A second possible motive is that the North Korean Navy and Special Forces, antsy for an opportunity to humiliate an increasingly capable South Korean Navy, saw a chance to attack and deny, understanding that any escalation would be limited because democratic South Korea and its ally the United States would want to avoid a conflict. Last November, tensions mounted after a two-minute naval skirmish off the west coast of Korea left one of North Korea’s navy vessels on fire and nearly destroyed.
But there’s a third possibility behind the torpedo incident. Even to this day, senior Chinese officials are convinced that hardliners in Pyongyang orchestrated the Rangoon bombing in order to scuttle secret diplomatic negotiations in Beijing between US and North Korean diplomats. It’s entirely possible that history has repeated itself.
Meanwhile, the Obama Administration is demonstrating a shrewd policy of firmness and reassurance by fully backing US ally South Korea. At the same time, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton is exhibiting exquisite timing by arriving in Tokyo to reach accord over a simmering basing dispute with Japanese Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama.
We may never know the full truth behind the torpedo attack until the day when North Korean archives are open to the public. Perhaps it was indeed Kim Jong-il himself who wanted to undermine pressure to return to the Six Party Talks. But regardless of the reason for the torpedo attack, cautious restraint and alliance solidarity remain the best policy course. When the North Korean regime eventually does transition—and perhaps collapse—it will be Seoul that will be in the strongest position to help bring about a new peace.
Dr. Patrick M. Cronin is Senior Director of the Asian-Pacific Security Program at the Center for a New American Security in Washington, D.C.
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Mark Thomason
There is another possiblity: this is meant to rub our noses in the lack of any more sanctions, and the total failure of sanctions to motivate the North. The message is for the next step of the nuclear talks, “Find some carrots and offer them.”
I don’t advocate by this that we should or not, but that this could be the message that was intended, not to stop the nuclear talks, but to make them go more to the North’s liking. It is extremely hard headed and confrontational, but that is exactly how the North operates.