China Prefers Devil It Knows

May 10, 2010

By Richard Weitz

South Korean officials expressed some displeasure that Beijing had decided to host Kim despite the unresolved sinking of the warship. Likewise, when asked about Kim’s comments, US State Department spokesman Philip Crowley replied that, ‘if Kim Jong-il wants to create favourable conditions for Six-Party Talks, he can do exactly what we have outlined for months and years – meet its international obligations, pursue the commitments that it made in the joint communiqué in 2005, cease provocative actions that destabilize the region.’ US policy toward the region, Crowley explained, would ‘be guided by North Korea’s actions. There are things that North Korea has to do, not say. And they have to meet their international obligations, cease provocative actions. That is what we’ll be looking for from North Korea.’

After Kim’s return home, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Jiang Yu offered several defences of his ‘unofficial visit.’ She argued that Kim’s trip had been planned well before the Cheonan’s sinking, that North Korea’s involvement in the incident remained unproven, that the two issues were separate events, and that maintaining regional peace and security should be the most important considerations even when determining how to respond to the explosion that destroyed the ship. The Chinese officials who briefed the South Korean Ambassador to China, Yu woo-ik, about the visit reported that the North Korean delegation had denied any involvement in the sinking.

Jiang’s comments underscore China’s priorities when it comes to North Korea. They should also prompt a sense of caution over the future of the talks even if the parties overcome their current impasse. It’s understandable that the international community has looked to China to influence Pyongyang’s policies and help end the protracted dispute over North Korea’s nuclear program and other threatening behavior—China is North Korea’s most important foreign diplomatic, economic and security partner. Through the Six-Party Talks and other mechanisms, Chinese policymakers have felt the optimal outcome would be for the North Korean regime to relinquish its nuclear weapons and moderate its other foreign and defence policies in return for security assurances, economic assistance and diplomatic acceptance by the rest of the international community. Such a benign outcome would avoid the feared consequences of precipitous regime change—humanitarian emergencies, economic reconstruction, arms races and military conflicts.

Yet, Beijing’s willingness to pressure Pyongyang to modify its policies is constrained by a fundamental consideration. Unlike most policymakers in Seoul, Tokyo and Washington, Chinese policymakers want to change Pyongyang’s behavior, not its regime. Chinese officials remain more concerned about the potential collapse of North Korea than about its government’s intransigence on the nuclear issue or other questions. Chinese policymakers fear that North Korea’s disintegration could induce widespread economic disruptions in East Asia; generate large refugee flows across their borders; weaken China’s influence in the Koreas by ending their unique status as interlocutors with Pyongyang; allow the US military to concentrate its military potential in other theatres (e.g., Taiwan); and potentially remove a buffer separating their borders from US ground forces (i.e., should the US Army redeploy into northern Korea). At worst, North Korea’s collapse could precipitate military conflict and civil strife on the peninsula—which could spill across into Chinese territory.

Chinese policymakers have therefore consistently resisted military action, severe economic sanctions and other developments that could threaten stability on the Korean peninsula. Whatever their personal feelings about Kim’s provocative foreign policies and his dynastic ambitions, they prefer to deal with the devil they know rather than the phantom of their nightmares.

Richard Weitz writes a weekly column for The Diplomat on Asian defence and security. He is a senior fellow and director of the Hudson Institute’s Center for Political-Military Analysis.