Can Afghanistan Help Itself?

March 25, 2010

By David Axe

Part of the problem is that many Afghans, even those in leadership positions, have grown comfortable allowing NATO to essentially govern in their stead. NATO shares some of the blame for providing services without always demanding Afghan involvement. ‘When I got here [a year ago], the coalition tended to do every step of the process for the populace,’ says Lt. Col. Chris Eubank, whose patrol area includes Salang. ‘We’d ask what they needed then find a person to do that job—whether it was a wall or a well—then set the contract in place, do the bidding, hire the person, pay the person and check his work. We were doing all that.’

As a result, ‘all too often in the past, Afghans looked to a coalition uniform—whether American or Canadian, pick your country…[and] they used to think, that’s my problem-solver,’ says Navy Cmdr. Kyle Higgins, commander of a NATO reconstruction team in Parwan. ‘What we’re trying to get at here, what I think success is going to be, is for Afghans to stop looking at us and start looking at their own government for solutions.’

But that hinges on there being an Afghan government that’s willing and able to assume ownership. Officials like Salangi seem to expect NATO to continue doing all the work.

Ownership

With their government failing them, and NATO making every effort to step back from a leadership role, many Afghans are taking matters into their own hands. This bottom-up approach might be the best way to address Afghanistan’s problems—and the most viable solution to the broader problem of developed nations turning developing nations into permanent clients. It isn’t sexy and it’s not easy to codify into policy or law, but it works. Individuals must take responsibility.

At the village outside the air base, agricultural expert Peterson finds Dr. Wali outside the man’s mud-walled home. Wali invites Peterson and the other soldiers inside and shows them the documentation he has voluntarily prepared in order to speed the installation of an 18-inch irrigation pipe. The pipe would finally bring water to the village’s vineyards, which have grown increasingly parched owing to nearby construction that has blocked the flow of water across the area.

‘This is good,’ Peterson says, examining the documents. On his own initiative, Wali had prepared a written appeal for NATO funding and had even begun coordinating with a local contractor who could do the work. The doctor’s initiative made it easy for Peterson to get the project funded and underway. The perfect solution would see Afghan financiers underwriting the work, but until that’s possible, linking foreign money with Afghan planning is the next best thing.

‘We’ve involved locals in the process.’ Eubank says. ‘The end-state is literally we go from: we did everything, to we do nothing but provide oversight. That’s where we’re headed, but it takes a team effort.’

In places like Salang, the team effort between NATO and the Afghan government is faltering. Elsewhere, individual Afghans and Afghan soldiers understand and embrace the need to take on an increasing measure of ownership. With men like Salangi in key leadership roles, Afghanistan is still far from being self-sufficient. But with Afghans like the commandos and Dr. Wali taking responsibility for security and development at the grass-roots level, there’s also some reason to be hopeful.