This success is what is likely behind, at least in large part, Obama’s plan to draw down troops in Afghanistan, the first time such a possibility could realistically be considered since operations began almost a decade ago.
There are now two options with this new Af-Pak policy. The first would be an early NATO pull-out that leaves the beleaguered nation’s fight against the remnants of the al-Qaeda and Taliban in the hands of the country’s half-trained armed forces, which are under the command of an apparently corrupt administration. Under such a scenario, the United States would maintain a skeletal presence for smoking out Osama bin Laden and other top al-Qaeda members. The US knows that such an operation would have to be covert, and may not be able to depend on Pakistan’s military and intelligence agencies.
The other scenario would be for the United States to maintain more of a presence in Afghanistan until the remnants of al-Qaeda and the Taliban had been completely annihilated, though the Obama plan makes this look unlikely.
Either way, the failure of al-Qaeda does not eliminate the Jihadist threat, although it does change things up quite a bit. With the apparent demise of al-Qaeda, ragtag splinter groups of Islamic militants will be left in its wake. Many of these smaller factions will either end up dying fighting on the fringes, or shift their focus to the ‘next best’ terror group. This makes it all the more likely that Lashkar-e-Taiba will assume a much more central role in the global terrorist network.
Radical Islamists, particularly in Southeast Asia, are bound to look beyond the failing al-Qaeda for moral guidance and material support, and Lashkar-e-Taiba looks most likely to fill the vacuum. Indeed, the group’s apparent interest in attacking foreigners and expanding its global reach are indicators that this process is already underway.
And within Pakistan itself, Lashkar-e-Taiba is already a troubling presence. The ISI appears to be in denial over the threat Pakistan faces, and there’s a growing feeling that state forces in Pakistan are increasingly unable to act effectively against the group.
This makes the Obama administration’s apparent desire to cut short the fight against militants all the more troubling. Call it the burden of history—the United States is the only country that can proactively lead the global effort to curb Jihadism. But if President Obama forgets this now, the United States will see US boots returning to Asia continent sooner rather than later.
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David
The biggest threat to the region is indian presence in afghanistan and the creation of Pakistan Taliban by the RAW (indian agency), funded and trained to carry out their terrorist activities inside Pakistan. This is the biggest mistake of the invasion force that has allowed india to play this dirty game. Now the tables have turned, the western forces are packing their bags and looking for an exit and the indians who had been riding on the necks of this invasion force are in a choas, while Pakistan military is manuvering swiftly to have the indians kicked out of the region, and that is the first condition for a peaceful settlement with Taliban in a post Nato scenerio, where Karzai is now looking for some space for his life!
Rahul Singh
This article: “the U.S. will see US boots returning to Asia continent sooner rather than later.”
U.S. officials think that Pakistan continues to pursue a hedging strategy in seeking to maintain relationships with an array of entities — including the U.S. and Afghan governments, as well as insurgent networks — struggling to shape the outcome in Afghanistan, even as it aggressively battles the Pakistani branch of the Taliban.
U.S. officials … see ongoing signs that some ISI operatives are providing sanctuary and other assistance to factions of the Taliban when their CIA counterparts are not around.
U.S. officials say Pakistani spy agency released Afghan Taliban insurgents
Greg Miller, Washington Post April 11 2010
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/04/10/AR2010041002111.html
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Pakistan continues to have influence with the Afghan Taliban and is using that leverage to force the Kabul government do its bidding rather than to broker a peace between the Taliban and the Afghan government.
Terrorism’s Supermarket
Why Pakistan keeps exporting jihad.
Fareed Zakaria, Newsweek May 8 2010
http://www.newsweek.com/id/237652
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The classic defense of our involvement in Afghanistan is that we need to make sure that Afghanistan never again becomes a sanctuary for al-Qaeda or other enemies of the United States. Ungoverned spaces attract terrorists, especially when they’re in bad neighborhoods. (See Pakistan)
But what I’ve seen in my last three trips to Afghanistan, and what I’ve read in the Pentagon’s own “Report on Progress Toward Security and Stabilization in Afghanistan” makes me believe that neither our strategy nor our tactics apply any longer.
Our so-called allies, Karzai, Inc., may no longer differ much from the terrorists who would likely govern southern and eastern Afghanistan if we leave. If al-Qaeda stays on the Pakistani side of the border, where, after all, living conditions and infrastructure are better, what’s the difference? Once we leave, the cause of expelling the foreign troops vanishes; al-Qaeda has much more of an interest in nuclear Pakistan; and the Karzais would likely meet the same end as Najibullah, strung up in the streets, once they lose our support.
Dying for the Karzai Cartel
Our strategy and tactics in Afghanistan, both of which make sense in theory, no longer apply.
Ann Marlowe, National Review May 20 2010
http://article.nationalreview.com/434392/dying-for-the-karzai-cartel/ann-marlowe
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In recent years, it has become all too clear how distant the prospect of a stable Afghanistan is.
A tribal-ethnic balance of power overseen by Pakistan is another matter entirely, however. The great irony is that such a success could make the region look remarkably like it did on Sep 10 2001.
Three Points of View: The United States, Pakistan and India
Peter Zeihan, Statfor April 28 2010
http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20100427_three_points_view_united_states_pakistan_and_india
Sumant Rawat
Excellent article that raises the awareness of radical groups currently operating in South Asia that will eventually pose a threat to the West and indeed the international community.The weakness of the state in India unfortunately encourages these actors and India’s handling of the ‘Maoist’ groups inspires little confidence.
Madan Ekbote
Good article. The author has gone in depth of the issue and forsee the role of US in curbing these activities. Excellent efforts!