And although the overall size of the submarine fleet has shrunk significantly over the past two decades, the steep decline reflects the mass retirement of obsolete vessels. The concurrent influx of modern boats has, in fact, significantly boosted the proportion of advanced platforms in the inventory and these qualitative advantages should in theory more than compensate for the quantitative losses and preserve or enhance China’s combat power.
China has also introduced its next-generation fleet ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), which could soon be armed with long-range nuclear-tipped missiles capable of reaching the United States. According to the US Navy’s Office of Naval Intelligence, the Chinese will likely build five SSBNs to maintain a near-continuous presence at sea. Such a deployment pattern would contrast sharply with reports that China’s first and only SSBN never went on a single deterrent patrol after its debut in the late 1980s. Indeed, analysts had previously thought China would possess only two of these older submarines by 2010.
As a result of these advances, the Chinese navy seems poised to assume a respected position on the world stage, and moves over the past six months – Beijing’s deployment of an anti-piracy flotilla to the Gulf of Aden, its hosting of a naval parade and its announcement of plans to build aircraft carriers – have overturned the conventional wisdom that the creaky PLAN would remain feeble for decades.
Analysts changing their tune
Such incontrovertible evidence of progress has swayed those inclined to discount the PLA navy, and the about-face by some China-watchers has underscored the magnitude of the navy’s modernisation. Even previously sceptical analysts now acknowledge that:
China possesses the capacity to deny US naval access to waters several hundred miles off the mainland; Taiwan on its own is no longer a match for China due to a dramatic qualitative shift toward the mainland in the cross-strait military balance; A muscular China will be able to exert ‘hegemonic leverage’ over East Asian waters by the middle of the next decade; The time is already ripe to contemplate the PLA navy’s future extra-regional missions beyond those related to a Taiwan contingency.
Of course, previous assessments were not all wrong, and indeed were prescient in many important respects.
For a start, although the overall growth in force structure is certainly real, it still does not portend a radical shift in the regional balance of sea power. For the surface fleet in particular, the Chinese seem to be engaged in a methodical process of experimentation involving a few hulls across many ship types to gain technological proficiency and operational experience – there’s no evidence the PLA navy has settled on a ship design for mass production. That said, the West should keep its eye on any future decision by Beijing to put to sea a much larger batch of destroyers and frigates.
Second, the Chinese still have a long way to go in ’software’ areas such as combat readiness, training and education. The PLAN is still an untested force in the rigours of modern naval warfare and it’s anyone’s guess how the Chinese fleet would fare in real wartime conditions. Indeed on this point, China’s persistent unwillingness to engage in serious joint operations with other maritime counterparts beyond superficial port calls and exercises suggests a lack of confidence.
Third, the geographic scope of Chinese naval power is still somewhat limited, especially when compared with the global reach of the US Navy. The PLAN remains riveted to sea denial missions designed to contest American command of the seas along the East Asian littoral and China still lacks the capacity to assert sea control in the blue-water environment.
However, the PLA navy is already in a position to impose its will upon critical transport routes running through the China seas that are the lifeblood of the global economy. In other words, China already possesses the nautical tools to pose severe problems without ever having to catch up to the West.
It is clear, on balance, that China watchers missed many indicators that the Chinese navy was on the threshold of a major transformation and that sanguine conclusions and condescending attitudes persisted for years after the evidence suggested such complacency was misplaced. Policymakers in Washington and Asia would therefore do well to ask themselves some tough questions: What went wrong? Why was there such a chasm between earlier predictions and the actual evolution of Chinese naval power? Why did it take so long to revise outdated estimates?
Answering these uncomfortable questions will be essential lest they again misread Chinese naval developments and further undermine the prospects for regional maritime stability.
Reddit
Digg
StumbleUpon
Delicious
Technorati
Yahoo
Google
Plurk
kamoi
The fact that China is advancing militarily is evidence of the fact that “nothing is permanent except change” i.e. “change is constant”. Like in football, one team dominates over several seasons, then another takes over in the football league. That sounds more natural and should be expected.