Asia’s Next Flashpoint?

November 17, 2009

By Luke Hunt

‘Why are you so worried when your neighbours are so poor? They need help,’ he said in regards to the current Thai leadership. Sounding a little irritated, he added: ‘They’re trying to pester me everywhere.’

Thaksin said he wanted to use his economic experience to help Cambodia’s poorest out of poverty, although such pronouncements are unlikely to impress villagers in the Dangrek Mountains.

‘People living along the border are very scared,’ Chheang says. ‘However, war, a conflict on the border? I don’t think so. I can’t see serious repercussions [from Thaksin’s appointment]…Some people fear that Thaksin might be allowed to set-up a government in exile here but that won’t happen. That fear isn’t justified. The days of the Vietnam War, the Cold War, when we allowed our country do that kind of thing are over.’

But the view in Bangkok, where Cambodian influence is minimal and political friendships in tatters, is less certain. Here, domestic politics are driving foreign policy and the biggest issue is the health of King Bhumibol Adulyadjej, who has ruled since 1946.

Land of Disappearing Smiles

Widely seen as the sole unifying force in Thailand, 81-year-old King Bhumibol was hospitalized in mid-September with a lung infection. His condition sparked panic selling on the Thai stock market and a sell-off of the Thai Baht a month later.

In early November, the monarch looked frail as he made a rare public appearance in a wheel chair with his wife Queen Sirikit and heir apparent Crown Prince Vajiralongkom.

Vajiralongkom’s hugely popular sister, Princess Sirindhorn, is next in line to the throne while his fifth and youngest son Prince Dipangkorn Rasmijoti, born in 2005 to his third wife, is also a contender.

Divorce and family squabbles have distanced from royal circles the children of Vajiralongkom’s previous marriages.

Greenwood says Thais are involved in a transitional struggle between the traditional elite–as embodied by the monarchy, the military and sections of the professional middle classes–and the enfranchised and mainly poor majority who Thaksin and his PPP have come to represent.

‘The Thai catharsis will almost certainly centre on the future of the monarchy following the death of the king and could prove difficult and dangerous,’ he says.

But discussion of the succession is enormously sensitive–any comment, any perceived slight that can be interpreted as an offence against the dignity of the monarchy risks charges of lese Majeste, which carry a jail term of between 3 and 15 years.

Charges have already been brought against The Times, BBC, The Economist, an American author an Australian novelist and the entire board of Thailand’s Foreign Correspondents Club (FCC).

Attempts to publish details of Thaksin’s business dealings with Vajralongorn, meanwhile, have also resulted in lese majeste charges being brought by supporters of the Crown Prince. Over the years these supporters have been friends with Thaksin, who has carried what Vajralongorn lacked–popular support–while the Crown Prince in return held the key to royal circles.

A tie-up between the two would fill the missing gaps in each one’s resume. But, given the current depth of animosity, each would also risk alienating their traditional support base.

‘The monarchy is in turmoil and the future is uncertain,’ Chheang says. ‘Some people have even suggested a republic. So any relationship between Thaksin and the Crown Prince could be short term.’

The ramifications for the region could be enormous, with many believing the recent spats over Preah Vihear and Thaksin’s indulgence of Cambodia could prove to be little more than a side show to the main event. Those wishing to avoid an escalation therefore are suggesting Hun Sen back off or risk the situation getting out of hand.

A tumultuous showdown between the factions, whether at Preah Vihear or on the streets of Bangkok, would not please the vast majority of Cambodians or Thais who are struggling to make ends meet amid a depressing economic downturn.

One opinion poll in Thailand taken after Thaksin arrived in Cambodia found more than 60 percent of Thais favoured diplomatic and peaceful resolution to the dispute at Preah Vihear.

This correspondent’s view based on his conversations in Cambodia suggest any similar survey conducted here would probably find similar results–most would prefer to see cooler heads prevail.

But here, Hun Sen rules as a popularly elected dictator with little opposition and he holds the moral high ground. Cambodia is internationally recognised as the legitimate sovereign owner of Preah Vihear and it was the Thais who crossed the border and occupied the site.

Still, by attaching himself to Thaksin, Hun Sen may have overstepped the mark.

‘His contempt for Abhisit–who he apparently views as a metropolitan neo-Western acolyte with no business in the neighbourhood–may have coloured his judgement,’ Greenwood says.

‘Thaksin has absolutely no chance, in my view, of recovering his political mantle in Thailand. Apart from the legal issues involved, there have been sufficient warnings by ‘elements close to the military’ that there are those who would be willing to kill him if necessary.’