Al-Qaeda is on the back foot, says Sunny Peter. But if the US eases up, other groups will soon step into its shoes.
Almost ten years into a full-on war on terrorism in Afghanistan and al-Qaeda has been dispersed. Indeed, the United States is now confident enough that it has dealt a significant enough blow to militants that it has shifted its focus to transferring the burden of confrontation and development into local hands under an Af-Pak policy expected to pave the way for a NATO pull-out from active conflict.
However, although in disarray, al-Qaeda and the Taliban are far from destroyed—a fact that raises troubling questions about Afghanistan’s ability to meet its objectives. And if Pakistan is, as some have charged, continuing its dalliances with terrorist groups, Jihadism will continue to pose a clear and grave danger not just to South Asia, but to the rest of the world.
For regional neighbour India, the risk of terrorism comes from a peculiar concoction of politico-religious Islamic radicalism riding on the back of an already powerful crime syndicate. D-Company is led by one of the world’s most-wanted men, Dawood Ibrahim, who is now believed to be safely nestled in Pakistan (although Pakistan denies any knowledge of him).
India may not yet face a direct threat from al-Qaeda, but it is still forced to contend with Lashkar-e-Taiba( Army of the Righteous) and its syndicates, which currently operate in India. Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) has been accused of backing the group as a way of targeting Kashmir and particularly India. But many experts, including in the United States, now feel that even if there were a resolution to the Kashmir dispute, it would no longer satisfy the group’s aspirations. Indeed, with operations in an estimated 21 countries, Lashkar-e-Taiba is bound to look for a larger role in efforts to create a Pan-Islamic world order.
With Muslims comprising more than 13 percent of the country’s population, the government in India (at the central and state levels) can ill-afford action that’s seen as alienating this politically important sector. Communalism is still a volatile issue, with the potential to drive the country toward carnage. But it’s the spectre of such carnage that has meant that all counter-terrorism efforts in India tend to get stuck in a quagmire, with policymakers caught between accusations of appeasement on the one hand, and fear of estranging the country’s Muslim populace on the other.
The terrorist threat in Southeast Asia, meanwhile, is quite different. Here, al-Qaeda has been the mentor, including to outfits such as Jemaah Islamiyah (Islamic Society), another force that has a presence beyond the borders of the country it is most associated with. JI was created and launched in an effort to create an Islamic community or brotherhood, with the ultimate aim of creating an Islamic caliphate of Southeast Asian countries.
Photo Credit: US Army
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David
The biggest threat to the region is indian presence in afghanistan and the creation of Pakistan Taliban by the RAW (indian agency), funded and trained to carry out their terrorist activities inside Pakistan. This is the biggest mistake of the invasion force that has allowed india to play this dirty game. Now the tables have turned, the western forces are packing their bags and looking for an exit and the indians who had been riding on the necks of this invasion force are in a choas, while Pakistan military is manuvering swiftly to have the indians kicked out of the region, and that is the first condition for a peaceful settlement with Taliban in a post Nato scenerio, where Karzai is now looking for some space for his life!
Rahul Singh
This article: “the U.S. will see US boots returning to Asia continent sooner rather than later.”
U.S. officials think that Pakistan continues to pursue a hedging strategy in seeking to maintain relationships with an array of entities — including the U.S. and Afghan governments, as well as insurgent networks — struggling to shape the outcome in Afghanistan, even as it aggressively battles the Pakistani branch of the Taliban.
U.S. officials … see ongoing signs that some ISI operatives are providing sanctuary and other assistance to factions of the Taliban when their CIA counterparts are not around.
U.S. officials say Pakistani spy agency released Afghan Taliban insurgents
Greg Miller, Washington Post April 11 2010
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/04/10/AR2010041002111.html
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Pakistan continues to have influence with the Afghan Taliban and is using that leverage to force the Kabul government do its bidding rather than to broker a peace between the Taliban and the Afghan government.
Terrorism’s Supermarket
Why Pakistan keeps exporting jihad.
Fareed Zakaria, Newsweek May 8 2010
http://www.newsweek.com/id/237652
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The classic defense of our involvement in Afghanistan is that we need to make sure that Afghanistan never again becomes a sanctuary for al-Qaeda or other enemies of the United States. Ungoverned spaces attract terrorists, especially when they’re in bad neighborhoods. (See Pakistan)
But what I’ve seen in my last three trips to Afghanistan, and what I’ve read in the Pentagon’s own “Report on Progress Toward Security and Stabilization in Afghanistan” makes me believe that neither our strategy nor our tactics apply any longer.
Our so-called allies, Karzai, Inc., may no longer differ much from the terrorists who would likely govern southern and eastern Afghanistan if we leave. If al-Qaeda stays on the Pakistani side of the border, where, after all, living conditions and infrastructure are better, what’s the difference? Once we leave, the cause of expelling the foreign troops vanishes; al-Qaeda has much more of an interest in nuclear Pakistan; and the Karzais would likely meet the same end as Najibullah, strung up in the streets, once they lose our support.
Dying for the Karzai Cartel
Our strategy and tactics in Afghanistan, both of which make sense in theory, no longer apply.
Ann Marlowe, National Review May 20 2010
http://article.nationalreview.com/434392/dying-for-the-karzai-cartel/ann-marlowe
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In recent years, it has become all too clear how distant the prospect of a stable Afghanistan is.
A tribal-ethnic balance of power overseen by Pakistan is another matter entirely, however. The great irony is that such a success could make the region look remarkably like it did on Sep 10 2001.
Three Points of View: The United States, Pakistan and India
Peter Zeihan, Statfor April 28 2010
http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20100427_three_points_view_united_states_pakistan_and_india
Sumant Rawat
Excellent article that raises the awareness of radical groups currently operating in South Asia that will eventually pose a threat to the West and indeed the international community.The weakness of the state in India unfortunately encourages these actors and India’s handling of the ‘Maoist’ groups inspires little confidence.
Madan Ekbote
Good article. The author has gone in depth of the issue and forsee the role of US in curbing these activities. Excellent efforts!