon Taiwan in 1949 when the KMT lost the civil war and fled across the Taiwan Strait. At that time, Taiwan’s status was in limbo; it was under the control of the KMT, but it had not been handed over to the ROC by Japan or the international community. And prior to this, it was under half a century of Japanese rule. Chen actually had guts whereas Ma is afraid to speak out the name of the country that elected him, and he is resurrecting the overlapping ROC/china view that prevailed under the KMT prior to the 1990s.
Y.M. Wang: Perhaps true, but there’s no sign whatever that the People’s Republic of China is democratzing, or that the CCP would allow such a development. It is becoming increasingly obvious that all those theories about China democratizing after it adopted the Western free-market system are pure confabulation — it’s not going to happen anytime soon, and we should not underestimate the CCP’s ability to adapt and stay in power. Consequently, the *eventual* unification you speak of is (in a form that would be acceptable to Taiwanese) too far in the future.
P.L. Wong: Solid points. From my perspective here in Taipei, however, I’d say that Ma’s low popularity had more to do with mishandling of domestic issues (Typhoon Morakot, US beef, high unemployment) that his cross-strait, pro-China policies. It’s a mistake, IMHO, to look at Taiwanese politics as if the only thing that matters is cross-strait relations. It isn’t. Most (not all) politics are local.
Y.M. Wang
Whether Taiwan’s sovereignty was legally transferred to the Republic of China can be argued either way. In 1945, when Japan renounced its claim to Taiwan, there was no dispute in the international community that sovereignty of Taiwan should rightfully revert to the ROC. The debate on the legal status only began much later with the rise of the independence movement. On the other hand, it is correct that there is no document that formalized this transfer.
Whether the Greens on Taiwan likes it or not, Taiwan is culturally tied to China. One needs only to look at Taiwanese currency, the national anthem, or the Palace Museum. If there is truly unambiguous support for a completely separate Taiwanese identity, these symbols would have been done away with and ancient Chinese artifacts removed from the museum and sent back to China. The fact that pan-Blue candidates are routinely elected in certain regions also demonstrates this.
Also, the PRC’s governments grip on Chinese life is slowly but surely loosening. The media today can cover events that a decade ago would be unthinkable. The ROC was a one-party state, complete with the trappings of autocracy like censorship and spy agencies, until 1986. Democratization does happen, but looking at development indices like per capita GDP, the PRC today is no where close to the level of the ROC in 1986.