If the Chinese are able to fully develop ballistic missiles, Beijing would, for the first time, be able to launch long-range (over 1600km) attacks against maritime targets direct from the mainland – a scenario the Pentagon is clearly taking seriously.
So under what circumstances would China create such a contested zone? A crisis or conflict over Taiwan would undoubtedly trigger attempts to deny US military access to the region. The Chinese fully expect Washington to call on its carriers should it ever decide to intervene in a cross-strait conflict, and recognise that aircraft carriers would play a crucial role in clearing the skies above and the seas around Taiwan of PLA forces. Beijing therefore plans to use the missile threat to deprive – or at least deter – the US of this option.
China’s calculus is an entirely rational response to past events. In 1996, Beijing lobbed missiles into waters near Taiwan to intimidate the island’s citizenry on the eve of a presidential election. However, the Chinese leadership learned to its dismay that the military was impotent when US President Bill Clinton responded with the dispatch of two carriers near the strait. That bitter lesson compelled the Chinese to redouble their efforts to avoid future embarrassment.
But Taiwan is not the only prize. The ‘China seas’ – the Yellow, East China and South China Seas – have long been regarded by Beijing as its offshore preserve. Heavy maritime traffic, driven by fellow Asian nations’ voracious appetite for Chinese goods, plied these waters in dynastic times. Indeed, these nautical thoroughfares were integral to the China-centric maritime order, which collapsed after the fleets of China’s last dynasty suffered humiliating reverses at the hands of Western imperial powers and Japan.
China’s capacity to influence events at sea with its missile force could thus buttress Beijing’s sense of entitlement over large bodies of Asian waters. Whether the Chinese would seek to employ its arsenal as an arbiter of US military presence in Asia remains to be seen. But that very possibility suggests that America’s undisputed dominance on the high seas and pre-eminent position in the region cannot be taken for granted.
Historical, strategic and operational considerations stimulate China’s pursuit of disruptive technologies at sea. We should therefore expect Beijing to lavish resources on its arsenal for the foreseeable future. The Chinese missile threat to maritime affairs is a real and growing one that is far more serious than the very distant problems that China’s carriers could ever pose.
Policymakers in Asia and Washington should therefore ignore the media hype surrounding Beijing’s blue-water aspirations and prepare for the less visible but more pressing missile challenge in the years ahead.
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Matt
Guam is part of the strategic triangle Guam Hawaii, Fiji whomever has control of that controls the Pacific. Now at present the US controls it, by controlling Guam and Hawaii and denying the PLA a base in Fiji. If the PLA goes ahead and establishes a base in Fiji behind Guam. The triangle becomes a dispute area. The US would also find themselves fighting on two flanks. Fiji is Guam but in reverse from the PLA view point I feel. The US doctrine is to contain another power from emerging in the Pacific, the PRC seeks the break that containment. Putting a PLA base behind Guam is a game changer, which can be achieved via soft power. But yes Guam is the key to the PRC opening up the Western Pacific. It is the strategic triangle that prevents and invasion of Australia via the Coral Sea. Once the triangle comes into dispute or the US are forced back to Hawaii that flank is exposed. The string of pearls while considered a defensive line or from the US view containable is actual an offensive line for the PRC to launch its running backs. The art of war is to build up for war without alerting you enemy you are doing it, the PLA could build six carriers now, but would further lead to an arms race and build up in SEA, the PLA seek to avoid that outcome. Also it is expensive to operate a carrier fleet, so the PLA will build them when they are ready, at present they will continue to train for carrier warfare on land based assets and via simulators. Indeed the PLA has built the fleet around carriers that are yet to be built. So while there is concern in relation to the PLA build up it is managed by the PLA in a risk management fashion. They do not want to alarm their quarry. The recent US/Japan war games were deceptive in location, the real objective is in fact Okinawa I believe. Once the reunification occurs between Taiwan and the mainland it is possible during conflict for the PRC to Island hop and seize this strategic asset. While the PLA do not seek to invade the Japanese mainland, they do seek to control the Islands.
Gary
The knight’s armour was discarded when gunpowder and guns came into play.
The large ships and aircraft carriers are also outdated by the new missiles.
We need small very fast composite unmanned surface vessels with remote controlled missiles that can be dropped into areas and triggered when needed.