Russian Roulette

February 02, 2009

By Medhi Chebil

Domestic divisions regarding diplomatic issues will most likely intensify. Kiev is actively trying to define Ukraine’s post-Soviet identity through its foreign policy alliances, and the NATO issue is not limited to a national security debate.

Yushchenko’s presidency has been marked by a bold reaffirmation of Ukrainian culture and identity distinct from its Russian neighbour. Major works of literature, textbooks and even Russian movies are being translated from Russian into Ukrainian, and the use of Ukrainian in government, education and the media is being enforced.

But a sizeable part of Ukraine’s 46 million-strong population – of whom 17 per cent are actually ethnic Russians – doesn’t readily identify with Ukrainian culture and feels alienated by the compulsory changes: ‘We read Russian books and magazines, we watch Russian TV soaps and movies, we listen to Russian radio… We didn’t become Ukrainian overnight with independence. We just want to keep and save our identity,’ argues Larissa Chulkova, an official from the Party of Regions.

Ukrainian nationalists, on the other hand, are convinced such restrictive policies are necessary.

‘In more than 300 years of Russian imperial history, the Ukrainian language has been discriminated [against]. If we don’t support it, it will disappear. The situation of the Russian language is different, as it has support from a big country,’ claims Crimean MP and Yushchenko supporter Leonid Pilunskiy.

Ukraine’s history – notably Holodomor, the ‘Great Famine’ that killed some 3.5 million Ukrainians in 1933 – is also being exploited for political gain both by pro-Russians and Ukrainian nationalists. The latter – who frequently exaggerate the number of victims – regard Stalin’s actions as premeditated mass murder in response to Ukraine resisting Soviet imperialism, while the former emphasise the fact that the catastrophe affected several regions in Belarus and Russia itself, and refute that the famine was planned on ethnic lines.

‘The history of Ukraine is false, those are only myths written in the last 15 years to portray Russia as an enemy of the Ukrainian people,’ says Larissa Chulkova. ‘Despite the famine, Ukraine became one of the most developed Soviet Republics. Because of its border with Europe, it was the face and the visiting card of the Soviet Union.’

To Ukrainian nationalists, joining NATO would be the ultimate assertion of independence from Russia, the ‘evil empire’ bent on controlling Ukraine. Yet such an act could well trigger secessionist conflict in the southern Crimean Peninsula. Crimea only became Ukrainian territory in 1954 when Soviet president Nikita Khrushchev retroceded a region that had been part of Russia since Catherine the Great wrested it from the Ottoman empire in 1783.

Black Sea Fleet remains crucial

Nowadays, Crimea is the only region of Ukraine where ethnic Russians outnumber Ukrainians (by more than two to one), and the prevailing mood is unmistakeably pro-Moscow, making the ‘culture wars’ and opposition to NATO more intense than anywhere else in the country.

‘Russia understands it can’t invade Crimea by force, as they did in Abkhazia or Chechnya, so they try to annex Crimea by using Russian language and culture,’ says Leonid Pilunskiy, deliberately recalling Moscow’s tactics in the breakaway regions of Georgia, where distribution of passports to ethnic Russians, followed by financial and political backing, gave the Kremlin a convenient excuse to rush to the defence of ‘its’ citizens in a sovereign country. Pilunskiy adds that while there is no sign of a mass distribution of Russian passports in Crimea, he is worried about Crimean officials holding dual citizenship.