As I understand it, the party structure has atrophied – there aren’t as many regular congresses and meetings of the party as might otherwise have been expected. So there does seem to have been a certain concentration of power. But I think in terms of decision making processes, they’re really impenetrable to outsiders and largely based on speculation that’s difficult to verify.
What do you make of South Korea’s response to the sinking of the Cheonan?
It has been a measured response. It has obviously stirred up a certain amount of anger and emotion as you’d expect, but I think it’s clear that the South Koreans haven’t allowed themselves to be overwhelmed with an emotional response…China has been reluctant to make a firm statement on the issue of the sinking of the Cheonan, partly because it might sense that it would be counter-productive to be explicitly, blisteringly critical of North Korea as it has certain credentials it needs to preserve. And those credentials could be cashed in at some point in the future when China’s leverage over Pyongyang needs to be exploited for perhaps some wider settlement on the nuclear issue. But I think there’s also clearly a risk for China in appearing to be too relaxed about what many countries in the region see as a fairly overt act of aggression and hostility, and it’s problematic if China allows that impression to arise.
How much sway does China really have?
I think the Chinese have always felt they have a lot of influence, but they’ve never had confidence they can calibrate that influence to achieve specific policy outcomes. They’ve always been concerned that an excessive application of that influence might prompt an over-reaction by North Korea, or alternatively that the form of pressure they apply – if too large – could have the effect of crumpling the regime in a way that would create all sorts of unwelcome contingencies on the Korean Peninsula.
But if you look at the sweep of Chinese diplomacy generally, you’ll see a general reluctance to force issues. There’s a certain sense that time is the great healer, that issues will play themselves out and that the wrong thing to do is to try and be impatient and force issues in a way that produces counter-productive responses. It’s a very process driven form of diplomacy, which compares with America’s approach, which tends to be much more driven toward product, towards outcome, towards clear and definable situations in a way that the Chinese don’t feel they have to act.
Is there any path back for North Korea to the Six-way talks?
It’s very difficult to see how that could be the case unless there was some sort of signal or act of contrition about the incident, or at least regret that would form the basis of a way they could be readmitted to those talks. Clearly, no one wants to abolish that forum, because it’s the only forum in which any real progress is seen to be likely, although in the last few years it has acted as a venue for bilateral contact between the US and North Korea that would be difficult to have outside that forum.
So it has a value, it has a function. It has been very limited in the results it has produced, but there doesn’t seem to be any particular interest in completely undermining that construct. But the key question is really the terms that the other countries want to set for North Korea’s re-entry to that forum.
Adam Ward is director of studies at the International Institute for Strategic Studies.
Reddit
Digg
StumbleUpon
Delicious
Technorati
Yahoo
Google
Plurk
MAO ZEDONG
“DEATH IS GREATEST INVENTION… WIPES AWAY OLD FOR THE NEW… STEVE JOBS.
Kim Jong Il die will die like me and you…. his idiot son at age 26 will laughed at worldwide…
Free Korea in about 10-years… No one will pay attention to an idiot 26-year Kim…