This particular issue was the elephant in the room in Vilnius. Minister after Minister took the opportunity to re-state their country’s commitment to the Afghanistan project. Some smaller countries announced or re-announced recent decisions to do more. But the silence of some of the larger NATO countries on this issue was deafening. If that silence extends beyond Bucharest, I fear for the future of the Afghanistan mission.
Success will require more troops with greater flexibility, better coordination, and a greater focus on non-military initiatives. ISAF soldiers are doing their bit and it is time their political masters ensured that a coherent strategy was in place to guarantee long-term success in Afghanistan.
There are encouraging signs that NATO members are coming to accept that more needs to be done. Post-Vilnius, I am hopeful that NATO’s Bucharest meeting in April will produce a new document which both recognises the current campaign’s short-comings and recommends solutions. However, the proof is always in the implementation. For example, acknowledging more troops are needed is one thing. Securing additional commitment is another.
New directions are needed in at least two areas. First, those NATO countries which are not pulling their weight need to provide more troops and remove the caveats attached to their mission which restricts what their troops can do and where they can do it. Without sufficient security we cannot succeed in Afghanistan.
NATO and its allies, including Australia, have around 50,000 troops in Afghanistan. By contrast, in Iraq, a country roughly two-thirds the size of Afghanistan, 170,000 US and other foreign military personnel are working to bed down democracy. Allied forces in Kosovo, an area less than 2 per cent the size of Afghanistan, peaked at 50,000 during the KFOR [Kosovo Force] Operations in the late 1990s. While the circumstances and challenges in Afghanistan are different to those in Iraq and Kosovo, the contrast in numbers is stark.
The commitment of NATO countries varies. The United States, Canada, The Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, and other countries are making vital contributions. Other NATO members are contributing to the extent they are able. There is a growing consensus that some countries remain unwilling to make hard choices and more substantial contributions. Their reasons are varied and sometimes understandable: many have already lost people and face strong pressure within their domestic constituencies. However, we support the view that ISAF is a NATO-led force and NATO has the responsibilities to provide appropriate troops as part of its leadership mission in Afghanistan.
NATO has identified the need for some 7,000 additional troops for combat and training support. Despite this, there have not been adequate contributions from the alliance’s combined 3.8 million military personnel. NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, has publicly stated that those NATO members “who perhaps are doing less in Afghanistan should think: Shouldn’t we do more?” The Secretary General went on to acknowledge that: “There are certainly a number of [NATO] allies who can do more”. At Vilnius, I pointed out that the failure of some NATO countries to pull their weight is putting pressure on countries like Australia which are heavily committed with numerous deployments around the globe.
The United States has recently announced the temporary deployment of around 3,200 marines to confront the anticipated upsurge in violence after the winter period. Poland, which is already making a significant contribution, has pledged around 400 more troops. The announcement that Germany would be providing soldiers for a Quick Reaction Force in Afghanistan is also a positive development.
Second, blurred lines of command are a barrier to success and greater coherence will be necessary to achieve the greatest effect with those forces at ISAF’s disposal.
Third, we must do more on the non-military side and better coordinate military, civil and political initiatives. Concerted military efforts in the absence of a broader strategy is a recipe for failure.
Fourth, both the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police lack the critical mass required to hold the gains ISAF forces make and in the longer term, the ability to maintain the rule of law in the war-weary country.
ISAF forces are busy disrupting Taliban activities and denying the insurgents safe haven and sanctuary. This improves the overall security in the region by denying the insurgents the opportunity to plan and prepare for attacks. But our collective forces are growing tired of clearing areas of insurgents only to have them return because the Afghan security forces do not have the strength to hold them.
Fifth, new strategies are urgently needed to stem the growth of Afghanistan’s opium trade. Current counter narcotics efforts need to be enhanced. Eradication programs are currently poorly targeted which could have the effect of punishing impoverished sections of the Afghan community, while wealthy producers have often avoided destruction of their crops. International counter narcotics programs often overlap and can be counter-productive when poorly conceived eradication drives up the price of opium, or leaves poor farmers with little choice but to join the insurgents. As a consequence, Afghan opium production continues to grow and now accounts for over 90 per cent of global illicit output. This growth has occurred despite the many millions of dollars spent by the international community to counter it. The failure to counter the narcotics industry is seriously undermining the international effort, and damages the credibility of the Afghan Government. Worse, the opium trade fuels the insurgency through a steady flow of funding.
The sixth point is about economic development more generally. Democracy cannot function without a viable economy. Greater efforts are needed to accelerate the various programs designed to stimulate economic development.
The seventh area is governance and the establishment of a fully functioning and robust justice system. Crime and corruption are the cancers of the democratic project. Again, efforts are being made, but much more needs to be done.
The eighth area is aid. Partners to the Afghanistan project need to consider the additional return they will receive for their aid investment if it reaches the critical levels required to ensure long-term success. It may be much cheaper than sustaining military efforts for decades to come.
Ninth is the overall coordination of all these activities and initiatives. The search to find a special envoy to coordinate these efforts is a worthy one. Yet producing this person seems to be elusive. President Karzai’s rejection of Paddy Ashdown is a disappointing set-back but a new player must be found soon.
Many will say that substantial work is already being done in each of the areas I’ve identified. That is true. But is it enough? Is the test the current rate of progress?
In Vilnius, work continued on the development of a new strategic, coordinated and holistic approach. The good news is that the areas requiring improvement have been identified. There are signs that greater progress will come soon. We all know what we want for Afghanistan, its people and for the safety and security of our own people. The war in Afghanistan is winnable. The real war lies in securing consensus on how to get there.
The Hon Joel Fitzgibbon is Australian Minister of Defence
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