The Chinese government has also been alarmed by the chaos within its neighbour. On April 8, Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Jiang Yu told reporters that, ‘We are deeply concerned over the developments of situation in Kyrgyzstan and hope to see early restoration of order and stability in the country and that relevant issues can be settled through the legal means.’
China has important interests tied to Kyrgyzstan. Its volatile province of Xinjiang, the scene of periodic ethnic clashes involving China’s Uighur minority, borders Kyrgyzstan and the last thing Beijing wants is for Uighur terrorists to establish a safe haven there. The Chinese government rapidly delivered communications equipment, tents and other defence items to Kyrgyzstan to help its government ward off a 1999-2000 incursion by Islamist terrorists. Indeed, Chinese policymakers consider developments in neighbouring Kyrgyzstan so important that, during the chaos of the country’s 2005 Tulip Revolution, Chinese officials even indicated that they might deploy combat forces there (though local and Russian opposition ultimately prevented any Chinese military operation in Kyrgyzstan).
More recently, the growing number of Chinese nationals and businesses in Kyrgyzstan has shaped Beijing’s perceptions of its evolving interests in the country’s security. Although no Chinese nationals were injured during the April riots, some Chinese businessmen suffered property losses when their shops were looted and burned along with most other business establishments in Bishkek.
Russian and Chinese policymakers face conflicting considerations in deciding whether to exploit the new situation in Kyrgyzstan to try to secure a US military withdrawal from Manas. On the one hand, Moscow would enhance its leverage with Washington if the United States were to lose its access to the base and have to rely more heavily on bringing supplies into Central Asia through Russian territory. Denied use of Manas, the United States and other NATO countries would depend on Russian goodwill to continue supporting their Afghan contingents through this northern route. Moscow could threaten to suspend transit through its territory should NATO prove excessively recalcitrant regarding Afghanistan, Georgia, missile defence, or other disputed issues.
On the other hand, NATO might decide to expand use of the South Caucasus as an alternative transit route, which would enhance the leverage of the current Georgian government, which is seeking to join the alliance. Or NATO might curtail its efforts in Afghanistan, which would increase the danger that terrorism and narcotics trafficking would spread to Russia and its Central Asian allies. In any case, a Russian effort to evict NATO from Manas would certainly harm the reset efforts that have produced the New START Treaty and possibly greater cooperation over Iran and Afghanistan.
Beijing appears not yet to have made a formal decision on Manas and Chinese officials may find themselves equally cross-pressured. Manas’ location only 200 miles from the China-Kyrgyzstan border, combined with Washington’s longstanding military cooperation with Taiwan and Japan as well as its growing security ties with India, invariably has stimulated fears of US encirclement. On the other hand, Chinese leaders thus far have avoided directly challenging the NATO military presence in Kyrgyzstan.
China’s ambivalence reflects recognition of the advantages of having the United States heavily involved in suppressing potentially anti-Chinese terrorism in Central Asia. It also results from uncertainties over the ability of China or Russia to manage the consequences of a precipitous NATO military disengagement from the region.
In all likelihood, providing the new Kyrgyz government can re-establish internal stability and agrees to meet the core demands of Russia (respect Russian military and economic primacy) and China (suppress Uighur nationalism and protect Chinese nationals and businesses), Moscow and Beijing will accept whatever decision the new Kyrgyz government takes regarding Manas.
Richard Weitz is a senior fellow and director of the Hudson Institute’s Center for Political-Military Analysis.
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E. Spengler
“While the interests of the three great powers in Eurasia largely overlap…”
Not really. The interests of Russia and China (as well as Iran) are to maintain stability in their back yard, part of which is to stem the tide of Afghan opium heroin and the emerging prominence of armed militias funded by vast drug profits.
The US on the other hand is not concerned with stability in Central Asia. If anything, its collusion with the double dealing of Pakistan’s ISI suggests the US is wilfully promoting a doctrine of manageable chaos throughout the CENTCOM region. Whether the chaos really can remain manageable is another matter.
kyrgyz
“Or NATO might curtail its efforts in Afghanistan, which would increase the danger that terrorism and NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING would spread to Russia and its Central Asian allies.”
During occupation of Afghanistan by America heroin manufacture has increased in forty times.
Richard Shepard
Aside from the inconvenience of losing Manas in June – for which contingency plans are in place – is there a strategic need of maintaining a semi-military presence in Central Asia? Bishkek is a long way to go and really does not provide any commensurate upside for the US. It is a stretch to imagine that the US could have more than marginal influence in Central Asia given the huge advantages in logistics, economic and military ties held by Moscow. It is as if those advocating a US presence – notwithstanding the current need for a supply route to Afghanistan – are similar to the early adventurers who tried to drag the East India Company into the “Great Game” with scare tactics and promises of huge markets.
Also, Manas hardly qualifies as a military base. It is a transit point and caters to large US military transports. I don’t think I have ever seen any type of attack aircraft parked at the base, unlike the Russian base at Kant which hosts several Migs.
Finally, there were reports of Chinese being attacked during the revolution and I know from personal experience that Chinese nationals are routinely harassed – whether Uyghur or not. The Chinese are viewed with deep suspicion in the heart of the country like Naryn. Somehow, I can’t conceive that the Chinese would be seriously concerned over the possible use of the Kyrgyz Republic as a terrorist base for Uyghurs.